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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with empirical inquiries into messages, 
particularly with scientific attempts to assess what messages may convey 
within a social communication process and how information carried by 
such messages may be measured. 
The advent of the mas s media of .communication has directed 
attention to the social significance of communication·processes by 
making changes in social structures dependent on and visible through 
these media. Their reliance on modern communication technology has, 
moreover, prompted the coping with complex communication networks 
from an engineering or design point of view. Numerous social organ-, 
izations being dependent on knowledge which makes the flow of infor-
mation more effective have favored the generation of such knowledge. 
Yet, very little has been developed in the way of a general theory of 
messages and much less in the way of systematic methodologies for 
empirical inquiries into their nature. 
Cybernetics is perhaps the most recent and certainly the most 
profound approach to the study of communication processes in rela-
tivelylarge and complex systems. It is the science of communication 
and control in all possible organizations irrespective of their mate-
riality (12) (13) (209) (211). The abstract nature of the knowledge 
which this diSCipline aims to develop accounts for the fact that it has 
stimulated such divergent activities as the design of communication 
facilities, the development of electronic computers, the installation 
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of automatic defence systems, the organization of libraries, social plan-
ning and the design of automatic government as well as scientific inquiries 
into biological and social systems. 
Although the social exchange of messages is much older than its 
reliance on technical means of communication, the point of view of 
"cybernetics" suggests, as Deutsch put it, "that all organizations are 
alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization 
is held together by communication .... it is communication, that is, 
the ability to transmit mes sages and to react to them,. that makes or-
ganizations; and it seems that this is true of organizations of living 
cells in the human body as well as of organizations of pieces of machin-
ery in an electronic calculator, as well as of organizations of thinking 
human beings in social groups" (50:77). 
One of the communication phenomena for which cybernetics 
has not offered adequate explications is the psychologically and socio-
logically relevant attribute of signals: "meaning." This is not at all 
surprising considering the fact that numerous philosophers have 
struggled for centuries with the problems of meaning, content, sym-
bol and consciousness neither reaching an agreement as to an 
acceptable definition of the terms, nor providing adequate operational 
procedures for the empirical specificatiO)l of the phenomena associated 
with them. Some have radically rejected certain problems of meaning 
as "meaningless, " others have produced volumes of verbalizations 
making it almost impossible to filter out some true generalizations 
which may be helpful in assessing such message characteristics in a 
social context. 
Such a state of knowledge seems to be all the more dissatisfy-
ing as even common sense suggests that signals such as black and 
white dots on paper, irregular sound patterns, or punched holes in 
IBM cards are relatively insignificant to the human sender and/ or 
receiver unless he is able to interpret them in certain meaningful 
ways .. It is not the physical signals but the conveyed symbolic content 
that moves people; not the carriers of a message but the ideas 
"behind" them that structures individuals into certain organizational 
forms. Social scientists while basically being in agreement with the 
cybernetic emphasis' on communication in society maintain that the 
most signific:;ant form of human communication is through some kind 
of symbol, symbol structure or message that means something to the 
interacting individuals or social groups. "Ideas are expressed by 
symbols," says Lasswell, "their manifest formis nothing more than 
a conglomeration of symbols .... Symbols are to a culture as money 
is to an economy" (113:65). 
Inquiries into the meaning of literary works, into the symbols 
contained in verbal Or non-verbal human expression or into the major 
ideas that dominate the thinking of particular periods in time, are 
of course no novelty in the humanities. But·the recent awareness of 
the social significance of these message characteristics together with 
the advancement of empirical methodology have favored inquiries of a 
iii 
different kind. Systell1atic and ell1pirical studies of what ll1essages 
actually convey have becoll1eproll1inent with the increasing dOll1inance 
of the ll1aSS ll1edia of COll1ll1unication, particularly within the last few 
decades. Such investigative attell1pts have been subsull1ed under the 
label "content analysis" and are today considered the prill1ary re-
search tool of cOll1ll1unications research. "The technique, " as Kaplan 
puts it briefly, "attell1pts to characterize the ll1eanings in a given 
body of discourse in a systell1atic and quantitative fashion" (96:230), 
and has by and large been associated with the study of the ll1ass ll1edia. 
Although an ever increasing volull1e of literature is devoted to such 
studies there has hardly been a contribution to a theory of ll1essages 
or a cOll1prehensive theoretical frall1ework for inquiries into their 
content. 
To fill this gapwhicl::t has been noted in abstract theoretical 
as well as down-to-earth ell1pirical dealings with the subject, it is 
conceivable to add another ell1pirical investigation to the volUll1e 
available in the literature. It is also conceivable to postulate a 
theory of ll1essage content that seell1S to be intuitively satisfactory 
and consistent with SOll1e other already established theories of the 
cOll1ll1unication process, thereby losing th,e ell1pirical touch which 
this interest in ll1essages has heretofore had. We therefore wish 
to take the ell1pirical inquiries into the content of cOll1ll1unications 
thell1selves as the raw data of our analysis. In this way we ll1ay not 
be able to forll1ulate a theory that could be deduced froll1 the 
iv 
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fundamental postulates of cybernetics, for example; we may not be able 
to say very much about the way particular individuals or social groups 
recruit the meanings to given physical objects of exchange; but we could 
abstract, and develop a theoretical framework for, the empirical in-
quiry into message content and answer such questions as to the 'suitable 
goal of such analyses and as to the investigative tools needed to accom-
plish such inquiries. Although we are very much concerned with socially 
significant messages, we do not wish to be limited by this empirical 
domain and therefore aim to include examples of inquiries into mes sages 
from other domains as well. 
Chapter One attempts to give a historical sketch of studies .con-
ducted under the name of content analysis. In this way the scope of the 
empirical concern of content analysis is introduced. 
Chapter Two then aims at a critical examination of this mode 
of inquiry focus sing on the definitional is sues, on critical points con-
cerning scientific methodology, and on the relevance of conceivable 
research results to a theory of communication. 
Chapter Three presents ten examples of inquiries into messages 
which will provide much of the basic data for subsequent elaborations. 
The examples deliberately include relatively extreme situations of 
analysis for it is believed that if inquiries are somewhat removed from 
obvious intuitive interpretations then they tend to exhibit more clearly 
what is required of an analyst when he attempts to empirically assess 
the content of given messages. 
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Consistent with our aim at formulating a general framework for 
the analysis of given data as messages, it is believed that all messages 
are alike in certain fundamental characteristics. Chapter Four there-
fore takes the ten working examples as a basis for discovering and 
formulating the investigative goal that all such inquiries presumably 
have in COIllITlOn. 
Taking the results obtained in Chapter Four, Chapter Five tries 
to formalize a concept of information pertaining to message analysis 
and suggests a measure and a calculus for quantities of such informa-
tion. In terms of this calculus the goal of mes sage analysis is stated 
more concisely than in Chapter Four. Some of its meaSUl:es are 
demonstrated on one of the examples introduced in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Six discusses some of the essential procedures which 
are required for treating given data as mes sages. It is an attempt to 
operationally describe observational prerequisites, investigative 
methods and evaluative criteria for assessing what messages convey 
. to an analyst. The basic procedures are outlined and their empirical 
problems are discussed drawing again heavily on pJ;"actical examples 
of inquiries into messages. 
Chapter Seven then extends the notions developed in Chapter 
Five to include some of the aspects that have been discussed in 
Chapter Six. In particular, a quantitative measure for the content 
of a message is introduced and related to the informational limitations 
inherent in this mode of inquiry. 
Concerned with the investigative possibility of the content of 
messages of any kind, the work does not suggest a general theory of 
communication on this level. If it clarifies the issues of empirical 
inquiries into message content, it lays perhaps the foundation of such 
vii 
a theory as it would be the ultimate aim of a cybernetic "durch-
musterung" of social-organizational phenomena. But the work does 
suggest, although not as its primary aim, a general theory of infor-
mation which may be more relevant in the social sciences than Shannon's 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A BRJEF HISTOR Y OF CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The following is an attempt to sketch the historical development 
of a particular form of empirical inquiries into messages and their con-
tents. Although SOme very early incidents of very similar inquiries 
have. been discovered, it will be shown that the evolution of investigative 
methods for such analyses dates only from the beginning of the twentieth 
century and is a predominantly North American contribution. 
The currently most widely accepted term for systematic in-
quiries into communications is "content analysis." It emerged in the 
1940's. But its first appearance in Webster's Dictionary of the English 
Language did not Occur until the third edition, in 1961, where it is 
characterized as "a detailed study and analysis of various types of com-
munication (as newspapers, radio programs, and propaganda films) 
through a classification, tabulation and evaluation of the key symbols 
and themes in order to ascertain their meanings and probable effects" 
(204:492) . 
The most striking evidence for the recency of this mode of in-
quiry can be found by examining the literature on content analysis 
itself. If one starts, for example, from the currently available pub-
lications on the subject as roughly described above and traces explicit 
references to literature cited in such publications, a web of citation 
links is revealed that indicates information flow from the past. Many 
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original sources appear around the 1920' s but none date back further than 
1893. 
This web of citations fu:rther reveals an apparent increase of 
density over time: as publication dates lie further back, fewer refer-
ences can be noted and the number of publications, either making use 
of the method or being otherwise concerned with it has steadily increo,sed. 
As early as 1948, Berelson and Lazarsfeld noted, in an account of the 
state of the art, that "the output of content analysis studies has doubled 
in every five-year interval over the past twenty years" (30:9). Barcus 
(20) who undertook the task of surveying over 1700 titles concerned with 
content analysis between 1900 and 1958 found this trend still continuing. 
During the first two decades of this century 51 studies were 
published. This figure rose to 119 during the 1920s to 199 during the 
1930s to 334 studies during the 1940s and further increased to 654 
studies during the period between 1950-1958 (20: 81). It is interesting 
to note that litero,tu:re devoted to methodological considerations of con-
tent analysis, which indicates awareness :regarding the instrumental 
character of this mode of investigaUon, follows a similar trend, being 
equally "explosive" though of a later origin. During the first two 
decades just one such study was published; during the next three decades 
respectively 14, 15, 73 studies were published and rose to 141 during 
the 1950-1958 period (20:79). The volume of currently published studies 
concerning content analysis seems to be expanding further. 
3 
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Compared with the growth rates of publications in other fields of 
scientific inquiry, the expansion of content analysis literature appears 
quite normal. Studying the development of publication figures in various 
branches of knowledge Price (165:92-124) argues that the "law of ex-
ponential increase" is a common characteristic of unrestricted scientific 
developments. It is the necessary consequence of cumulative use of 
information customary in institutions such as science. Smoothing and 
extrapolating the known publication figures supports the conjecture that 
the temporal origin of this cumulative growth lies around 1900. 
Prehistory and Marginal Developments 
And yet, much of the terminology and thinking that permeates 
contemporary discourses about communications is undoubtedly older, 
most frequently of Greek origin. Many scholars refer to such well 
known works as Aristotle's Rhetorica, his De Poetica or Cicero's 
De Oratore in'order to point out the apparent age of the problems that 
discourses about communications tend to be concerned with. But, 
these inherited conceptual frameworks largely remain systems of 
ideas. Such ideas had considerable normative implications concerning 
appropriate oratory styles, correct human reasoning and logic, for 
example, but hardly lend themselves to systematic validation. More-
over, such systems did little to explain processes of interaction 
through messages called communication. 
On the other hand it is true that highly reliable quantitative 
descriptions of written text have already been known to the Masoretes 
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who, after the destruction of the Jewish state in A. D. 70, devoted them-
selves to preserving the text of the Bible by counting verses, words, etc. 
As Yule points out such enumerations are presumed to have been used to 
detect writing errors efficiently Or to assess the required efforts of copy-
ingthe text (217:7-8). But these quantifications had little to do with the 
charactedstics of messages; other non.,communicative objects could 
have been subjected to the same form of descripti"n. 
It took the invention of the printing press to develop a critical 
awareness concerning the nature of written materials, their "powers" 
and their "dangers." According to Groth (79) it was not before the 
middle of the seventeenth century that university professors are re-
ported to have made use of newspaper clippings in their lectures on 
civics, geography and other topics. Concurrently a few "Zeitungs-
Kollegien" (newspaper seminars) were founded at some German uni-
versities discovering some typical features of messages which had 
consistently been overlooked when written communication was either 
a more personal matter or a way of standardizing religious belief. 
The earliest doctoral dissertations about newspapers date back to 
1690, 1695, and 1699. They were written to obtain degrees in theology, 
a disc'ipline that became interested in the dissemination and content of 
newspapers because of their presumed effects, but dealt with the sub-
ject mainly in moralizing terms (79:26). 
Historians in general and literary historians in particular are 
almost exclusively concerned with information from the past transmitted 
• 
to the present in some written form. Considering the peculiarities of 
historian's data and the age of this profession, it is surprising to learn 
that the awareness of the message characteristics of such data is only 
a very recent phenomena. According to Garfield l it was as late as the 
middle of the nineteenth century that von Ranke made the "document" 
a technical term in inquiries into history. Before, history had been 
transmitted merely as "a kind of fairy tale." Only since then have 
historians been concerned with such problems as detecting corrupt 
texts, deciding among competing attributions of authorship, arriving 
at the time order in which wOJ;'ks were composed, determining the 
sources relied upon by an author, and inferring historical events from 
eyewitness reports, social records, and biographies, "-all problems 
which are very closely related to those of a communications analyst. 
The first well-documented case of a quantitative analysis of 
printed material as messages sterns from eighteen century Sweden. 
Dovring (55) (56) describes some of the crude quantitative comparisons 
that were made to deter>mine whether a collection of hymns was the 
carrier of a religious sect's "dangerous thoughts" suspected by the 
clergy to undermine the Swedish state and orthodox church. 
And yet, although these few incidents of analy:z;ing message 
characteristics mOre or less systematically clearly presuppose some 
rudimentary understanding.of the nature of communication processes 
in society, they were discovered only recently, did not enter the 
lEugene Garfield, personal communication to the author. 
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content analytic literature and had little effect on current methodological 
developments. However indicative of the increasing awareness concern-
ing messages, such unrelated incidents maybe considered pre-historical 
to the study of communications as pursued today. 
Outside the United States the first empirical investigation of news-
paper content seems to have appeared in France during the Dreyfus affair 
in which the press was presumed to play amajpr role. A few. years later, 
the study was repeated in Berlin to obtain comparative data (143: 1 74-176). 
And although such interstimulation of investigations was originally quite 
evident, at this early time a cumulative growth of publications compar-
able to that of the American development did not occur. As early as 
1903 a book by LobI entitled Kultur und Presse (121) suggested an elab-
orate classification scheme for analyzing the "inner structure of content" 
according to the social functions newspapers perform. But the book, 
although influential in journalistic circles, did not give birth to the 
empirical investigations it held in its womb. 
One of the most prominent European proponents of a systematic 
analysis of press contents was Mal< Weber who, at the first meeting of 
the German Sociological Society in 1910, laid down the design of a 
thorough sociological investigation. As a social scientist he explicitly 
rejected such problems as "what should be made public" as suitable for 
analysis. He rather wished to ascertain the historical changes of the 
convictions concerning such public issues, what "Weltanschauungen" 
underliechanges in those media, and what power structure produces 
8 
the specific newspaper publicity. His specific questions were essentially 
questions of content analysis: What are the information sources of the 
newspapers and how is the material presented? What habits do news-
papers foster? How do they influence the "super individual cultural 
objects "? What kinds of mas s beliefs and mass hopes are created and 
destroyed? 
Suggesting that the investigation exploit the newspaper content 
itself, he said 
"we will have to start measuring, plainly speaking, in 
a pedestrian way, with the scissors and the compass, 
how the contents of the newspapers has quantitatively 
shifted in the course of the last generation, ... between 
feuilleton and editorial, between editorial and news, 
between what is presented as news and what is no 
longer offered ... and from these quantitative results 
we have to move toward qualitative ones. We have to 
pursue the .style of presentation of the paper, the way 
in which similar problems are treated inside and out-
side the papers, the apparent expression of emotions 
in the papers, ... " (203: 52). 
In this way, Weber hoped to analyze the ideological basis, organization 
and power distribution in the press that may account for newspaper con-
tents. He secured funds for the proposed research project but the 
scientific climate was unfavorable to such empirical approaches and the 
study was never carried out. 
A third example of early European developments is Markov's 
statistical analysis of a sample of Pushkin' s novel in verse Eugene 
One gin from which he developed a theory of chains of symbols (126 
c. f. 137:423). This work was published in 1913, was revived only in 1948 
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through Shannon's work oninforInation theory (175) and produced no iIn-
pact on content analysis until 1955 when Osgood undertook his contingency 
analysis (147). 
Whether the total lack of references in the content analysis 
literature to such earlier European approaches with their cOInparatively 
Inuch stronger theoretical bases indicates that their work was not con-
sidered content analysis or whether it indicates relatively little COIn-
Inu)1ication between the two continents, the fact reInains that the early 
European work had .little influence on the evolution of the Inethod in 
North AInerica. 
In view of the voluIninous AInerican literature on content analysis 
now available and the multiplicity of'viewpoints that can be imposed to 
structure it, the evolution of this Inode of inquiry cannot be presented 
along a single dimension. Perhaps the most fruitful way of showing the 
changes that occurred during the life of content analysis is a differentia-
tion of a few developmental phases during which particular disciplines 
dominated in their attemptsto solve particular social problems to which 
con;ent analysis was believed to be instrumental. These stages, to be 
distinguished below, may be called: quantitative newspaper analysis, 
mass comInunications research, propaganda analysis, interdisciplinary 
expansion, and computer text analysis. 
Quantitative Newspaper Analysis 
The earliest studies making use of what was then called "quanti-
tative newspaper analysis" were alInost exclusively made by journalists 
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and used to substantiate evaluative judgments concerning press perform-
ance. By and large such studies employed straight subject matter cate-
gories and. compared the volume of print in each. Probably the first 
analysis, pUblished in 1893, asked the rhetorical question "do newspapers 
now give the news?" (184). The author showed how religion, scientific 
and literary matters had dropped out of leading New York newspapers 
between 1881-1893 in favor of gossip, sports, and scandals. A similar 
study attempted to reveal the overwhelming space devoted to "demoraliz-
ing," l1unwholesorne'l and r'trivial" matters as opposed to !'worthwhile!! 
news items (128). 
By simply measuring the column inches a newspaper devoted to 
particular subject matters journalists attempted to reveal "the truth 
about newspapers" (192), believed they had found a means of showing 
the profit motive as the cause of "cheap yellow journalism" with its 
emphasis on sensationalism (212), were convinced that they had estab-
lished "the influence of newspaper presentations on the growth of crime 
and other antisocial activity" (62), or concluded that a "quarteLccentury 
survey of the press content shows demand for facts" (205). Such uses 
• 
to which quantitative newspaper analysis was put during this phase re-
o 
flects the transition of the press from a public service for the educated 
few to an economic enterprise seeking to attract masses of readerI'. 
The social consequences of such a transition were felt threatening. 
Barcus, who tabulated the literature on content analysis in 
·.various ways, found that the concern with typical journalistic topics, 
11 
i. e., evaluations of press performance, media inventories and compar-
isons, took up SO percent of all studies made during the first thirty years 
of this century. 
Naturally, thes\" early studies which were predominantly geared 
toward evaluations of pres.s performance indicate the high emotional in-
volvement of journalists with their own medium" but are methodologically 
rarely satisfactory. If the conclusions were not formed before actual 
counts were undertaken, their simple subject matter categories tended 
to be implicitly biased toward intended evaluative judgments. Most of 
the results would hardly withstand critical examination. When reviewing 
these early quantitative studies on<e cannot help getting the impression 
that they were largely the product of the apparent power simple statistics 
or numerical expression could (and perhaps still can) bestow upon a 
primarily public argument. 
This time period is also marked by the growth of journalism 
schools and their original concern with establishing the ideological 
bases of the journalistic profession and solving juridicial problems of 
the press. Much of quantitative newspaper analysis was influenced by 
the School of Journali.sm at Columbia University where investigations 
began to turn away from serving immediate objectives of press critic-
ism. Already. in 1912 the Columbia University Professor Tenney 
advocated a more global "scientific analysis of the press. " He argued: 
"why should not society study its own methods of produc-
ing .its various varieties of thinking by establishing a ... 
careful system of bookkeeping? What is needed, .. , is 
the continuous analysis of a large number of journals ... 
the records in themselves would constitute a series 
of observations of the 'social weather' comparable in 
accuracy to the statistics of the United States Weather 
Bureau" (195: 896-898). 
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The practical difficulties were too great for suchan idea to be realized, 
but various large scale descriptions of newspaper content were stim-
ulatedand these culminated in such studies as Willey's analysis of "The 
Country Newspaper" (213) published in 1926. 
While a few journalism schools became mouthpieces for the kinds 
of studies mentioned above, the work which was done during the first 
three decades of this century remained largely that of single journalists 
of small prominence without theoretical foundation and without attempts 
at scientific generalizations. By tl;J.e end of the 1920's, quantitative news-
paper analysis as an approach to content analysis was essentially ex-
hausted. 
Mass Communications Research 
The second phase of content analysis may be said to be due to 
at l~ast three independent developments. There was first the intro-
duction of new and more powerful media of communication such as 
film, and more importantly, radio. The technical development of such 
media, their rapidly growing popularity and their already appearant 
social consequences quickly escaped journalistic understanding and 
control. 
Secondly, during the time period following the economic crisis 
- a time period of socio-psychological insecurity, political instability 
13 
and ideological struggles - the free political and economic exploitation 
of the public media of communication by big organizations was felt to 
be a serious threat to traditional individual and public values. Attempts 
to overcome the consequences of this crisis, culminating in the New 
Deal programs, assigned a major role to the new mass media. 
Thirdly, the social sciences just started to be ready to extend 
their theoretical frameworks and empirical methods of inquiry to such 
multidisciplinary problems as the mass media of communication seemed 
to pose. 
For example, sociology started to make extensive use of survey 
research and public opinion polling. The experiences gained in analyz-
ing public opinion gave rise to the first serious consideration of method-
ological problems of content analysis by Woodward, entitled "Quanti-
tative Newspaper Analysis as a Technique of Opinion Research" (2lS). 
From writings about public opinion, interests in something 
like social "stereotypes" (122:9S f£) entered the analysis of communi-
cations in vario1,ls ways. Questions such as, how Negroes we;r:e pre-
sented in the Philadelphia press (179); how the United States presented 
her wars in her history textbooks as compared to versions advanced 
by her former enemies (l99); or how nationalism was expressed in 
American, British and other European children's books (127) 
now assumed importance. 
.' 
One of the most important concepts that emerged in psychology 
, 
during this time was that of "attitude." It suggested the association 
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of su.bject matter categories with such evaluative dimensions as "pt:o-con" 
or "favorable-unfavorable." In a situation of widely spread social and 
political struggles, the detection of hidden biases or partisanship toward 
one or another party of a controver"y were felt to be important. Quanti-
tative assessments of such biases led to various communication stand-
ards which -' proposed by investigators -appealed to such rational' ideals 
as "objectivity, " "fairness, " and "balance." Among such explicit stand-
ards Janis and Fadner's "Coefficient of Imbalance" (93) deserves 
mention. (The, coefficient is a statistical index of the degree to which 
favorable and unfavorable references to an issue cancel each other out 
within some body of text). 
Psychological experiments in' rumor transmis sion led Allport 
and Fadner to study newspaper content from an entirely new point of 
view. Their "Five tentative laws of the psychology of newspapers" 
(7) attempted to account for the transformations that information under-
goes as it travels through an institution and finally appears on the 
printed page. 
Political science with it"interest in political symbols added 
another feature to the analysis of public messages. McDiarmid, for 
example, analyzed thirty U, S. presidential inaugural addresses in 
terms of symbols of national identity, of historical reference, of 
reference to fundamental concepts of government, and of fact and 
expectations (131). Above all Lasswell, viewing communication 
problems within his psychoanalytical theory of politics introduced 
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many new perspectives to such studies. In an early attempt to classify 
symbol data (107) he suggested such categories as "self" and "others," 
forms of "indulgence" and "deprivation," etc. His symbol analysis led 
to a "world attention survey" (108) in which trends in the frequencies of 
national symbols were compared for several major national newspapers. 
In the course of radio and press competition the Office of Radio 
Research was founded at Princeton University which paid much attention 
to the effects of cornrnunica,tion. La,zarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 
to cite only one example, used the 1940 U. S. presidential election to 
relate mass media content to "how the voter maJ<:es up his mind" (114). 
Several disciplines studied their own trends in scholarship as 
reflected in the contents of representative journals. This was probably 
first done in Russia regardiJ;lg physics (166) but most thoroughly in the 
field of sociology (24) (25) (174) and recently also in journalism (193). 
While many social sciences contributed to the scope of analysis 
during the late 30's,attention of content analysts was increasingly 
focused on studies of propaganda:, identifying its principles, revealing 
manipulative intents and disclosing foreign propaganda sources in the 
United States. This interest goes back to Lasswell's pioneering 
analysis of goals in World War I propa,gal;lda and his attempt at evaluat-
ing the techniques employed by the opposing powers (106). Foster's 
study of "hoW America became belligerent" (66) reflects the then 
popular belief that the United States was drawn into the war against 
her will. Federa,! courts requested content analyses to disclose 
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propaganda agencies in this country and accepted their results as evidence 
(111). In a comparative study of British and German radio broadcasts to 
the United States during 1940 Bruner identified nine dimensions for de-
scribing political propaganda (36). Increased concern with propaganda 
stimulated the emergence of research centers with attempts at public en-
lightenment. Among them the Institute for Propaganda Research, did 
much to popularize so-called "tricks of the trade" Or propaganda devices 
(88) on the assumption that people would resist propaganda if they were 
familiar with its techniques. Lee and Lee's study of Father Coughlin's 
speeches (116) may be cited as an example of the explanation toward 
which these devices lend itself. With the outbreak of World War II this 
institute ceased to exist. 
In Barcus' tabulation of co.ntent analysis literature this second 
phase of content analysis showed dominant emphasis on social values 
and problems other than those directly associated with press perform-
ance in the narrower sense. Indeed 60 percent of the content analysis 
publications between 1930 and the·outbreak of the Second World War 
are concerned with studies of race, social prejudice, value implications 
of motion pictures, standards of morality and propaganda; in short, 
with the expression of social values in the mass media. 
Characteristic of this second phase of content analysis is fur-
thermore that eminent social scientists entered the public debate. 
While accepting many of the social problems that had been identified 
by journalists and cultural critics, attempts were made to empirically 
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verify some of the propositions that were more Or less believed in. How-
ever, many results were not encouraging. But, investigating mass 
communications systematically, more complex structures of message 
characteristics became recognizable and identifiable, structures that 
had some theoretical significance in the social sciences and could be 
studied empirically. Attitudes, stereotypes, styles, political symbols, 
values and propaganda devices simply escaped the crude measurements 
of newspaper content along subject matter categories so typical for the 
first developmental phase of this investigative tool. 
When this technique of analysis was applied to various media 
other than the newspaper, such as books, radio programs, films, 
political speeches, conversation, objects of art, and cartoons; the 
original term "quantitative newspaper analysis" became "content 
analysis." The change of name did not result in a clearer definition 
of the technique. 
Propaganda Analysis 
The third phase of content analysis began with an ended 
shortly after the American involvement in the second world war. 
The mere characterization of the mass media of communication, 
radio in particular, as powerful agents of molding public opinion 
and mobilizing large populations toward political ends was not enough. 
But, such characterizations suggested their possible contribution to 
the war efforts in several ways: domestic propaganda and promotional 
activities had to be made more effective; psychological warfare directed 
toward enemy nations had to be planned; and systematic attempts of 
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extracting intelligence from foreign broadcast had to be organized. Such 
needs favored the establishme.nt of large research organizations and in 
turn the development of new methods. 
In 1941 a "research project on totalitarian communication" began 
its work at the New School for Social Research. "Supported by one of 
the large foundations, it was assigned to develop methods for the study 
of enemy propaganda and to train American social scientists for pro-
spective government work in this field. The work of the project was to 
be mainly concerned with propaganda by radio, the importance of which 
was highlighted by the experience of the war in Europe (I03:v). 
One of the directors, Hans Speier, later resumed responsibilities 
at the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, a rese"rch operation with the principal task of 
monitoring, analyzing and reporting on broadcasts from other countries. 
This cooperation of notable social scientists offered'unprecedented 
opportunities to advance the methods of content analysis. Whether 
some newspaper is biased toward one side of a controvlOrsy or whether 
some speaker can be labeled a propagandist became rather irrelevant 
in this context except when such knowledge could be used to draw 
specific inferences to the antecedent conditions of communications or 
to give evidential support to predictions concerning planned political 
Or military actions of interest to policy makers. 
While content analysis in previous years had been essentially 
a descriptive technique, the most notable contribution of these war 
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years was a demonstration of the potential inductive use of this mode of 
inquiry. Indeed, George (71), who later evaluated the performance of 
this analysis operation, could report about remarkable succes ses and 
attempted some generalizations concerning the methods employed. 
Another important contribution of this concern with propaganda 
is the recognition of the systemic nature of society within which the con-
tent of propaganda may playa certain role. By and large, previous 
content analyses had studied communications in relative isolation or in 
reference to only a few personality or social variables. Specific in-
ferences from domestic propaganda, on the other hand, required con-
sideration of more complex models of the situation from which commun-
ications were obtained. Such models had to consider the social structure 
of the governing elites, their modes of operation, perceptions of en-
vironmental changes and estimates regarding planned actions as well 
as their political support by, and ability to control the population. 
While th" former approaches did not fully develop methodo-
logically, hence, emphasized qualitative methods of analysis and em-
ployed verbal logic to justify their inferences, a third influential group 
of researchers advanced th", quantitative description of propaganda 
messages. This third approach was heavily influenced and guided by 
Lasswell and his earlier work, produced numerous memoranda under 
the Library of Congress's Experimental Division for the Study of 
. , 
, 
Wartime Communications (see 96) and led to the volume edited by 
LaBswell entitled The Language of Politics (112). In the course of 
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this later approach and reflecting the nature of the material studied, 
"content analysis" became characterized as the "statistical semantics 
of political discourse" (96:230) and often simply referred to by the 
term "propaganda analysis. " 
Interdisciplinary Expansion 
Following World War II, content analysis, having largely been 
constrained by war objectives, enlarged its scope of attention to 
problems far beyond those of mass media research. While a distinctive 
research task is very difficult to discern during the fourth phase of 
content analysis, its rapid spread into numerous disciplines hitherto 
almost unaware of the technique I s potential use may be noted. Content 
analysis had matured to seek new boundaries. 
It took the cooperation of historians , political scientists, s ociol-
ogists and psychologists to analyze the volumes of raw documents that 
had been accumulated during the war years. Inferences made from 
domestic propaganda were systematically validated as formerly in-
acces sable information became available (71); new political phenomena 
could be linked to Some forms of communication; and many research 
projects that had been delayed carne up again and were pursued from 
new poil1ts of view. 
For example, Lasswell expanded his idea of a "world attention 
survey" to the Revolution and Development of International Relations 
(RADIR) project designed to test the hypothesis that in the last 60 years 
a "world revolution"has been in steady progress, a revolution that is 
manifest in extensive compositional changes of the vocabulary of the 
"ruling few" (113) (160). The project also shed light on the trends of 
Symbols of Internationalism (159) and Symbols of Democracy (161). 
Similarly, White could now compare values expressed in 
political documents and speeches by Hitler and by Roosevelt to ascer-
tain differences between war and peace propaganda that would shed 
light on the extent to which the Soviet Union may be engaged in the 
preparation of international hostilities (206). Jacob found frequencies 
of references to atrocities in German domestic propaganda to be Cor-
related with intended political-military agression (89). And Lewin 
analysed the social aims expressed in song books and manuals of the 
Hitler Youth and the Boy Scouts of America (119). 
As an outgrowth of both experiences during the early phases 
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of propaganda analysis and the traditional interest of literary critic-
ism, sociologically inclined literary historians started applying content 
analysis to various forms of popular entertainment provided by the 
mass media. The method seemed suitable to explore and compare 
cultural pattern across time and space. StiU during the war, 
Lowenthal (123) published his pioneering study of historical changes 
of biographies appearing in popular magazines. Adorno (3) suggested 
a psychoanalytic framework for analyzing the social relevance of 
television content. Kracauer (101) presented an extensive study of 
the German film and placed its content in historical and political 
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contexts, and Schneider and Dornbusch examined fourty-six bestsellers 
published between 1875 and 1955 in order to identify trends in popular 
religious themes (170). Such approaches, plus the earlier interest in 
social stereotypes, can be considered a stimulus for such investigations 
as Berelson and Salter's "Majority and Minority Americans" in mag-
azine fiction (31) and Gerbner's ... "Social Role of the Confession Mag" 
azine" (73). 
While studies in propaganda had taken up the majority of published 
literature during the war, Barcus' tabulation for 1950-1958 shows that 
the number of investigations concerned with social values, social 
problems and American cultural themes again ranked first within the 
content a:oalysis literature. Although journalistic topics still occupied 
a large portio:o of the publications, the seco:od highest rank was now 
taken by an area of application that hitherto had not contributed much 
to content analysis literature: psychological and psychoanalytical re-
search. 
"When one stops to think of it," writes Cartwright in 1953, 
"it is really surprising how much of the subject matter of 
social psychology is in the form of verbal behavior. The 
formation and transmission of group standards, values, 
attitudes, and skills are accomplished largely by means 
of verbal communication. Education in the schools, in the 
home, in business, in the neighborhood, and through the 
mass media is brought about by the transmission of infor-
mation and by the exercise of controls which are largely 
mediated through written or spoken words. If one is con-
cerned with problems of social organization, the situation 
is similar. Supervision~ TIlanagem.ent, coordination, and 
the exertion of influence are principally matters of verbal 
interaction. Social and political conflicts, although often 
stemming from divergent economic interests and power, 
cannot be fully understood without studying the words 
employed in the interaction of conflicting groups, and 
the proces s of mediation consists largely of talking 
things out. The work of the world, and its entertain-
ment too, is in no small measure mediated by verbal 
and other symbolic behavior" (39:422-423). 
Such sudden realization of the message characteristics of much 
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psychologically r"levant data led to the development of three interrelated 
areas of inquiry and development. The .first is concerned with studying 
written material to discover motivational, neurotic, psychosocial, or 
other dimensions attributable to the author of a document. Auld and 
Murray (17) reviewed numerous projective techniques and tests for 
various clinical purposes, tests that require in essence a content 
analyses of verbal records. The Dollard and Mowrer "Discomfort-
Relief Quotient" presumed to be an index of a psychological state may 
be mentioned as a representative example. 
The second area of psychological use of content analysis refers 
to the analysis of qualitative data gathered in the course of rel;learch 
processes. Recorded responses to openended questions, records of 
conversations in controlled experiments, observational accounts of 
social processes can be utilized in scientific inquiries only insofar as 
reliable methods of characterizing their content are available. This 
need forced many psychologists to adopt content analysis fo>: processing 
qualitatively recorded data. Bales' Interaction Process Analysis (19) 
is one example where content analysis merged with techniques of 
small group experiments and contributed to establish theoretical 
assertions concerning face-to-face cornrnunication. But also the use 
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of available verbal material as psychological data which was one of All-
port's early concern (5) must be noted here. In an analysis of "Letters 
from Jenny" (6) he demonstrated the use of personal documents for as-
certaining the personality structure of a writer. 
A third psychological contribution to content analysis developed 
in conjunction with inquiries in the psychology of speaking. In the new 
field of psycholinguistics (146) relationships between speech character-
istics and a:cceptance of symbolic material as well as of language 
acquisition, attracted the attention of a large group of psychologists. 
Under the leadership of Osgood numerous rigorous measuring instru-
ments of verbal content (147) (152) were advanced and made available 
for application in other fields. 
Quite independently from methods of analysis developed in the 
social sciences, literary scholars started to use statistical procedures 
to discern stylistic features of prose. The interest, partic)llarly that 
of identifying the unknown author of a document on the basis of his 
vocabulary, goes back to Yule who attempted to show that it was not 
the alleged Gerson but a Kempis who had written De Imitatione Christi 
(217). More recently Mosteller and Wallace tackled a similar problem 
regarding the disputed authorship of the Federalist Papers (139) and 
Brinegar concerned himself with a statistical test of the authorship of 
the Quintus Curtias Snodgrass Letters (35). 
While during the phase of mass communications research and 
propaganda analysis the focus of inquiries into messages was extended 
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to include such media as books, radio, films and to some extent television; 
during the interdisciplinary expansion stage this focus was furthermore 
broadened. Studies have been made of proverbs (100), folktales (130), 
inscriptions on Greek vases (11), private letters (153) (6}, diplomatic 
documents (82) (84), rumors (49}, results from openended interviews 
(157), pauses in psychodiagnostic sessions (40).(61), speech disturb-
ances (124), photographs (201), paintings (155) and even dreams (80). 
This widespread use of content analysis in hitherto untouched 
fields is also reflected in the composition of the participants at the 
first work conference On content analysis which the Committee on 
Linguistics and Psychology of the Social Science Research Council 
held in Winter, 1955. The researchers whose contributions were sub-
sequently published. in book form (162) carne from such areas as 
political science, psychology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, anthro-
pology, folklore, literature and history. When discussing new content 
analytic methods in their respective fields the participants found them-
selves surprised to discover numerous common empirical problems. 
In this interdisciplinary climate several suggestions for further im-
provement of the technique emerged. 
Among the most notable contributions of this conference is 
probably George I s clarification of the virtues and limitations of 
quantification in content analysis (70). Evidence for the success of 
so called qualitative methods rendered these hitherto often disqualified 
techniques as important alternatives. Osgood's methodological 
26 
suggestions, his contingency analysis in particular, designed to overcome 
some of the earlier limitations of frequency descriptions, has since then 
found numerous applications (147). And Mahl raised the problem of the 
instrumental use of language and derived ,methodological consequences 
( 
of analysis (124). 
The time period following the first working conference is still 
too short to allow for an adequate evaluation. Yet, a new branch seems 
to have emerged. 
As a result of the Cold War various research organizations con-
cerned with international relations found content analysis instrumental 
for their tasks. Since first-hand information about political- organiza-
tional changes in foreign nations is rarely directly accessable, an exam-
ination of political documents can provide indicants of otherwise hidden 
transitions. For example, Angell and Singer tried to ascertain and 
compare the values of Soviet and of American elites and their attitudes 
toward foreign policy from their articulations in the respective mass 
media (9). While this problem is still reminiscent of the type of propa-
ganda analysis that had been done during World War II, North, Holsti 
and collaborators (84) (142) tried to measure the interaction of national 
tensions during international crises and thus added a new dimension to 
the content analysis of political documents. Singer (180) even went so 
far as to investigate the possibility of inspection for disarmament ex-
clusively by means of analyzing mass media material in place of the 
then disputed international control stations. 
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While the spread of the technique into new fields and its subsequent 
assimilation with other modes of inquiry is still continuing, a process that 
was identified with the fourth phase of content analysis, a fifth phase is 
already emerging. 
Computer Text Analysis 
Probably the most important impact on the technology of content 
analysis during the current decade is to be expected from the uSe of 
electronic computers in the behavioral sciences (32). The quantity of 
symbolic mate rial that needsto be proce ssed in typical content analysis 
projects is often very large and easily exceeds available manpower and 
other human limitations. To overcome some of these barriers, computer 
analysis and transformation of data to which some meaning is attributed 
now appears almost everywhere and suggests most significant research 
problems. 
One area of recent advancement of immediate relevance to con-
tent analysis is the use of mechanical devices to retrieve information 
stored in large libraries, to search for literature,· to assemble biblio-
graphies relevant to a given problem domain, to make abstracts, to 
index, etc. Theoretical frameworks and software suitable to this end 
are in the proce.ss of development (26). 
Closely related to such efforts is the considerable progress 
that can be noted in translating languages automatically, particularly 
between Russian and English (144). Although much justified criticism 
referring to premature claims and much too optimistic expectations 
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has been heard (23), computer programs that actually do such translations 
within a limited discourse and theories that could lead to appropriate 
algorithms corne more and more into prominence. Katz and Fodor (99) 
provided such a theoretical framework for semantic interpretations of 
sentences. 
An example of more immediate and p;ractical application of such 
technologies is the automatic manipulation of medical records for diag-
nostic ends. After applying proper codes on autopsy records in natural 
English, Smith and Melton (182) could show how a data bank of protocols 
of pathological processes can be utilized to aid autopsy diagnoses. 
Quite different is an example by Allen (4) who is interested in 
the use of computers for legal purposes and who tried to determine the 
numb"r of ways a section of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests 
in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater is structurally ambiguous 
and can lead to different interpretations. The existence of structural 
ambiguity, a serious problem in language translation, turns out to be-
come of great value to the content analyst who wishes to ascertain the 
alternatives available to the partners committed to such an agreement. 
Literary inquiries into style, mentioned above, have largely 
been facilitated by the use of computers. Mosteller and Wallace (139), 
for example, were aided by automatic data processors in their attempt 
to provide further evidence in the case of the disputed authorship of the 
Federalist Papers. Computer programs that discriminate subject 
content in scientific and technical prose (198) are in theory identical to 
those that distinguish authors by their· style of writing. Such and other 
forrnal similarities have led to a new mode of literary research called 
"computational stylistics" (172). It is needless to say that the volume 
of text that has to be handled statistically strongly links this mode of 
inquiry with the use of computers (117). 
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Examples of this kind could be extended at length. They suggest 
considerable advances in natural language processing for still very 
limited purposes. Oile computer program that claims to be a general 
one and has been developed to aid traditional types of content analysis 
(189) deserves to be mentioned, however.. It is called "General In-
quirer" and maps written text into sets of terI7's of interest to the 
analyst such that various statistical computations can be made. The 
program has been successfully applied to a wide range of problems 
such as establishing cultural differences manifest in folktales, pre-
dicting the inclination of the writer of a letter to commit suicide, 
finding differenti'lting issues in arguments for or against a proposal 
(190), and measuring international tension (84). While this program 
cannot handle the complexity many problems of analyzing natural 
l'lngu'lge text m'ly require, it is indic'ltive of a trend that has barely 
begun, a trend that is believed to be dominant in the fifth phase of 
content analysis. 
Summary 
The historical sketch of the development of content 'lnalysis 
in its social-historical context may now be summarized as follows: 
from the above it is clear that the acc1J.m1J.lative concern with analyzing 
messages systematically dates from and has not beeninterr1J.pted since 
the beginning of this cent1J.ry. 
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Originating as "q1J.antitative newspaper analysis, " the first phase 
of this concern was clearly dominated by j01J.rnalistic attempts to eval-
1J.ate press performance. Primitive q1J.antitativemeas1J.rementsalong 
s1J.bject matter categories were merely 1J.sed in s1J.pport ofp1J.blic arg1J.-
mentation involving j01J.rnalistic val1J.es and concerns. 
D1J.ring the 1930' s prominent social scientists replaced the 
analyzing j01J.rnalist and c1J.lt1J.ral critic .. New concepts and more refined 
descriptive techniq1J.es entered what was s1J.bseq1J.ently termed "content 
analysis," and its scope was extended to other mass media. B1J.t, the 
analytical tasks, prompted by the prevailing social concern with the 
new media of comm1J.nication remained essentially the same. The 
content analytic res1J.lts of :mass comm1J.nications research were 
rela tively inconseq1J.ential. 
D1J.ring World War II, the third phase of the analytical concern 
with messages, content analysis became primarily a tool for analyz-
ing propaganda either in the sense of detecting hidden agents of foreign 
c01J.ntries orin the sense of drawing military intelligence from known 
propaganda S01J.rces. An ind1J.ctive element was added to the hitherto 
entirely. descriptive techniq1J.e and the systemic character of propaganda 
was realized altho1J.gh its methodology did not develop f1J.lly. 
The f01J.rth phase has been characterized as a rapid spreading 
of content analysis into numerous empirical domains, thereby losing its 
previous association with the mass media. Perhaps it is this dissocia-
tion from a specific subject matter and from particular disciplines 
which gave content analysis a chance of developing .into an interdis-
ciplinary method in its own right. 
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The still infantile fifth phase, it is believed, will be dominated 
by the emergence of new computer techniques designed to analyze large 
quantities of text for various ~cientific and practical tasks. More than 




CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Critical issues always have a historical dimension. Their com-
ing into the focus of discourse is the result of a long-term intellectual 
preparation and is typically preceded by an unqualified acceptence of the 
subject matter of these issues. 
As the previous chapter showed, content analysis was originally 
used mainly as a rhetorical device to support public judgements regard-
ing press performance by supplying figures to the journalistic argument. 
Figures suggested objectivity regardless of the adequacy of the methods 
by means of which they were obtained and hence, regardless of how 
I 
validly they represented whatever they claimed to represent. With the 
intrusion of the social sciences into content analysis, computational 
techniques became more sophisticated and con<:eptual categories more 
" 
detailed. This transformation led to the emergence of a few critical 
issues: the explicit- impressionistic dilemma (110); the quantitative-
qualitative dilemma (70) (20:21-23) and the manifest-latent dilemma 
(30:7-8) (20:19-21). Commitments towards either side of the contro-
versy often had ideological overt,ones. 
Although such issues can be viewed in a historical context 
they can also be discussed in the context of scientific methodology. 
This chapter proposes to do just this. It seems that the critical 
issues mentioned above as well as others that have not been covered 
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in the literature can be subsumed under three main headings: definitional 
issues, methodological issues and theoretical issues. 
Definitional Issues 
Definitions seem wholly arbitrary agreements and yet, in the con-
text of technical discourses, their relative utility may be evaluated. For 
example, a good definition is expected to abbreviate and sharpen a specific 
discourse; it ought to improve the efficiency of communication. Another 
criterion of a good definition, one of interest here, is its organizing power, 
i. e. the degree to which it structures similarities among events and leads 
to unambiguous distinctions in the universe of possible phenomena. With 
respect to the latter criterion, we may suppose that methodological dis-
courses attempt to define investigative techniques(a) in terms of their 
empirical domain or the domain of possible observations to which they 
are assumed applicable, (b) according to their specific purpose or the 
class of problems for which they are claimed to provide solutions, or, 
(c) on the basis of specialized procedures and evaluative criteria they 
contain. FOllowing is an attempt to critically evaluate existing defini-
tions of content analysis along the above mentioned lines. 
Kaplan's "statistical semantics of political discourse" as a 
paraphrase for "content analysis" has already been mentioned. The 
same author continues to say that " ... the technique ... attempts to 
characterize the meanings of a given body of discourse in a systematic 
and quantitative fashion" (96:230). This, being an early (1943) attempt 
at clarification, already includes most of the concepts that were 
'relevant during the second developll1ental phase of content analysis. 
Berelson and Lazarsfeld, reviewing several sill1ilar definitions that 
had been advanced in the technical literature of that till1e, proposed a 
definition which is claill1ed to include all essential distinguishing 
characteristics: 
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systell1atic, and quantitative description of the ll1anifest 
content of cOll1ll1unication (30:5-6). 
Due to Berelson' s subsequent book on content analysis (27) and his re-
view in The Handbook of Social Psychology, this definition becall1e by 
far thell10st widely accepted and 1l10st frequently cited definition of 
content analysis to date. It can very well be taken as representing 
the dOll1inant conceptualization in the field. It seell1S that one of the 
reasons for the surprisingly widespread acceptance of this definition 
is its inherent indefiniteness concerning the ell1pirical dOll1ain of the 
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method. Note that the key terll1 "content" appears in both, the definiens 
and the definiendull1 of the definition. How little such a definition 
delineates can easily be seen when replacing the critical term with, 
say X. The definition then reads: 'X-analysis is a research technique 
for the ... description of. .. X of cOll1ll1unicati<;m.' If the terll1 "content" 
is not already well defined, which,as we shall discuss under theoretical 
issues is indeed not the case, rOOll1 is provided for alll10st any intuitive 
interpretation of the terll1 and hence alll10st any ell1pirical domain is 
acceptable for content analysis. While this indefiniteness is clear 
without giving further exall1ples, it is 1l10st probably not intended. 
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Slightly less indefinite concerning an empirical domain are two 
definitions that succeeded Berelson's. Both have neither gained popular-
itynor been frequently cited. From a psychological point of view, 
Schutz argued that almost all human behavior is symbolic in some sense 
and must therefore be said to have content. On the basis of such reason-
ing, he suggests the definition: 
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of human behavior, 
particularly linguistic (171:3). 
Cartwright, elaborating on Berelson's definition from the same vantage 
point, caITle to a silllilar' conclusion: 
Communication should be thought of as any linguistic ex-
pression, and the restriction to 'manifest' content should 
be removed. With these modifications, we have an 
adequate designation of all the kinds of analysis of quan-
titative materials of interest to social psychologists . 
.. . we propose to use the terms "content analysis",and 
"coding" interchangeably to refer to the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of any symbolic 
behavior (39:424). 
Although these two formulations give the appearance of avoiding 
the circularity of Berelson's definition, they replace "manifest content 
of communication" by terms which are not very well defined either, 
and do not possess the necessary discriminative power. As far as 
the distinction between symbolic and non,- symbolic behavior is con-
cerned, agreement exists only at the extremes of such a dimension. 
To identify the empirical domain of content analysis with that of human 
behavior is equivalent to the suggestion that all research techniques in 
the social sciences should bl" subsumed under the label content analysis, 
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which amounts to making no differentiation among those techniques as far 
as content analysis is concerned. 
The three definitions agree, however, that content analysis has 
to be "objective, systematic and quantitative." This triple requirement 
refers neither to the empirical domain of the technique nor to its pur-
pose, but to evaluative standards imposed on its use. With "obj ective ... 
description" Berelson wants to assure "reliability" of the analytic pro-
cedure. The analysis must be replicable, leading to identical results. 
With "systematic ... description" he wants to exclude "biases" of the 
analyst by r'l'quiring that "all the relevant content is to be analyzed in 
terms of all the relevant categories" as well as "to insure (that the) 
data (be) relevant to a scientific problem or hypothesis" (27:17). The 
requirement of quantification is, according to Berelson, "the most 
distinctive feature of content analysis" (27: 17) and refers to an enumera-
tion of instances found in the material under analysis. 
Many early writers concerned with the subject insist very 
strongly on the attribute "quantitative" as a definitional requirement 
of content analysis. For example Lasswell emphasized this point in 
a paper entitled "Wby be Quantitative" (110). And Pool characterized 
"content analysis" briefly as "the statistical tabulation of the things that 
have been said" (161 :3). Even most recently Stone makes quantifica-
tion the central prerequisite for content analysis when defining: 
"Content analysis" refers to any procedure for assessing 
the relative extent to which specified references, attitudes, 
or themes permeate a given message or document (188). 
) 
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With "permeation, " Stone wants to include both frequency and distribution 
of identifiable characteristics in texts, thus being quite specific concern-
ing the quantitative descriptions that a content analysis is to provide. 
On the other-hand, quantification in content analysis has been an 
extremely controversial issue as McGranahan points out. 
Quantitative techniques in content analysis _ can provide a 
defense against subjectivity and bias. They_ cannot, how-
ever, provide a substitute for serious thinking. Unfor-
tunately, as in many other fields of social science, some 
authors seem tempted to quantify for the mere sake of 
appearing scientific, and produce elaborate statistics 
that are meaningless or, at best, trivial. Content analysis 
will be useful if it supports but not if it suppresses the in-
quiring intellect (133:559). 
Smythe referred to the use of inadequately simple statistical 
, 
t<;!chniques to describe mass communications as an "immaturity of 
science" (l83). Kracauer (l02) and George (70) challenged quantifica-
tion as a definitional requirement of content analysis on similar grounds. 
Underlying this controversy seems to be the association of "quantitative" 
with "objective" _as opposed to "qualitative" with "impressionistic" 
approaches, an association which Goode and Hatt try to eliminate by 
pointing to a more reasonable goal for scientific inquiries. 
Modern research must reject as a false dichotomy the 
separation between "qualitative" and "quantitative" studies, 
or between" statistical" and the "nonsta tistical" approach. " 
The application of mathematics ... does not ensure rigor 
of proof, any more than the use of "insight" guarantees 
the significance of the research. 
The fundamental question to ask about all research tech-
niques are those dealing with the precision, reliability, 
and relevance of the data and their analysis. . .. If the 
observations are crude, casting them in a statistical 
form will not help the research. If other scientists 
cannot repeat them, mathematical manipulation is 
futile. If the data do not satisfy a rigorous logic of 
proof, the conclusions rem.ain doubtful (77:313). 
While quantification seem.s not to be an agreeable prerequisite 
for content analysis, virtually no objection-hf'.s been raised against the 
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two attributes "objective" and "systematic" in the aforem.entioned defini-
tions. But these two definitional requirements refer to the m.ost general 
presuppositions of any scientific m.ethod and could very well have been 
taken for granted without loss. When discarding the controversial re-
quirement of quantification, Barcus com.es perhaps closest to the points 
of agreement by asserting: 
The term. "content analysis" is used here to m.ean the 
scientific analysis of com.m.unications m.essages. 
He then continues realizing that: 
The method is broadly speaking the" scientific method, " 
and while being catholic in nature, it requires that the 
analysis be rigorous and systematic (20:8). 
At this point it seem.s that the definition of content analysis has 
lost almost any organizing power within methodological discourses. If 
no way can be shown to differentiate content analysis from. other m.odes 
of scientific inquiry, then hardly any justification exists to call content 
analysis an investigative technique in its own right. But before we are 
to pass a final judgem.ent let us examine definitions of content analysis 
with respect to explicitly stated purposes and procedures. 
Kaplan, Berelson, Schutz, Cartwright and probably Stone are 
quite clear on the point that content analysis aims at som.e form of 
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description, and yet Berelson insists in addition that the data be relevant 
to a scientific problem or hypothesis . Cartwright too is ambiguous con" 
cerning the goal of content analysis. While explicitly defining the tech-
nique as a descriptive one, he goes on to say that "as a rule the content 
analyst is not interested in limiting his conclusion or findings strictly to 
the content actually analyzed .. Almost invariably he undertakes his 
specific analysis in order to reveal something about a more general uni-
verse of data thaIl- just those symbolic materials (produced at a certain 
place and time) with which he deals" (39:449). 1£ - so one is forced to 
argue -the job of a content analyst is not conceptualized here as some-
thing quite distinct from performing a content analysis, then at least the 
terms "description" and "interpretation" are seriously confused. This 
confusion also seems to be manifest in a recent unpublished definition 
of content analysis that makes no distinctions between the process of 
identifying characteristics within a text and that of making inferences. 
This definition has been proposed by Holsti and reads: 
Content analysis is any technique for making inferences 
by systematically and objectively identifying specified 
characteristics within text (83:10). 
So far the clearest description of a purpose in content analysis 
has been given by Osgood who wrote: 
..• if we define content analysis as a procedure whereby 
one makes inferences about sources and receivers frorn 
evidence in the messages they exchange, then the probletn 
falls precisely in the field of special interest of the psycho-
linguist. . . This is because it is the psycholinguist who, 
by definition, is concerned with discovering and etnploying 
lawful relations between events in tnessages and processes 
transpiring in the individuals who produce and receive 
them ..•. when the interest of the content analyst lies in 
making inferences about the SOl,nce of a message, he must 
rely on encoding dependencies, that is, the dependencies 
of message events upon psychological processes in speakers 
and writers. When his interest lies in making inferences 
about the effects· of a message upon its receivers, on the 
other hand, he relies upon decoding dependencies, that is, 
the dependencies of events in listeners and readers (their 
meanings, emotions, attitudes, and the like) upon the con-
tent and structure of messages. (147:35·-36) 
Such a proposed restriction of content analysis to the making of certain 
kinds of inferences of interest to the psychologist is quite powerful in 
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differentiating between several investigative techniques. Controlled ex-
periments, field observations or interviews are not usually directed 
toward the inferences referred to above. On the other hand, Osgood'.s 
strictly psycholinguistic orientation· is most probably the reason why 
his definitional attempt has not ·been fully appreciated or further 
developed in the literature. 
Since the purpose of the method is not unambiguously ascertain-
able from given definitions or not unani~ousl yagreed upon in the litera-
ture, let us now turn to those definitions that attempt to characterize 
content analysis in terms of specific procedures. 
In his Language and Communication, for example, Miller casts 
his very clear description of the content analytical procedure in defini-
tional form: 
In order to handle larg.e blocks of verbal materials in a 
statistical way, it seems necessary to reduce the variety 
of alternatives that must be tabulated. This can be ac-
complished by putting a wide variety of word patterns 
into a single category .... when ... the frequency of occur-
ence of word patterns in each category of a classification 
scheITla is counted, the result is called a "content analysis" 
(136:95-96). 
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The second definition that delineates required analytical procedures 
has been proposed by Janis in his atteITlpt to COITle to grips with SOITle ITleth.-
odological probleITls of content analysis: 
"Content analysis" ITlay be defined as referring to any tech-
nique (a) for the classification of sign-vehicles, (b) which 
relies solely upon the judgeITlents - which theoretically, ITlay 
range froITl perceptual discrimination]> to sheer guesses - of 
an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles 
fall into which category, (c) on the basis of explicitly forITl-
ulated rules, (d) provided that the analyst's judgeITlents are 
regarded as the reports of a scientific observer. The re-
sults of a content analysis state the frequency of occurrence 
of signs - or groups of signs - for each category ina classi-
fication scheITle (91:429). 
Both definitions depict the content analytic procedure quite ade-
quately. Miller's forITlulation, although very specialized and geared to 
a consideration of analytical probleITls in the psychology of language, 
leads directly to the kind of perITleation ITleasures Stone suggested in his 
definition. Janis' forITlulationessentially agrees with the definition above 
but eITlphasizes the process of controlled hUITlan judgeITlent that is iITl-
plicit in the procedure as depicted by Miller and ITlust precede any kind 
of enuITleration. It is fahrly obvious that the analytical procedure as 
described by both authors can hardly lend itself to the kind of interpreta-
tions Cartwright observed as being the rule in content analysis. Such 
interpretations are clearly outside the scope> of a technique that cate-
gorizes sign-vehicles according to SOITle explicit rules. 
The two definitions seeITl to iITlply a distinction between content 
analysis and those analytical techniques that provide the basis for both 
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more definite and more sophisticated measurements. By suggesting 
distinctions such as (a) between procedures that lead to such standardized 
measures as of age, weight, or temperature, and those that solely de-
pend on human judgements; or (b) between measuring scales possessing 
various types of order and simple (nominal scale) categorizations of 
qualities, content analysis appears as a method of systematically ex-
ploiting controlled human judgements in the absence of more refined 
measuring operations. Given the fact that science has always proceeded 
from qualitative differentiations to quantifications of such differences, 
content analytic procedures here appear formally identical with measur_ 
ing operations but simply of a more primitive kind. 
In summary then, we attempted to inquire primarily into the 
organizing power of proposed definitions of content analysis. With 
respect to the empirical domain of the technique, none of the definitions 
can be said to be explicit enough as to make adequate distinctions within 
the universe of possible data to which the technique is deemed applicable. 
With respect to the goals toward which the use of content analysis may 
be put, the definitions do little but give conflicting requirements. The 
definitions that attempt to delineate specific analytical procedures do 
indeed succeed in suggesting differentiations within the repertoire of 
investigative methods in the social sciences, but the question remains 
to be answered whether the dimension along which this differentiation 
. is proposed is indeed intended by those making frequent references to 
the technique. Most of the definitions cited above are of little prominence. 
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The only one that has indeed gained wide popularity has almost no organiz-
ing power and must be judged inadequate with respect to this criterion. 
We were almost exclusively concerned with the organizing power 
of definitions of content analysis and mentioned the efficiency of a good 
definition only in pas.sing. But a good definition .of an analytical technique 
can also be expected to have some heuristic value in that it directs atten-
tion to specific methodological problems. Some such problems, whether 
generated by the definitions or derived from analytical difficulties will 
be taken up in the following section. 
Methodological Issues 
This section is devoted to content analysis as investigative tech-
nique, that is to say, to some of its critical problems pertaining to 
methodology. Methodology examines principles and procedures of 
scientific inquiry with respect to their ability to provide certain know-
ledge but abstracts from the particular use to which such inquiries may 
be put. From a methodological point of view, the two chief criteria for 
evaluating investigative techniques are reliability and validity. There 
are other evaluative criteria such as their efficiency or the costs per 
unit of information gained which are important when making choices 
among possible research tools, but we will confine ourselves to consider-
ing reliability and validity only. Before the pertinency of these 
criteria to content analysis can be discussed some of the peculiarities 
of the technique have to be clarified. 
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As a point of departure, Janis (92:55) and Miller's (136:95-96) 
definition of content analysis, cited above may be taken as giving an 
adequate description of the analytical procedure to be considered. In 
short: a scientific observer applies explicitly formulated rules for 
categorizing sign-vehicles to a usually large body of data. The date or 
collection of sign-vehicles, to use Janis' term, can consist of almost 
anything: themes, characters, items (30:78), letters, phonemes, 
words (136), topics, propositions (76), headlines (75), music scores 
(c£. 30:17), cartoons (18), proverbs (lOO), films (95), etc. Similarily 
as we shall see no restriction seems to exist as to the category 
schemes that may be employed, 
"Rules for categorizing" sign-vehicles are logically equivalent 
to operational definitions of categories that make explicit the criteria 
according to which a particular sign-vehicle is either included in or 
excluded from a particular category. It is generally required that 
definitions of categories be such that (a) a category scheme be ex-
haustive and (b) each of the categories within that scheme be mutually 
exclusive (34:l0). Thus, the rules for categorization must be every-
where defined and single valued. In short, the rules effect a mapping 
in the mathematical sense of a set of sign-vehicles into a set of cate-
gories. Since these rules are required to be explicitly formulated, 
the scientifically trained observer is expected merely to ensure that 
they are implemented o.r followed consistently apd reliably. We shall 
see the implication of such a method shortly. 
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Consider first the number of possible mappings that can be well 
defined over a given body of data or the number of explicit categorization 
rules that are formulable: If m is the number of discriminable sign-
vehicles in the domain of such a mapping and n the number of categories 
in the category scheme chosen, then the number of possible mappings 
, m 
1S n Now imagine that only a single issue of the New York Times 
has to be content analyzed, say with words as sign-vehicles, m then 
already becomes a very large number. Note that in the number of 
possible rules for categorization m appears as the exponent of n. 
Thus, in the presence of this unimaginably large number nm the con-
tent analyst is faced with an extremely difficult problem of selection, for 
he has to choose one out of nm possible mappings! 
By definition the product of anyone of the nm possible map-
pings applied on the text constitutes an objective and systematic de-
scription in the sense of Berelson and Lazarsfeld's requirement for 
content analYl'is. Waples, Berelson, and Bradshaw may have realized 
the large number of alternatives available to content analysts when 
writing: "There are as many ways of describing publications as there 
are reasons for wanting to know about them" (200:63) to which Berelson 
and Lazarsfeld add " ... it opens the door to the indefinite expansion of 
categories" (30:101). 
If no constraints on this large set of pos sible rules for cate-
0' 
gorizaticin.,are discernable then any arbitrarily chosen one would do. 
Although there appear few guidelines as to appropriate choices among 
those rules, the existence of relevant constraints is suggested in the 
following statement by Berelson and Lazarsfeld: 
Content analysis stands or falls by its categories ... Studies 
done on a hit-or-miss basis without specific problems for 
investigation and with vaguely or poorly articulated categories 
are almost certain to be of indifferent or low quality as re-
search productions. Although competent performance of 
other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the 
invention and definition of appropriate categories takes on 
critical importance. Since categories contain the substance 
of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than 
its system of categories (30:88). 
The authors continue: 
.•. Since communication materials contain almost every-
thing people say or do, the production of relevant cate-
gories is limited only by the analyst's imagination in stat-
ing a problem for investigation and designing categories 
to fit the problem (30:101). 
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Although much of the quotation merely asserts the importance of 
appropriate choices, key criteria for such choices seem to be derivable 
from a "problem of investigation." Osgood also emphasized this point 
when stating that "the nature, number and breadth of categories ... de-
pend upon the purposes of the investigation. If the analyst has a very 
specific purpose, he will select his content categories around this core" 
(147:62). But what is the formal nature of those problems of investiga-
tion that are presumed to affect decisions concerning particular cate-
gory schemes? As it has been mentioned earlier, Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and others require of a content analysis that the categories be chosen 
to test some hypotheses. Although this is not included as a definitional 
requirement they make the point quite clear: 
The derivation of hypotheses for a content analysis study 
is of central importance, since the hypotheses determine 
the nature of the categories as well as the framework of 
actual results. The hypotheses derive out of the nature 
of the problem and they in turn are translated into cate-
gories for analysis. It can hardly be over-stressed that 
the prior construction of appropriate hypotheses is indis-
pensable for a sound and fruitful analysis ... if the problem 
was not clarified to the point where several worthwhile 
hypotheses can be formulated (in advance), then the pro-
jected content analysis should be abandoned. One should 
not analyze unless or until he has something concrete 
and specific to analyze for (underlined in the original) 
(30:92). 
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At this point we cannot stress strongly enough the methodological 
implications of making decision criteria concerning category schemes a 
derivative of the apriorily stated hypotheses tobe tested: if a content 
analyst chooses his categorization rules only according to the set of 
hypotheses upon which the data to be categorized are supposed to be-
stow some significance, then the validity of the result is either entirely 
. accidental or solely dependent on the analyst's prior intuition concern-
ing that result. In either case the method is fallacious. 
For proof of the above proposition let the number m of dis-
criminable sign-vehicles in a body of text be very large compared 
with the number n of analytical categories. To keep the example 
simple let the categories be cells in a two-way contingency table. A 
hypothesis defined within the terms of the contingency table can be 
said to be accepted if the frequency distribution in that table differs 
significantly from the one for which the complementary null-hypothesis 
would account. Since frequencies are additive, the size of the sets 
into which the m different sign-vehicles are grouped are assertedly 
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arbitrary, the nm possible mappings from the text into the table can 
produce almost any desired frequency distribution. The only limitation 
sterns from the magnHudes of nand m. Hence, the mapping can 
almost always be chosen in such a way that any hypothesis with terms 
contained in the mapping's range, i. e. our contingency table, can be 
II supported." Thus, if decisions concerning rules for categorization 
are completely. arbitrary or made without reference to criteria that 
are external to the analysis, then the degree to which a content analysis 
provides factual evidence for a set of hypotheses is absolutely indeter-
minate. The confidence that can be associated with some statement so 
"tested" is zero. The validity of such a statement cannot be better than 
chance unless the content analyst has some prior intuition as to which 
of the hypotheses is to be refuted or accepted and selects categoriza-
tion rules correspondingly. Hence the analysis does not provide any 
evidence beyond the prior intuition of its designer and is in fact quite 
superfluous if not seriously misleading. 
This fundamental fallacy which seems to be inherent in contemp-
orary conceptuq.lizations of this investigative technique must be con-
sidered the most critical single issue in methodological concernS with 
content analysis. It appears whenever content analysts are completely 
free to choose any category scheme they feel is applicable for whatever 
reasons. 
In practice, however, the analysts cannot choose quite so freely 
among the possible rules for categorization. His choices are subject 
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to at least two kinds of constraints. The first type of constraint refers 
to the limitation of the content analyst's imagination - as Berelson and 
Lazarsfeld (30: 1 01) mentioned in passing. This limitation need not con-
Cern uS here, but it is obvious that the analyst cannot evaluate the 
astronomical number of possible mappings systematically. His imagin-
ative capability delineates only a small manageable set of categorization 
schemes for examination. The second constraint refers to the limited 
instructability of the scientifically trained judge who is supposed to 
categorize the data under consideration. 
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Neither of these constraints have been discussed in the literature. 
On the face of it, it appears that they are disadvantageous to content 
analysis; but the case is quite the opposite. Since the method - if strictly 
followed as stated - leads to fallacious results, it seems that these con-
straints provide the only source through which some validity can enter 
the analysis. They may help to bring about results that are,if not accept-
able, at least not completely arbitrary. Before we can examine the 
role of these constraints in full detail, some theoretical framework has 
to be adopted on the basis of which a definition of validity and reliability 
can be proposed and within which the methodological implications of 
, 
such constraints become apparent. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section one important 
evaluative standard that any investigative technique ought to meet is 
"validity." Roughly stated, a measuring instrument is said to have 
validity if it measures what it proposes to measure; if its results, 
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which range from the numerical value of a variable to a complex state-
ment, represent what they claim to represent. From an empirical point 
of view the validity of an investigative technique can be assessed by 
measuring the agreement between its results and those obtained from 
other already validated research procedures that are applied to the 
same phenomena. To be an acceptable investigative technique, content 
analysis must produce results that are valid in the above mentioned 
Sense. 
The validity of content analysis is in this respect extremely 
difficult to establish as it is not altogether clear what the product of 
the analysis is supposed to represent. As we have shown in the 
previous section, the definitions are quite ambiguous with respect to 
the empirical domain of content analysis. Hence, they do not offer 
satisfactory explications of the term "content" that would easily lend 
itself to validations. It is conceivable that this crucial indefiniteness 
concerning the empirical domain of the technique is the cause of the 
fact that almost none of the published content analyses aitempt to 
validate their results by comparing them with evidence obtained by in-
dependent means. 
In the absence of a simpler framework and without attempting 
to anticipate the topic of the final section of this chapter, let us accept 
Janis' sign-theoretical position (91) (92) and argue that the purpose of 
a content analysis is to represent the" signification response" by, say, 
members of an audience to a message composed of sign-vehicles. 
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Without suggesting any formal definition of this term let us assume that 
each member of the audience has acquired some "signification habits" -
to stick to Janis' terms - or culturally conditioned competencies for 
distributing sign-vehicles into some notational scheme of possible signif-
ication responses. These signification habits may be thought of as being 
intuitive rules for conceptualizing. There is no need to suppose ex-
haustiveness of andmutually exclusiveness within the notational scheme 
and no reaSOn to expect perfect agreement among the communicators or 
respective members of an audience. Assuming there are ways for 
assessing the signification responses to a given set of sign-vehicles, 
then content analysis can easily be validated by comparing the distribu-
tion of sign-vehicles in the category scheme of a content analysis with 
those in the respective notational scheme obtained from the individuals 
Concerned. Thus, if the product of applying explicit categorization 
rules is identical with or at least sufficiently similar to an audience's 
signification responses to the same set of sign-vehicles then the con-
tent analysis can be rendered valid. 
Signification responses may not be directly accessible in the 
case of which it becomes difficult to measure the amount of agreement 
between content analytic results and signification responses referred 
to. Under these conditions, Janis argues, a content analysis may be 
validated indirectly if some other variable that is dependent on the 
audience's signification response can be shown to correlate highly 
with the content analytic results. Such a situation may exist if 
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sign-vehicles cause some behavioral responses that are mediated through 
and moreover linearly dependent on the signification responses to that 
set of sign-vehicles. 
Unfortunately it is not only the lack of adequate explications of 
"content" and the empirical restrictions on the observation of significa-
tion responses that make validation of content analysis so difficult. The 
analysis of historical documents, of domestic propaganda obtained from 
enemy nations or political speeches by otherwise inaccessible political 
leaders exemplify typical content analytic situations that exclude the 
possibility of obtaining validating instances. In such cases at least one 
other evaluative standard can be employed that is logically prior to 
validity and refers to the degree to which a research technique leads to 
replicable results. 
This evaluative standard is neces sary, for it is sometimes quite 
a difficult task, even for a scientific observer, to map such sign-
vehicles as words J propositions, or sentences into exhaustive sets of 
mutually exclusive categories and to maintain consistency in such 
classification over a longer period of time. It is therefore of some 
interest to measure the degree to which the actual categorization 
performance of the scientifically trained judge deviates from the ideal 
of a mapping. This measure is called "reliability" and given an im-
portant place in methodological consideration of content analysis. For 
example, Kaplan and Goldsen write: 
The results of content analysis, like those of other pro-
cesses of measurement) lllUst meet certain conditions of 
reliability before they can be accepted as data for 
hypotheses. By reliability of a measurement with respect 
to a given variable is meant the con$istency of its re sults 
as that variable assumes different values. The variables 
usually considered are: the measuring event (e. g., the 
same person using the same value in successive measure-
ments of the same object); the measuring instrument i~. g. , 
different "forms" of an intelligence test); the person doing 
the measuring (e. g., different eyewitnesses on the same 
event) . 
The importance of reliability rests on the assurance it 
provides that the data obtained are independent of the 
measuring event, instrument or person. Reliable data, 
by definition, are data that remain constant throughout 
variations in the measuring process (98:83-84). 
In content analysis reliability is measured either as inter-judge 
oras intra-judge agreement whereby each measure may be applied to 
evaluate anyone component of the category scheme or focus on the 
categorization procedure as a whole. Whatever the focus of evaluation 
maybe, reliability is logically prior to validity insofar as high validity 
presupposes high reliability but is not ensured by the latter. The 
measure of reliability sets only the upper boundary for the validity a 
content analysis can be expected to achieve. This fundamental relation 
between reliability and validity is not always realized in the literature 
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when attempts are reported to evaluate a content analysis methodologically. 
Only a few studies care to measure the reliability of the analytical tool 
employed while most of them pay at best lip service to the problem of 
How does the limited instructability of judges affect both of these 
methodological standards in content analysis? Schutz (171) is probably 
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the first who realized a direct relationship between the reliability of a 
content analysis and the nature of the explicitly stated rules for cate-
gorizing sign-vehicles. These rules are given to a scientific observer 
in the form of instructions with the obligation to follow them. Searching 
for an adequate measure for reliability he argued that the mere act of 
giving instructions to a set of judges would almost ensure a level of 
agreement better than chance. Instructions are at least intended to 
specify and to determine the behavior of persons employed in the cate-
gorization process. 1£ the reliability is low, Schut", argued, then the 
instructions have not been perfectly understood by the judges. 1£ the 
reliability is high he infers that the instructions were successfully com-
municated to them or at least that the judges make consistent use of 
some rules that give the same results regardless of the individual idio-
'.) 
syncrasies of the persons involved. 
The assumption of an initial chance agreement can most cer-
tainly not be maintained. Even a scientifically trained judge brings 
with him a host of intuitions concerning the categorization process. 
By virtue of the fact that he grew up in a certain culture, a certain 
social stratum and assumed certain roles when exposed to the mass 
media, for example, signification habits are inevitably acquired that 
ensure agreements better than chance. Signification habits are 
already present prior to accepting the role of the objective judge in a 
content analysis and to a large extent determine which rules for cate-
gorizing sign-vehicles can be acquired in a reasonable period of time 
and which are followed with some degree of consistency. 
Almost all of the few studies reporting on the reliability of the 
analysis describe how training sessions and extensive instruction pro-
grams had to be arranged in order to make the categorization rules 
sufficiently understood. O'Sullivan, for example, conducted a training 
seminar over a whole semester period to prepare judges for participat-
ing in a content analysis of writings in international relations (154). 
When categorization rules cannot consistently be followed by the judges, 
it is customary to arrange discussions among them that frequently lead 
to special interpretation and successtve modification of the explicit 
rules until the categorization process reaches an acceptable level of 
reliability. For example, in "a study of the values of Soviet and 
American elites" Angell "found that ... agreement among coders on 
whether or not a dimension was involved in a story or editorial - (was) 
most discouraging for a long time ... a rule adopted on this subject 
helped a great deal. Discussion and analysis of the differences between 
coders on their practice runs also increased reliability. We believe 
our statistical tables represent 80% reliability ... " (9:13). 
Thus reliability is not solely the product of understanding ex-
plicitly formulated instructions--as Schutz seems to suggest - but may 
be said to be the outcome of an interaction between the rules for 
categorization, the judges' intuitive signification habits and the com-
munication situation in which the judges are participants. On the one 
hand, the categorization rules rarely ever specify the process so 
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completely as to serve as an algorithm. They almost always require 
situation-dependent interpretations by the user. On the other hand, 
there seems to be ample evidence- -and the two examples mentioned 
above are only suggestive in this direction - that during the judge's 
training period categorization rules are being imposed upon and 
partially override the stock of signification habits. Categorization 
processes in which a person is engaged when assuming the role of a 
judge in content analysis are typically quite alien to the intuitive con-
ceptualizations that may go on when assuming roles.in an audience. 
Whether and the extent to which explicit rules for categorization and 
intuitive signification habits override', each other is crucial for the 
degree of validity that a content analysis can achieve in a given situa-
tion. 
The situation in which a content analyst's choice of pos sible 
categorization rules is solely guided by his intent to test some hy-
pothesis can now be reconsidered in the light the existing constraints 
on the judge's performance. It represents one extreme where explicit 
rules for categorization completely specify the procedure without 
being affected by any of the intuitive signification habits a person may 
have had prior to becoming a proficient judge. Such a situation exists 
particularly when comp1,lter analyses are attempted. A computer 
program can not delegate "intuition" to an information processing 
device. Such a situation is not very likelyt'o arise when human 
judges are employed in the categorization process. For such an 
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extreme it has been shown that even when reliability is perfect, validity 
solely depends on the analyst's intuition concerning those categorization 
rules which he feels will produce results that are most likely valid to 
him. 
The other extreme is found in the situation in which categoriza-
tion rules either are not made explicit or are completely ignored by 
competent judges (i. e. judges who possess sufficiently. developed signif-
ication habits to respond consistently to the sigh-vehicles presented to 
them). Here object of validation and criterion against which validation 
is to be made become confused. According to the definition of validity. 
in content analysis, the outcome such a . situation would produce is valid 
to the extent that judges are representative of those communicators or 
audience members whose signification response their outcomes claim 
to represent. Such a situation comes closer to being a psychological 
experiment than a content analysis: The qbsence of explicit rules make 
the data obtained dependent on the personality of the individual who 
performs the categorization operation, and "lack of validity" becomes 
simply equivalent to the sampling error. While this situation avoids 
the troublesome fallaciousness of the other extreme, it is not a content 
analysis according to Janis's definition and, lacking explicitness and 
most probably replicability, does not sati~fy the methodological re-
quirements of an acceptable measuring technique. Actual content 
analyses tend to assume a position somewhere between the two ITlethodo-
logically defective extremes and create what ITlight be called the content 
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analyst's dilemma: the more the content analyst pushes in the direction 
of non-directiveness concerning the judges signifying behavior the more 
his procedure becomes questionable as an investigative technique for 
assessing content. Since he is most often rewarded for exhibiting rigor, 
showing "objectivityj It "systelllaticness, It and "quantitativity" in his 
analysis, he is pushed into a methodologically fallacious situation which 
he cannot easily recognize as such. 
The crux of the matter is that validity in content analysis simply 
does not follow from those evaluative criteria in terms of which the 
analyst habitually justifies his pursuit. The conception of the content 
analytic procedure not only makes validation very difficult but also 
renders no provisions for keeping track of the actual sources of 
validity. For instance, content analysts are not expected to justify 
their choices of judges on the basis of the . representativeness of their 
signification habits. Content analysts are not expected to - and indeed 
never do - assess the degree to which the explicitly formulated cate-
gorization rules approximate the signification habits of the audience 
Or communicators to which the analysis generalizes. Even if a content 
analyst were able to eliminate such uncertainties he has no idea about 
the extent to which explicit categorization rules and intuitive significa-
tion habits mutually override each other during the categorization process. 
The two actual sources of validity in content analysis seems to be 
(al the existence of intuitive signification habits of judges as far as they 
are representative of those held by the respective audience and the 
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extent to which such habits are either not subject to explicit constraints 
or effectively override the categorization rules, and (b) the prior intui-
tion that lead the designer of a content analysis to the selection of cate-
gorization rules that are equivalent to the signification habits of the 
respective audience and effectively override those of the judge I s signifi-
cation habits that are not representative of the ones held by the respective 
audience. 
The surprising result of the methodological examination is this: 
while investigative techniques are generally designed in such a way as 
to ensure the validity of a scientific inquiry, content analysis can in no 
way guarantee valid results. 1£ validity emerges in content analysis, 
then it does not stern from its explicitly stated procedur.e but from a 
hidden interaction process in which intuition plays a decisive part. 
This interaction process is neither under the control of a content analyst 
nor accessable to a methodological evaluation. Thus only luck and 
intuition ensures what is believed to be derived from explicit rigor 
and apparent objectivity. 
The content analyst's dilemma becomes even clearer in a flow 
chart of the defective process (see Figure 2). Although the presentation 
is a simplified one,the critical feature appears in form of an iterative 
loop adapting the explicit categorization rules to the nature of the sign-
vehicles and the stock of intuitive signification habits until the product 
of the categorization process passes the reliability test. When that 
product has reached the desired level of reliability the content analyst 
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knows little more than that some rule has been applied consistently. Since 
he has no control over the nature of this rule as it emerges from the in-
teraction between intuitive signification habits and·explicit instructions, 
he can hardly ~e certain about the possible validity of the results. Assum-
ing that the signification habits of judges and respective audiences are 
initially identical, it is almost certain that instructions only diminish the 
validity of a content analysis. Validation is at least theoretically con-
ceivable but practically never done. In the diagram, communication be-
tween defective content analysis and validation procedure is denoted by 
dotted arrOws. 
Essentially two means seem to suggest an immediate resolution 
of the content analyst's dilemma. Both require some conceptual modifi-
cations of the analytic technique. The first would require the explicit 
rules for categorization ideally to be made identical or at least not of 
such a nature as to interfere with the judge's signification habits as 
far as they are representative of the r",spective audience .. Then con-
tent analysis could most probably achieve explicitness, reliability and 
validity of the categorization process. This resolution presupposes 
the content analyst to acquire and possess a considerable amount of 
information about the signification habits to a givenset of sign-vehicles 
and about the learning process for acquiring such habits before he can 
ever start formulating appropriate rules. In fact he must have a well 
established theory of signification which seems currently very far from 
being conceivable. 
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The other means of resolving the analyst's dilemma is standariza-
tion of the procedure, ,If a set of explicit categorization rules - as arbi-
trarily as they may have been chosen - are employed consistently, 
exhibiting high reliability in a large variety of situations, then differences 
in the results do represent differences in the data. What such differen,:es 
mean ,is another problem altogether. They certainly cannot be so easily 
, interpreted as representing some signification response as it ,has been 
customary in content analysis to date. 
Little use has been made of either ways of ,resolving the method-
ological dilemma. Perhaps the attempt to make use, of Osgood's meas-
ureS of afiectivemeaning (149) (152) as a basis for a computer content 
analysis program (84) may be mentioned as a timid experiment in the 
direction of the former means of resolving the dilemma. Lasswell's 
attempt to standardize categories for detecting foreign propaganda 
'. 
SOurCes in domestic mass media (Ill) suffices as an example for the 
latter. But neither approaches have been widely accepted. Many con-
tent analysts, including Berelson argue "against the development of a 
single set of categories. "Proponents of this view, " as Budd put it, 
"maintain that every content analysis is unique, presenting"its own 
individual problems that require individual handling" (34:13). Pool 
believes that not enough research has been done to establish standard-
ized measures in content analysis. !1Such a measure is convenient 
when a considerable number of researchers are working on the same 
variable, and when someone suc:aeeds in working out good categories 
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for that variable. It is doubtful that either of those criteria can be met 
in most areas of content analysis ... until that time there is a good deal 
to be said for ~hoc categories ... " (162:213-214). 
How little various ad hoc category schemes, content analysis 
measures and indices yield comparable results and, hence, how little 
they validate each others results was the lesson of a study made by the 
Institute for Communications Research at the University of Illinois (191). 
The investigators took as many as 70 written passages of about 300 words 
each from such varied sources as The Bible, the Chicago Sun- Times 
and a manual for operating a Remington typewriter. Each of these 
passages were analyzed in 55 different ways. The 55 different analyses 
had been suggested in the content analysis literature and claimed to 
measure some effects a text may have on its reader, e. g. retention, 
interest, willingness to read more material of a similar nature. The 
analyses involved simple counts such as the number of first, second, 
and third person pronouns, various indices such as readability sCOres, 
the average number of.meanings per word, and scaled judgements such 
as "interestingness of .subject matter," "how well written." In total 
the study was a gigantic design, "a content analysis, to end all content 
analyses. 11 
A factor analysis revealed 10 factors accounting for some 620/0 
of the total variance. But most of the factors could not be interpreted 
in a meaningful way. To validate the factors, it was argued that they 
should at least be able to distinguish among texts of different sources. 
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Some positive results were present but they were only slight. 
Then a set of texts scoring high, medium, and low on four factors 
believed to be meaningful were given to readers who were subsequently 
subjected to a series of tests known to measure interest, evaluation, 
comprehension and retention of the content. Correlation of the test re-
sults with each of the factors yielded no satisfactory result whereupon 
work on the content analysis variables was suspended. 
This was the only extensive and sophisticated study designed to 
throw some light on the validity of the numerous content analytic schemes 
in a fairly limited domain. The rules for categorization varied from 
the highly explicit type quantitative measure to the kind using intuitive 
judgements on simple scales. Its results provide empirical evidence 
for the reality of the content analyst's methodological dilemma. 
Theoretical Issues 
Reviewing studies in content analysis one cannot but detect the 
feeling of those who are not absolutely satisfied with the quality of the,ir 
products that more adequate results would quickly be forthcoming if 
there were more studies and better quantitative methods. Yet an in-
crease in the number of such studies is not likely to bring about the 
expected improvements, although investigative technology undoubtedly 
plays a major role in determining the quality of content analysis. 
Barcus I survey (20) of over 1700 content analyses displayed the great 
variety of subject matter to which researchers had devoted themselves 
but he could not point toward qualitative improvements. As "a content 
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analysis of content analysis" Barcus! method is subje ct to a well known 
logical constraint: no method can uncover its own explanatory power and 
limitations, much less go beyond it. 
Dissatisfactions that are sometimes associated with content 
analysis do not always arise from methodological considerations. They 
can often be traced .back precisely to the point when empirical research 
stepped in where hitherto socially responsible journalists and cultural 
critics had reigned supreme. To the latter there was never any doubt 
of what content is, what communications are about and that their mass 
distribution act as great social forces. But when specific inquiries 
into mass media content and their effects on election campaigns, 
audience evaluation of educational radio programs, etc., were made, 
these presumed facts could rarely be demonstrated. It is certainly 
conceivable that the social philosopher's judgments were severely 
biased or that such analyses, were objectionable on methodological 
grounds, but it is also possible that informed authorities on social, 
political and public matters make use of concepts of content that are 
incompatible with those underlying a particular content analytic 
technique. Under these conditions dissatisfaction may be due not to 
the methodological dilemma but rather to the il;ladequacy of the 
theoretical frameworks that are built into the investigative technique 
employed. 
As we argued in the section on definitional issues, the em-
pirical domain of content analysis is delineated only on intuitive 
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grounds. And yet each content analysis is explicitly or implicitly required 
to ope rationalize the term "content" in some way. This section is devoted 
to a critical examination of such built- in conceptions of content. 
Content as a Permeating Characteristic 
There can be no doubt that the volume of data upon which content 
analyses are most typically based calls for the use of procedures for 
rigorous simplification. In content analysis such simplification is most 
commonly achieved by enumerating the relevant units (sign-vehicles, 
words, sentences, paragraphs, cooccurrences, etc.) that are found in 
each category after a suitable categorization process has been applied 
on a given text. Enumerations of this kind lead to relative frequencies 
or other statistical indices of the distribution of category assignments 
within a category scheme. The most significant feature of such simpli-
fications is that the relative position of the categorized units within the 
text is not maintained. Thus, the statistical measures so computed 
are always measureS of permeation. 
A logical prerequisite of categorization and enumeration is the 
discriminability of mutually exclusive units within the symbolic 
material to be analyzed. Even at this point sound theoretical frame-
works are not available to justify a particular unitization in terms of 
the meanings conveyed by a given message. 
According to Pool the problem of whether there exists a "basic 
unit of meaning of relevance to content analysis" had been considered 
at the first working conference on content analysis mentioned above. 
The working definition that apparently emerged at this conference is an 
entirely. statistical one. It identifies "a basic unit of meaning" with 
"relatively little freedom for variation within it, but much freedom at 
its boundaries. Habit strengths are strong, transitional probabilities 
high within it but low across its boundaries. Such a unit, if it exists, 
is a kind of building block" (162:203) that can provide the logical basis 
for categorization and enumeration. 
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The conference discussed this issue, could not find a satisfactory 
solution, and had to leave the matter of "basic units" vague. "It is 
one of the problems, " writes Pool, "to which psycholinguistics may 
help to produce an answer. But as of now it is not clear how one identi-
fies a basic unit of meaning" (162:203-204). Linguists, on the other 
hand, start out with the assumption that words, while isolable on 
statistical grounds are inherently relatively meaningless unless viewed 
in the context of the syntactic and semantic structure of a language. 
Such a structure, however, is precisely "counted away" when apply-
ing quantitative measures of permeation. It enters at best through the 
backdoor of an extra analytical interpretation. 
While the problem of basic units of meaning that are sufficiently 
general for all content analyses has not been solved, the requirements 
on the nature of the units that are distinguished in content analyses 
seems to vary with the specific purpose of the investigation. For 
example, if the research tries to ascertain the amount of attention de-
voted to some country it might be adequate to enumer:ate the number 
of words explicitly referring to that country. If more elaborately 
structured images of that country are the focus of analysis it seems 
necessary to define units of enumeration in terms of propositions that 
include respective references etc. 
Whenever actual counts are presented of, say, words, political 
symbols, propositions, themes or even silences that have been identi-
fied within a speech or body of text, a critical attitude often leads to 
the question "so what?" When for example, the political symbol 
"freedom" appears in a country A with the hi!jhest relative frequency 
while the political symbol "dictatorship" takes the first rank among 
the political symbols mentioned in country B, what does this indicate? 
Are the people of country A more free than those of country B? The 
premise which seems to suggest a confirmatory answer to this ques-
tion could very well be reversed on the assumption that people talk 
about what they don't have. The inferences that can be drawn from the 
degree to which kno"l;n symbols permeate particular communications 
are most certainly not obvious. 
Since Lasswell's World Attention Survey (108) content analysts 
have become more modest in their claims and take the relative fre-
quency with which a symbol, theme, etc. appears as a measure for 
the amount of attention devoted to the phenomena signified by it. But 
analysts identifying relative frequency with relative attention cannot 
consider themselves on safe grounds either. 
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Symbols may, for instance, be purposively selected whereby atten-
tion is devoted to something instrumentally linked but not manifestly 
contingent with that symbol. For example, someone living under 
Stalinist domination who is primarily concerned with opposing this form 
of government would be a fool to use the symbol "dictatorship" or even 
"decentralization" too freely in public. He is mOre likely to argue in 
economic terms or express concern with the working conditions of the 
people or their living standard, thus making the link to his attention 
non-manifest. When early psychological theories of stimulus reinforce-
ment were applied to political propaganda the sheer frequency of stim-
ulation gained considerable significance. But as it now turns out, such 
theories cannot account for instrumental usages of communication, 
probably not even for content as distinguished from physical stimuli. 
They reduce communicators and audiences to rather primitive mechan-
isms of habituation. 
To give another example that critically opposes the frequency 
attention identification: symbols when repeated frequently may lose 
their original meanings up to the point where they become habitua,! 
utterances devoid of cognitive or behavioral consequences. This is 
the essence of recent experimental work on "semantic satiation" (105) . 
. It suggests that high relative frequency of a symbol may under certain 
conditions be indicative of quite the opposite of high attention. 
Neither is there any a priori reason for the units used in con-
tent analysis studies to be concerned with meanings in the linguistic 
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or psycholinguistic sense nOr for permeation measures to be in accord 
with any particular sociological or political theory. But in order to have 
any practical or theoretical significance at all, such statistical permea-
tion measures of message characteristics have to be indicative of some 
phenomena, whatever the basis of this indication may be. This hypothe-
sized significance has yet to be substantiated in each individual situation. 
One rare example of an attempt to give some significance to a 
content permeation measure appears in Holsti, Brody and North's 
study of the 1962 Cuban crisis (84). The researchers subjected all 
available documents issued by the major decision makers in the crisis 
to a computer content analysis. Empirical results in psycholinguistics 
had gone into this analytic device which could now be used to identify 
the intensity of affective meaning of each word appearing in the docu-
ments and compute an average score for each SOurce of documents on 
a day- by,cdaybasis. While the resulting scores are not strictly 
.. :; 
. frequency characterizations their permeation .measures are s:fficiently 
similar to them. During this crisis situation the fluctuations of Holsti, 
Brody and North's permeation measures were found to significantly 
correlate with those of the Dow-Jones Average of Industrial Securities. 
Although this correlation is indicative of a relation between the two 
measures, since the meaning of the Dow-Jones Average is not per-
fectly understood the significance of the content permeation measure 
is still merely suggestive. In this case the_analysts interpreted their 
measures as indices of international tension. 
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The content analysis described above moreover exemplifies the 
maximal indicative power that can be expected from a concept of content 
as a permeating characteristic. It is limited to uncovering only the most 
general tone <;>r attitudinal coloring that prevails in the communication 
situation from which messages are sampled: international tension, 
, 
affective orientation, public attention or something akin to the dominant 
social climate. Since more complex syntactic and semantic structures 
are discarded when the analysis focus$es on such simple statistical 
measures of permeation, the organizational condition of the communi-
cations must largely remain hidden. 
While also interested in such permeating message characteristics 
as "the German war-mood," George (71), who participated in an ex-
tensive analysis of enemy broadcasts during World War II, provided 
many irrefutable examples in which statistically insignificant occur-
rences, (the simple presence or absence of a reference in a political 
speech or newscast) yielded reliable bases of prediction. The propa-
ganda analysis operation of the FCC which George evaluated after the 
war was of importance for policy makers in need of valid intelligence. 
Under these conditions it was of little importance how standards of 
reliability were assessed, which concept of content was utilized or 
whether the method qualified as a content analysis by definition. The 
experiences gained during this time period seem to indicate that under 
.. certain conditions non-statistical characterizat.i.ons of messages can 
have more theoretical and practical significance than frequency type 
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characterizations of permeation. 
The problem of the theoretical significance of permeation meas-
ures has unfortunately become an issue of qualitative versus quantitative 
analysis and remained as such at least since Kracaueris 1952 iiChallenge 
of quantitative content analysisii (102) without getting to the basic argu-
ment. We touched on this apparent controversy under definitional 
issues. As it seems, the critical point is that the convenient method 
of measuring simple frequencies of occurrence becomes inadequate 
when message sources and/or receivers exhibit higher order depend-
encies, much more so when they follow a complex logic; and are even 
out of place when source and/ or receiver pos sess some intelligence, 
e. g. produce novel instrumental communications according to particular 
objectives. 
The problem of whether the products of a content analytic pro-
cedure ought to be statistical or non- statistical, quantitative or quali-
tative, becomes rather immaterial when viewed in isolation from the 
nature of the particular system from which mes sages are obtained for 
analysis. Thus, criteria for differentiating analytical units within 
given mes sages and analytical procedures including their evaluative 
criteria obtain their appropriativeness only in reference to a suitable 
theoretical framework that is expected to predict some features of the 
system under analysis. Content as a statistically formulated permeat-
ing characteristic has not proven to have much theoretical significance 
except when interpersonal or social systems can be reduced to almost 
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structureles s entities. 
The history of quantification shows considerable success in its 
attempt to numerically represent what appeared hitherto "unanalyzable 
qualities" - the componental description of color qualities in the late 
19th century or the recent success in quantifying such apparent in-
tangibles as information and intelligence may suffice as examples. In 
order to have any theoretical significance it is quite conceivable that 
the analysis of message content within social systems of some com-
plexity requires quantitative techniques that go far beyond simple 
statistical permeation measures. Such analyses may require, for 
example, quantizations and transformations of syntactic structures or 
computational procedures making use of elaborate models. Quantitative 
measures that are more sophisticated than simple frequencies may 
prove more appropriate for the analysis of complex messages even 
though such messages may appear to their receivers as non-analyzable 
qualitative varieties. 
Content as Intersubjectively Verifiable 
A second issue which leads to theoretical implication is the role 
of the "manifestness" of those message characteristics that content 
analysis can supposedly handle. 
It will be recalled that Berelson made it a definitional require-
ment of content analysis that the content to be analyzed be manifest 
while Cartwright later rejected this requirement on the grounds that 
latent message characteristics can also be of interest to social 
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psychologists and should hence not be excluded. The controversy and the 
social psychologists' position becomes quite understandable when "mani-
fest content" is identified - as it usually is - with a kind of dictionary 
interpretation while "latent content" then becomes more like a depth in-
terpretation as it would be given by a psychoanalyst. But the "manifest 
latent" controversy can become too easily a quibbling over words without 
corning to the point. Berelson and Lazarsfeld, for example, conceive 
of this differentiation quite differently. They argue: 
If one imagines a continuum along which various commun-
ications are placed depending upon the degree to which 
different members of the intended audience get the same 
understandings from them, one might place a simple news 
story on a train wreck at one end (since it is likely that 
every reader will get the same meanings from the con-
tent) and an obscure modern poem at the other (since it is 
likely that no two readers will get identical meanings from 
the content). Other kinds of content will fall at various 
points along this continuum. Thus analysis of manifest 
content is applicable to materials at the one end of the 
continuum where understanding is simple and direct and 
not at the other. Presumably, there is a point on the 
continuum beyond which the "latency" of the content (i. e. , 
the diversity of its understanding) is too great for reliable 
analysis (30: 7 -8). 
Here, "manifest content" becomes operationally. identified with 
some message characteristic that produces "uniformity of comprehen-
sian al;ld understanding" for a large majority of receivers. It is, in 
other words, intersubjectively verifiable. Intersubjective verifiability 
is also the underlying conception of content in Janis' sign-theoretical 
framework that was employed as an example for explicating reliability 
and validity in content analysis. In the light of the discussion in the 
section on methodological issues, we can see that in order to satisfy 
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any of the methodological standards, a content analysis that regards con-
tent as an intersubjectively verifiable message characteristic is absolutely 
limited to the investigation of manifest content in the sense of Berelson 
and Lazarsfe~d's definition. This is true even if some content analysis 
proposes to investigate latent content in the sense that Cartwright pre-
sumably had in mind. Whenever an analysis makes use - as it commonly 
does - of content as an intersubjectively verifiable characteristic it must 
exclude highly divergent message interpretations on the ground that such 
divergent interpretations only reduce achievable levels of reliability and 
hence have a diminishing effect on the probable validity of the result. 
If content analysis accepts a concept of content that is existent-
iallylinked with its intersubjective verifiability it is of course compelled 
to uncover only the most obvious oontent characteristics of communica-
tions. The limitation which the so.conceived content imposes becomes 
apparent when one consults, for instance, Adorno's discussion of 
"various superimposed layers of different degrees of manifestness or 
hiddenness that are utilized ... as a ... means of 'handling' the audience" 
of television. His main hypothesis is that the "hidden message may be 
more important than the overt, since this hidden message will escape 
the controls of consciousness," (3:479-480) and will therefore not be 
subject to the same modes of interpretation. Adorno gives two examples 
of television plays which are overtly intended to be amusing and com-
ical. Their" 'hidden meaning' emerges simply by the way the story 
looks at human beings; thus the audience is invited to look at (and 
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identify with) the characters in the same way without being made aware 
that indoctrination is present" (3:480-481). 
Analyzing verbal behavior, psychoanalysts in particular have 
found it useful to deal with "underlying motivations" or "deep-rooted 
assumptions" quite different from those explicitly expressed. This 
approach may take, say, two political speeches both overtly supporting 
the officially accepted ideology of the state, but, by utilizing fairly 
complicated metaphors, symbolisms, Or allusions, may show that one 
makes indirect references to peaceful coexistence, economy, and elim-
inating previous obstinacy, while the other stresses a revolutionary 
phi,losophy. and fight against revisionism. In certain critical political 
situations such a 'hidden content' may not only be intended, but more-
over, may be used instrumentally in such a way that the content is not 
easily detectable by everybody. who receives the message carrying it. 
The argument is not sOlely meant to be in favor of including 
Adorno's '!hidden content" in the empirical domain of content analysis. 
This would only replicate Cartwright's earlier cited definitional de-
mand. The example is mainly meant to show what is implicitly ex-
cluded from the scope of analysis when the idea of content as an inter-
subjectively verifiable characteristic is accepted. The investigation 
of message characteristics that can not be recognized Or of which a 
large majority of audience members is unconcious can hardly ever 
be validated for it would presupp.ose "uniformity of comprehension 
and understanding" by the audience which those message characteristics 
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will not yield by definition. The analysis of possible effects of commun-
. ications must also be excluded on the same grounds, for the probability 
of obtaining valid results (valid again in the sense of high intersubjective 
agreement) from such analyses which are sometimes called "prag-
matical" can, according to Janis, (91) be expected bnly to,Jje very low. 
The way the concept of an intersubjectively verifiable content is 
intimately interlocked with the methodology of content analysis has 
theoretical consequences of even more importance. Lasswell wrote 
that "although word counting is involved in the study of communication, 
not all quantitative procedures are necessarily 'content analysis.' The 
term can legitimately be applied only when 'counts' are undertaken 
with reference to a general theory of the communication process" 
(110:387). Not only has such "a general theory of the communication 
process" not emerged in content analytic pursuits, but the assumption 
of the intersubjective verifiability of content seems fundamentally 
alien to the basic ideas of communication. This assumption is not 
only opposed to tolerating possible differences in interpretative 
capability between scientifically trained judges and persons presumably 
handling the analyzed communications intuitively, but also fails to 
account for differentiations among the specific roles, intentions and 
positions those persons may occupy when constituting the communica-
tion network from which the messages were taken. This becomes 
explicit in a quotation from Berelson, who requires that 
... the content be accepted as a "common meeting-ground" 
for the communicator, the audience, and the analysts. 
That is, the content analysts assumes that the "meanings" 
which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain 
categories, correspond to the "meanings" intended by the 
communicator and/ or understood by the audience. In 
other words, the assumption is that there is a common 
universe of discourse among the relevant parties, so that 
the manifest content can be taken as a valid unit of study 
(27:19). 
From the point of view of any conceivable theory of communica-
tion the avoidance of differentiations between the constituents of a com-
munication network .- whether such network is an interpersonal one or 
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one. in which mass communication processes take .place - is ciducial. Un-
symmetric relations between social roles, conflicts (whether centered 
around unequal distribution of power, capabilities or opportunities), and 
differential access to information are but a few prerequisites of social 
communication processes. Differences in the interpretation of com-
munications that may stern from such conditions can very well be indi-
cative of the dynamics of the communication process itself. The concept 
of an intersubjectively verifiable content can hardly obtain an exclusive 
position in any communication theory. 
For instance, a rrlost prhnitive conception of a cOITlITlunication 
situation may postulate that messages flow only from someone informed 
to SOmeone ignorant of the issue. Assuming this to be the case, a given 
message must consequently be interpreted differently depending on who 
is asked to reproduce its content. Interpretative differences of a given 
message may very well indicate the possible communication structures 
that a message may facilitate; they may very well provide the basis for 
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predicting the probable pattern of information flow within a social group 
or throughout a population. 
Or, consider the phenomena of propaganda, the manifestation of 
social power in messages. Dahl, for example, considers political power 
as measurable in two respects: the first is the ability of an actor to 
produce a change in the probability distribution of a class of repetitive 
outcomes, the second is the frequency of association of an actor with 
outcomes that appear successful from the actor's presumed point of 
view (48). Political power lies in the essentially unsymmetric nature 
of a communication relation and appears by analyzing the interpretative 
differences and their peculiar interlinkages. Thus, the influencee 
might find himself increasingly involved in watching a popular television 
program while the growing popularity of the program helps the sponsor 
to sell his goods. For the one the program provides entertainment, 
for the other a convenient means to focus popular attention. To neglect 
such differences is to eliminate the possibility of inferring even the 
most rudimentary. social relationships of communication situations 
from which such messages are taken. 
And yet there seems to be no a priori reason for not allowing 
an analysis to account for those interpretational differences that 
provide re lia ble of pos sible dynamics of comn1.unication 
processes. Prerequisite for such analyses is, of course, the abandon-
ment of the idea of content as something unique which is supposedly 
recognizably manifest in some physical stimuli for a large number of 
individuals including the scientifically trained judge, or simply the re-
jection of the idea of an intersubjectively verifiable content. 
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In asking the question as to whose meaning is supposed to be 
categorized by a content analysis, Janis recognized that these messages 
may be different for different audience s or communicators whose signif-
ication responses are intended to be estimated. "The classification 
procedures of semantical content analysis ... require the classification 
of sign-vehicles on the basis of the coordinated signification responses 
of some class of sign interpreters" (91:432). In this case the inter-
s:ubjective verifiability. is not abandoned but only limited to a specialized 
audience delineated in advance. Results that such an analysis can pro-
vide still cannot be expected to have significance in the light of a theory 
of corrnllunication Q 
But it is quite conceivable that a series of analyses of a given 
sample of communications could - as suming various information pro-
cessing regularities that derive from the structure and constituencies 
of the communication situation - yield results that not only differ from 
each other but moreover make no attempt to represent something like 
signification responses of the persons involved. These analytical re-
sults, though not necessarily intersubjectively verifiable, may indeed 
provide the empirical basis for reconstructing the underlying com-
munication network of the system under consideration as well as for 
inferring some of its inherent dynamics. 
81 
What we are arguing for is the liberation of content analysis from 
the idea of an intersubjectively verifiable content in order for its results 
to be relevant for a theory of communication. Since this content con-
cept is so deeply built into the analytical technique its change would re-
quire considerable modifications of the procedure. 
Content as Individually Realizable 
A third quite serious theoretical issue is the dominantly psycho-
logical formulation of the content analytic process and hence the con-
ception of content as only individually realizable. 
By "psychological formulation of content analysis" we do not 
suggest that categories are held to be of psychological significance only. 
As Barcus' tabulation of the content analysis literature shows, cate-
gories of content refer more often to social matters such as prejudice, 
social stereotypes, majority and minority representation (31) or to 
political matters such as attitudes toward ideological complexes, pro 
and con fascism (111), political symbols (113) and values of elites (9). 
Berelson explains what the individual realizability of content encom-
passes: 
In a sense, content analysis occurs whenever someone 
summarizes and/ or interprets what he reads or hears 
... But in the more limited sense in which it is used 
here, content analysis denotes a ... method ... intended 
to provide precise and concise descriptions of what the 
communication says, ... : (l60:iii). 
As we have shown, Janis,too,presupposes a judge'S ability to 
estimate the signification responses of a class of sign interpreters 
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to a given set of sign-vehicles. Whether content is here conceived of as 
the "what" that a communication" sa ys, " connoting a unique and manife st 
quality or whether it is viewed as an estimate of the signification re-
sponses that is intersubjectively verifiable with respect to members of 
a particular audience 1 it is always 11soll1eo.tlAel~11' who sUInn1arizes, inter-
prets or estimates an apparently otherwise intangible message character-
istic. This is true whether this "someone" is a scientifically trained 
judge who becomes an essential part of the analytical procedure or 
whether' it is a communicator and/ or audience member who is regarded 
as providing validity criteria for the analysis, the meanings, significa-
tions, and contents are assumed to be housed solely in an individual 
human being. They are, so to speak, ethnocentral attributes. 
As a consequence of this built-in conception of content as only 
individually realizable, one obse rver of content analysis, S'chutz (171), 
whose definition was cited above, goes even so far as to declare that 
content analysis basically a psychological method of inquiry which is 
in this respect in agreement with Osgood"s view. He correctly per-
ceived that the content analytic procedure as 'currently followed is 
essentially analoguous to the psychological technique of projective 
tests. Both, content analysis and such projective tests as the Rorschach 
and the Thematic Apperception Test,o££er a person texts, visual dis-
plays and other material for a symbolic interpretation. The difference 
lies only in the interpretation of the results obtained in such situa-
tions. 
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While response variations in content analysis are assumed to be 
due to some characteristics in the material presented to the respondent, 
response variations in projective tests are assumed to be due to varia-
tions in the respondents personality. By controlling for reliability and 
forcing judges to follow explicit categorization rules, content analysis 
at least aims at setting possible personality differences of the respond-
ents at invariance. Projective tests, on the other hand, try to standard-
ize the relatively ambiguous material presented to the respondents and 
thus hope to gain certainty about the way mental mechanisms are ex-
pressed in the responses and the way in which elicited projections 
are to be interpreted reliably. While most of the tests are by now 
fairly well understood to "tap the durable essenCe of personality" (8), 
content analysis is in a triply difficult situation, for (al the content 
categories are rarely ever standardized, (b) the universe of possible 
projections is virtually infinite and (cl there seems to be no adequate 
theoretical framework that could account for personality-independent 
projections elicited by the material presented. 
In a self-critical momeht,' Lasswell and associates, whose 
work is almost entirely devoted to the content analysis of political 
symbols in the above mentioned fashion, admit that 
.. ' . there is as yet no good theory of symbolic communica-
tion by' which to predict how given values, attitudes, or 
. ideologies will be expressed in manifest symbols. The 
extent theories. tend to deal with values, attitudes, and 
ideologies as the ultimate units, not with the symbolic 
atoms of which they are composed. There is almost no 
theory of language which predicts the specific words one 
will emit in the course of expressing the content of this 
thought. Theories in philosophy or in the sociology of 
knowledge sometimes enable us to predict ideas that will 
be expressed by persons with certain other ideas or 
social characteristics. But little thought has been 
given to predicting the specific words in which these 
ideas will be cloaked. The content analyst, therefore, 
does not know what to expect (113:49). 
" 
In a situation that lacks adequate theoretical frameworks, not 
to speak of established theories, the ease with which individually 
,realized mes sage characteristics are projected onto socio- political 
structures seems surprising, especially since judges are considered 
to be scientifically trained. But even if some' certainty could be gained 
concerning this critical theoretical issue, when data are obtained from 
more complex social systems it is quite conceivable that the concept 
of content as an individually realizable message characteristic is 
entirely inadequate for providing information about viable structures 
of that system simply because the information processing capacity of 
an unaided human individual is fairly limited and even more restricted 
by particular points of view that are inevitably acquired. 
Let us consider a very common example from the customary 
empirical domain of content analysis: products of modern mass 
culture in industrialized societies such as books, records of popular 
mus'ic, television shows, fads or fashions, popular celebrities. 
While these messages are distributed on a mass basis to very large 
audiences whose members enjoy them and respond to them more 
or less as individuals they are undoubtedly the outcome of highly 
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organized collaborations of man and machines, each participant of which 
fulfills specialized functions in, derives motivations and obtains rewards 
from those complex organizational frameworks. 
It is, of course, always possible to apply a psychologically based 
content analysis procedure to industrially produced messages and corne 
up with some subjectively satisfying description of their characteristics 
which may - in a case that is considered ideal in content analysis - even 
be congruous with the signification responses of those audience members 
toward which the communications were directed. However, the discovery 
of antecedent conditions of such communications which go beyond the 
habitual interpretations by single individuals must escape a concept of 
content as an individually realizable characteristic. Members of mass 
media audiences perceive only the front of a stage made up of authors, 
actors, simple interpersonal relations, social situations or features 
purposefully cultivated about them. Judges chosen from such audiences 
are more likely to achieve reliability along habituated lines. 
The incapability of an approach to content analysis that is limited 
to the individual realizability of content refers specifically to the im-
pact of more complex, super-individual, socio-technological structures 
of which the nature of the mass produced messages seems to be the 
outcome. The personification of modern governmental machineries 
or of international relations is a symptom of this incapability. Or, to 
stick to our example of mass media products, that under these condi-
tions individual authors are still associated with them is but an 
unconscious remainder of pre-industrialized culture and a useful sales 
argument skillfully manipulated by the cultural industry at large. As 
Adorno put it vividly: "To study television shows in terms of the 
psychology of the authors would almost be tantamount to studying Ford 
cars in terms of the psychoanalys.is of the late Mr. Ford" (3:482). 
Even Adorno, who in opposition to the inter subjective verifi-
ability of content suggested consideration of "various levels of hidden 
messages" for analysis, is still limited to its individual realizability, 
although he regards content within a social psychological framework. 
This concept of content as individually realizable message character-
istic allows for individual differences in interpretation but can treat 
neither communicator nor audience as an organization but as an 
agglomeration of individuals. The difference appears, for instance, 
in the multiplicity of aspects under which the successful communica-
tion industry tends to view its own products and the singleness with 
which such a product appears to an individual. This multiplicity of 
functionally interlinked I contents! which reflect the complexity of a 
social communication network may, in fact, be purposefully reduced 
to a simple single interpretation on the part of an individual consumer. 
Whenever sufficient evidence exists that participants in a com-
munication situation are independent individuals or that its participants 
can be viewed as an agglomeration of people without too much loss -
as it may be justifiable for the typical atidieu€·e of modern mass 
media - the concept of an individually realizable content seems 
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perfectly adequate. But whenever messages mediate between. social 
structures of some complexity.,i. e. are the outcome of a non-random 
interaction process of which individuals are constituent participants, 
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the analytical use of this concept of content must lead to faulty results. 
The fact that virtually no objections to content analysis have been raised 
along this line can be considered indicative of the content analyst's 
position in this situation. While practically and theoretically incapable 
of analyzing the content of a given message as it pertains to an inter-
pretation on the part of the complex social organization of the mass 
media, he is severely bound by the nature of the popularizations, the 
images and points of view that ,the communication industry tries to 
create and maintain and can do rfothing but conform in seeking validat-
ing support for his analysis in the happily individualized mass media 
audience. 
A psychologically formulated content analysis that is based on 
the individual realizability of content could almost be paraphrased as 
an attempt to replicate or represent aspects of subjectively meaning-
ful cognitive processes that are evoked by some stimuli whereby these 
aspects are regarded as symbolic manifestations of the psycho- social 
environment of the subject. The ease with which such individual 
realizations are customarily projected onto social structures, or 
its reverse, i. e., sOcial events are studied through the cognitive 
processes of their participants, has had no suitably formulated theo-
retical basis but a long history and continual support by western 
88 
philosophies who have defined signs, symbols, language etc. in such a 
way that they uniquely segregate man from animals on the one hand and 
individual from society on the other. A concept of content that is super-
individually realizable is virtually nonexistent. 
When communications between social organizations are intended 
to be the subject of something like a content analysis the relevant 
messages must be expected to exhibit an extremely complicated "gram-
mar" and "semantics" and tend to contain much more information than 
a single human being maybe able to process. Thus the analysis of the 
products of such social organizations as the mas s media industry, 
political parties Or whole cultures as messages, and in terms of the 
dynamics of the underlying communication networks, must be assumed 
to be veiyinvolved. Analyses of this magnitude necessitate adequate 
theoretical frameworks within which scientific teams can cooperate 
effectively and elaborate investigative tools can develop. 
Very little has been done to enlarge the scope of content 
analysis beyond the boundary that the individual realizability of con-
tent imposes. Perhaps Hall's insightful interpretation of culture as 
a gigantic commu;nication process· should be noted as an example. 
Unfortunately, his attempt to develop a "vocabulary of culture" of 
which messages transcending the lifetime of individual human beings 
are thought to be composed (81) has not found empirical applications. 
We have focused on three theoretical-conceptual issues that 
seemed most critical in implicitly delineating the scope of content 
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analysis. As far as one can speak of a concept of "content" in psycho-
logical tests involving symbolic responses it is most certainly conceived 
of as an individually realizable quality of the material presented. When 
one attempts to suppress the effects of personality variables on such 
symbolic interpretations and then proceeds to extrapolate from these 
interpretations to the possible signification responses of communicators 
and/ or audience members of a communication situation, "content" then 
becomes moreover an J.ntersubjectively verifiable characteristic. In-
direct validation makes necessary, and the volume of material typically 
analyzed favors the view of "content" as a permeating characteristic of 
communications. Although these critical theoretical issues are com-
pletely. independent of the methodological dilemma in content analysis 
they are closely related to the way trained judges and their non-
formalized content concept are explicitly and exclusively used as 
crucial constituents of the analytic process. After elaborating on the 
practical consequences of these theoretical issues it is now appropriate 
to focus briefly on some of the potential breakthroughs. 
One of the legacies of propaganda analysis in World War II are 
some sound objections to content analysis and the rudimentary form 
of a theoretical framework for a new approach. Although the permea-
tion of moods, tensions and anxieties in domestic propaganda were 
also of interest to the policy makers of that time, they placed more 
value upon predictions of military actions and inferences._ concerning 
expectations of the governing elite. While the analysis was used in 
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this context rather pragmatically and explicit descriptions of the theo-
retical assumptions and propositions were not attempted until after the 
war, (71) it became quite obvious that an analysis that was based on a 
concept of content as elaborated above was not very likely-to bring about 
the desired results. Account had to betaken of the social structure of 
the governing elite, their deciSion-making situation, and in particul<u 
the position of the propagandist within that elite and in relation to the 
population to be mobilized. The conventional content became merely 
a vehicle through which specific insights could be gained, and not the 
object of description. This inductive element which is quite alien to 
content analysis as an investigative technique is already manifest in 
the interest of the propaganda analyst ":S stated by George: 
In propaganda analysis, typically, the investigator is 
interested in inferring one or more of the following 
antecedent conditions of the propagandist's communica-
tion: his propaganda goals and techniques; the esti-
mates, expectations, and policy intentions of the lead-
ership group for whom the propagandist is speaking 
which have influenced the adoption of a particular 
propaganda strategy; the situational factors or changes 
which have influenced the leadership's estimates, 
expectations, and policy intentions and/or the propa-
gandist's choice of communication goals and techniques 
(70:18). 
According to George the propaganda analyst proceeds through 
a series of inferential steps from the most obvious linguistic features 
of a message to those of interest to the analyst. While the traditional 
content analyst takes into consideration, only what the communication 
manifestly "says, " the propaganda analyst assumes such surface 
appearances to be subsumed under a propaganda strategy which is to 
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be inferred as a first step inorder to get at elite intentions, expectations 
etc. George argues that this "indirect method requires logic-of-the-
situation reasoning and the use of generalizations other than the one-to-
one type of correlation between a content indication and an aspect of the 
elite I s political behavior Or situational milieu" (71 :43). 
Making inferences from texts as to their antecedent conditions 
or possible effects became also the concern which seemed to unite the 
efforts of many participants at the working conference on content 
analysis mentioned above. Here Osgood remarked that there seemS to 
be a "general natural law" relating the nature of a message with the 
nature of its producer and it appeared that the analysis of messages is 
very much concerned with some such law. Elaborations on some such 
law, Mahl's IIExploring Emotional States by Content Analysis" showed, 
for example, how speech disturbances such as superfluous repetitions, 
hesitations, stuttering, and sentence corrections may be used clinically 
as indicators of an individual's state of anxiety (124). Note that such 
speech disturbances are traditionally not considered subject to semantic 
analysis and have certainly little to do with signification habits or 
meaning in the common sense of the word. Saporta and Sebeok made 
a similar point in their paper on "Linguistics and Content Analysis:" 
"presumably, deviations from the structural norms in the formal 
characteristics of messages would then be correlated with differences 
in the intentions, behavioral states, in short, with some non-linguistic 
conditions in the producer of those messages" (169:131). 
While Mahl based the validation of hi$ analysis on some kind of 
intersubjective verifiability, namely, on a high correlation between the 
judgements of experienced psycho-diagnosticians with the measures 
obtained, Osgood sought validating evidence for his inferences in psy-
chological experiments. He could show "that contingencies among 
events in messages are indicative of the association structure in the 
source and predictive of the association structure that may result in 
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the receiver" (147:73). The "association structure" that can be in-
ferred from contingencies in messages can be regarded as a theoretical 
construct that has its roots in classical associationism in psychology 
and has been used to explain a variety of behavioral phenomena. While 
Osgood's contingency analysis provides a tool for the description of 
a particular message characteristic that is quite different from 
simple frequency characterizations, the meaningfulness of its results 
is rendered only under the assumption of a particularly psychological 
theory of human cognition. Thus, contingency analysis as an ap.alytical 
tool remains entirely descriptive. As a technique for counting some 
identifiable CO-Occurrences in messages it does not offer a method for 
making inferences from messages. 
When analyzing a written text a psychological point of view 
suggests itself immediately, for the text having been produced by an 
individual author can most obviously be expected to reflect non-
linguistic features of that author. Even the analysis of Nazi propa-
ganda had to consider the personality and propaganda habits of Goebbels 
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as a first step. Less specifically psychological in orientation is a state-
ment by Gerbner, who took up the main argument advanced in propaganda 
analysis and at the conference. He wanted to "see in content the basis 
for inference about specific functional relations between the communicat-
ing agent or agency and other events or systems, and about actual or 
potential consequences" (74:87), and not as a kind of objective summary 
of what the message says to someone. For him, "a 'communication' 
is ... a specialized, formally coded or representative social event which 
makes possible inferences about states, relationships, processes not 
directly observed. The 'process' of communication is the transmission 
of such events and sharing of certain inferences. The 'content' of com-
munication is the sum total of warranted inferences that can be made 
about relationships involved in the communication event" (74:86). The 
above statement was part of an attempt to introduce a conceptual frame-
work for content analysis in mass communications research. But the 
paper containing this statement did not go so far as to outline how such 
a view can be implemented on a practical basis. According to Gerbner2 
this formulation has not found any reflection in empirical research, 
which is rather unfortunate. 
A recent review of "Trends in content analysis" by Stephenson 
led to the conclusion that in the focus on methodological problems of 
computing data, "Osgood's contingency analysis, for example, merely 
2George Gerbner, personal communication to the author, 
February 1966. 
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sidetracks genuine communication problems, providing complications of 
facts which have no relevancy to such problems. A return to earlier 
formulations, and to real problems would provide the necessary theo-
retical basis for sound theoretical use of content analysis" (186:155). 
But Stephenson also neither offers any convincing argument for a re-
orientation of the goals of content analysis, nor specifies the critical 
issues of such computational techniques from a theoretical point of view. 
Since the conference on trends in content analysis no significant 
theoretical contributions to content analysis have been published. 
Numerous applications in sociology, psychology, communications re-
search and linguistics rarely indicate a departure from those traditional 
research ideas which have already been suggested by Berelson and 
Lazarsfeld (30) Berelson(27) (28) and recently been reviewed by 
Pool (162). Perhaps a handbook by North and others is worth mention-
ing. It discusses some of the .more sophisticated procedures for 
analyzing historical documents in reference to situations of inter-
national conflict (142). But, this work as well as HolsH's yet unpub-
lished review of content analysis (83) and Stone's report on his work 
with the General Inquirer cornputerprograms (188) (189) (190) do not 
provide new theoretical insights either, and Stephenson's unexplained 
dis s a tisfa ction a pplie s a swell. 
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Summary 
This is essentially the current state of content analysis .. Its 
critical issues show more unsolved problems than resolutions. Already 
the definitions that have been advanced in the cause of its development 
and that ought to have distinguish this mode of inquiry from others are 
by and large insufficient; Neither do they unambiguously delineate the 
empirical domain to which the method is presumably applicable, nor 
do they clearly as sert toward what use such analyses may be put. The 
few attempts to specify analytical procedures that are typical of this 
mode of inquiry are either too narrow or have been shown to easily 
lead to methodological inadequacies that may render content analysis 
a method full of fallacies and hence, inacceptable on intellectual 
grounds. 
The more carefully the habitual use of this investigative tech-
nique is examined, the weaker does its theoretical foundations appear. 
It seems that the intentions of the content analysts and their claims 
often run far ahead of their understanding of the constraints that 
a re built into particular methodologies. Part of the difficulties, it 
seems, stern from unnecessary commitments regarding explicit 
procedures of enumeration and computation that have been useful 
in other domains of empirical inquiry but are apparently alien to the 
study of the content of messages. If data are subjected to an 
analysis because of their known Or assumed "semanticity" or 
"referentiality," their "symbolic nature" or by virtue of the fact 
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that they are "about!! something else~ or have lI c ontent j It then it ITlust be 
argued that specific ll1ethodological requirell1Emts have to be ll1et which 
ll1ay be irrelevant where such assull1ptions are inconsequential. 
Rather than systell1atically working to elill1inate ll1ethodological 
defects and to enhance the power of theoretical frall1eworks, whether 
consciously or not, content analysis seell1S to have frequently ll1ade 
use of its techniques for reason other than that of gaining verifiable 
. information froll1 available data. The peculiar historical origins of 
this undertaking may account for this use. 
The current state of content analysis seell1S all the 1l10re un-
satisfactory considering the fact that the ll1ethod today constitutes 
probably the 1l10st fundall1ental tool in comll1unications research and 
in the social sciences as far as they are concerned with the exchange. 
of messages of any kind. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TEN WORKING EXAMPLES 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, the current concep-
tion of content analysis as an investigative method is unsatisfactory in 
numerous respects. This makes it difficult to conceive that a redefini-
tion of this widely used term will bring about the desired adequacy. 
The strong associations between these previously elaborated insuffi-
ciencies and the term "content analysis" alone justify the introduction 
of another, broader, and intuitively more satisfactory' name for our 
subject matter: message analysis. 
What is meant by "message" will be clarified later. Forthe 
rnOITlent it suffices to assume the intuitive notion of a l1m.essage 1! as 
"a communication about something not identical with the materiality 
of that which is transmitted." A letter could, for example, be con-
sidered a message on the ground that it tells a reader something about 
something other than the paper and ink of which it consists. But the 
notion of message becomes more interesting if it is extended beyond 
its conventional interpretation to include, for example, the products 
of popular mass media if they indicate to an analyst some antecedent 
condition of their industrial production or omission, or allow him to 
predict the pos sible socio- cultural consequence s of their existence. 
On the other extreme this notion should be broad enough to encompass 
non-verbal behavior of which the individual may not be aware. 
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Graphology would be an example of this extreme (214). 
In the light of the previous criticism it does not seem feasible to 
start-out by defining what message analysis IS or how it OUGHT to be 
understood, but rather to ask what problems are solved with it and what 
methods are employed when data are considered as messages in the 
above-mentioned sense. Therefore we begin to describe various inci-
dents in which directly observable phenomena were treated as a message 
about something else. In order to emphasize the generality of our con-
cern the ten examples which are chosen below refer to a wide range of 
areas, some of which appear to deal with problems of message analysis 
only on second inspection. 
Working example I, for instance, describes the decipherment 
of a language, a classical problem of archaeology. A historically in-
teresting case of what is called "quantitative semantics" is reported 
as working example II. Cryttography provides the working example 
IlL From literary research working example IV could be taken. 
Working example V is an example of war propaganda analysis. The 
use of propaganda analysis for intelligence purposes is exemplified 
in VI. The authors of working examples V, VII and VIn are com-
mitted to communications research, each from a different point of· 
view, but all dealing with mass media products of one kind or another. 
Working examples IX and X are included to show the role computers 
may play in message analysis with X as a specific application to 
psychodiagnosis. 
The working examples are assumed to provide a sufficiently 
broad support for the generalizations concerning the goals of such an 
inquiry, the analysis of the underlying methodological pattern and a 
statement of the specific empirical problems associated with message 
analysis which are attempted in succeeding chapters. 
Working example I 
One of the traditional subjects of archaeology is the inquiry 
into hitherto unreadable records pertaining to ancient cultures. liThe 
greatest single task of decipherment ever performed ll is, according to 
Pratt (164:19), the decipherment of the old Persian script. Although 
this accomplishment belongs to the history of science, it may provide 
a good illustration for a certain type of message analysis although a 
replication of such an incident is improbable. 
During the 17th century, when many European travelers dis-
covered origins of civilizations in the Near East, several inscriptions 
were copied from the rocks of old Persian ruins and published as 
mysteries along with the travel adventures. Neither the purpose of 
these inscriptions, nor the language in which they were written was 
known. 
According to Doblhofer (52:81-113), our main source for this 
example, the first contribution to an understanding of these cuneiform 
characters was evidence provided in support of the hypothesis that 
the inscriptions were written horizontally and not vertically as was 
assumed at that time. Years later Carsten Niebuhr, mathematician, 
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engineer and archaeologist, discovered that the inscriptions belonged 
to three different writing systems. He concentrated on the first, 
distinguished 42 different characters but could not make sense out of 
the extensive frequency tables he compiled. 
After he died the orientalist and librarian Oluf Gerhard 
Tychsen continued. He correctly assumed that the role of one of the 
characters which appeared with a frequency unusual for natural 
languages is that of a word-distinction-marker. His knowledge of 
philology led him to conclude that the three writing systems discovered 
earlier belonged to three different languages, the first based on an 
alphabetical, the second on a syllabic and the third on a word script 
none of which was known. But two important mistakes led him into 
a ,blind alley. The one was that he tried to assign phonetic values to 
the characters in the hope of finding a language close enough to give 
meaning to the words. He obtained only gibberish. The second was 
a misdating of the Persian inscriptions. 
Friedrich Christian Karl Heinrich Munter paralleled the dis-
coveries of Tychsen but, being in addition familiar with the medieval 
Persian usage of titles, he reasoned that if the seven characters which 
had already been noted to be repetitious in the inscriptions, refer to 
"King" and "King of Kings, " then the preceding word should be a per-
sonal name. This was all he could achieve during his lifetime. 
Then carne George Friedrich Grotefend, no orientalist, but a 
thorough philologist and historian with broad interests and a 
predilection for mathematical puzzles. He knew enough of medieval 
mythology and was sufficiently equipped to place the many hypotheses 
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which had been accumulating in a proper historical context. Herodot, 
with whom he was thoroughly familiar provided him with lists of 
names from which he had to select. The fact that these three writing 
systems had also been found together On clay plates indicated a period 
in which three languages had to have been used simultaneously. This 
period had to coincide with the names of three successive kings if 
Munter's hypotheses were correct. The Greek names of kings satis-
fying such a condition could then be identified but old Persian was an 
unknown language. Happily, their translation into medieval Persian 
corresponded to the number of characters at the appropriate places. 
So Grotefend gained the total of 13 letters and several other word in-
terpretations consistent with the mythology handed down through 
history, and with what became independently known about those places 
where the inscriptions were found. 
The comparative philologist Ramus Christian Rask could 
correctly determine the genitive plural of "king" after other inscrip-
tions became available. Then Engene Burnouf published a new 
cuneiform alphabet and suggested that several of Grotefend's 
interpretations were wrong. The indiologist, sanscritist and 
historian Christian Larsson, being equipped with thorough know-
ledge of the documents pertaining to the historical period and area 
. in which the script presumably originated, could suggest certain 
I 
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very probable interpretations of the situation in which the texts were 
written. His work resulted in a new alphabet which already contained 
23 phonetically correct determined letters. Later several missing 
signs were independently interpreted by E. E. F. Beer, E. V. St. 
Jacquet and others. The final and probably most inclusive contribution 
to the decipherment of the old Persian script is due to Henry Creswicke 
Rawlinson, who as British representative in this area discovered num-
erous monuments with similar inscriptions and could- -in cooperation 
with the ongoing research in Europe--complete the task in the middle 
of the 19th century. The script could then be transc ribed and the 
documents translated into modern languages capable of denoting what 
the inscriptions presumably referred to. 
The working example represents J of course J an extrellle case 
of message analysis. The obstacles which had to be removed to 
achieve a correct reading of the records were so great that it occupied 
the lifetime of four generations of distinguished scientists. There-
fore the case illustrates most clearly some of the steps required for 
such an analysis and the kind of knowledge brought to bear on such a 
problem. 
Working example II 
18th century Sweden provides an example where a religious 
controversy was decided by applying certain rudimentary quantitative 
techniques to written text. The incident is documented by Dovring 
(55) (56) and involved a collection of 90 hymns, entitled "Songs of Zion." 
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The songs of unknown authorship passed the state censor and were 
published several times during a period when the powerful state church 
felt undermined by various religious movements. Disobedient behavior 
was observed, and suspiciously enough those people using the songs dared 
to choose their preachers according to their preferences, leaving empty 
the churches to which they were assigned. The popular ministers soon 
became associated with a religious sect, the Moravian Brethren, and 
the orthodox clergy accused the songs of being "contagious, " carrying 
"dangerous ideas" which "may have disastrous consequences for the 
whole Swedish state. " 
The controversy soon crystallized around the question of whether 
the apparently quite popular songs were in fact the carriers of those 
disintegrating thoughts or not. The accusation seemed, however, 
quite pointless. The frequency distribution of significant symbols i~ 
the songs showed close resemblance to the one in the official hymnal 
of the established church and no obvious difference between these two 
song books seemed to justify the prediction of "disastrous effects. " 
However, the clergy and intellectuals invo~ved in this contro·· 
versy were not only well read but also had continual acc'ess to foreign 
newspapers. A study of the German literature written in opposition 
to the Moravian movement revealed that the sect used a "special 
language" in the dissemination of their "dangerously diffuse doctrine." 
Their ideas were dressed in the ordinary language of each country's 
native tongue but new meanings were given to well known words, 
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themes and symbols. Because of the familiarity of the words and phrases 
used by the Moravians, the public was not aware of being exposed to a 
new way of thinking. According to Dovring, the learned clergyman 
"Kumblaeus felt that this use of language made it possible for the Mora-
vians to conce"l dangerous, false doctrines, and to create 'a state within 
the state'" (55;392). 
Kumblaeus then devised a kind of key-syrnbol-in-context method 
in order to recover the apparently concealed information. This method 
not only significantly distinguished the songs from the official hymns, 
but, moreover, clearly brought to light some of those features of the 
"special language" which had been described in the literature to be in-
dicative of the Moravian Brethren's propaganda technique. Supplemented 
by other "tests" and further "interrogations" the analysis led to the 
irrefutable conclusion that the songs indeed represented a link between 
the religious dissenters' behavior and the activities of the Moravian 
movement. 
The example refers probably to the first well documented inci-
dent in the history of message analysis in which non-conventional 
indicators of written text (i. e. not based on conventional or dictionary 
meanings of words) were used to draw inferences as to possible com-
munication links. Although the analytical tools employed were not 
highly developed, Dovring claims that a reconsideration of the invest-
igation with modern scientific methods of quantitative semantics 
confirms the "correctness of many of the accusations mad·~· by the 
orthodox clergy" (55:394). 
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Working example III 
The history of the concealment of information goes back to the 
Greeks who supposedly first made this art purposefully subservient to 
the needs of diplomacy and the army. But cryptography, as the science 
of secret communication is called today, reached its highest signif-
icance when the organization of big armies started to rely on wireless 
telegraphy, a medium of corrununication which could easily be overheard 
by an opponent. But simultaneously with the advance of secret codes 
arose the skill to break them. Many war situations therefore depended 
on whether the cryptographer of one side could outwit the one on the 
other, by analyzing those messages the content of which were inten-
tionally concealed from him. 
Pratt (164:183-187) vividly describes how Union cryptographers 
during the American Civil War scored their most spectacular success. 
In fall of 1864 the Union operations in the southwest were not prosper-
ing. General Canby commanded there for the Federals andihis problem 
was what Kirby Smith's Rebels meant to do. The rebels were lighter 
and moved faster than Canby could; unless he figured out their inten-
tions in advance he would have to guard every point 'at once, an under-
taking for which sufficient troops were not available . 
. 
Just at this time three documents were transmitted to Union 
headquarters in New Orleans. One was a telegram partly cipher, 
partly clear, that had been taken from a tapped Confederate wire: 
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September 30 
To Genl. Eo Ko Smith: 
What are you doing to execute the instructions 
sent you to HCDLLVW XMWqIG KiM GOEl DMWI IN 
VAS DGUGUHDMlTDo If success will be more cer-
tainyou can substitute EJTFKMPG OPGEEVT 
KQFARLF TAG HEEPZZU BBWYPHDN OMOMNQQGo 
By which you may effect 0 TPQGEXYK abo"., that 
part HJ OPG KWMCT patrolled by the ZMGRlK GGlUL 
CW EWBNDLXLo 
Jeffno Davis 
The second was a telegram which had been intercepted two years 
before, looking somewhat similar to the first. 
Vicksburg, Deco 26, 1862 
Geno Jo Eo Johnston, Jackson: 
I prefer OAAVVR, it has reference to XHVKJ 
QCHFF IBPZE LREQP ZWNYK to prevent PNUZE 
YXSWS TPJW at this point. ROEEL PSGHV ELVTZ 
FIUTL rLASL TLHlF NOIGT SMMLF GCCAJ Do 
J 0 Co Pemberton 
With the third document carne a note saying that it probably is 
the original clear of the secondo It had been found among the captured 
Confederate papers at the fall of Vicksburg and corresponded in date, 
phraseology, and number of letters: 
I prefer Cantono It has reference to fortifica-
tions at Yazoo City to prevent passage of river at 
that point. Force landed about three thousand, 
above mouth of rivero 
The cryptographic department at New Orleans was sufficiently 
familiar with the Vigen'ere tableau,' a device by means of which the 
clear of a message could be transformed into a cipher according to a 
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variable key. It was discovered that the Pemberton message of 1862 was 
written by means of that device. With the ciphered message and its 
clear, the key "MANCHESTER BLUFF" could be worked out, for the 
process of extracting the key is in the Vigenere tableau just the reverse 
of enciphering the message. But this was not the key for the message 
to Smith. 
Like the Pemberton message, the telegram included passages 
in clear; the irregular grouping of the letters seemed, moreover, to 
indicate word divisions. In particular the last sentence of the message 
had a peculiar suggestive structure to the cryptographer: 
BY WHICH YOU MAY EFFECT * ':0:'****1.,* ABOVE 
THAT PART *,~ *** *",*** PATROLLED BY THE 
****** ***** *:::~ *:;.~***~?:** 0 
The only patrols in that part of the world and of the war were the naval 
gunboat patrols on the river. He tried "of the river" between "part" 
and "patrolled" to extract the key and got "TE VICTORY C," a per-
fectly sensible fraction which could not possibly have been the result 
of a fortuitous process. 
However, the key was still incomplete, especially its beginning 
was missing. The longer word at the end of the message seemed to 
offer several possibilities, but the one-letter word followed by another 
eight letters could only be an "a" and for the eight-letter word the 
cryptographer could think only of "crossing." Again he tried to ex-
tract the key and obtained "ORY COMPLE." The two fractions 
appeared successive in the message, hence, giving "COMPLETE 
VICTOR Y" as the key to the decipherment. 
Beyond any doubt the message could now be read. It ordered 
Kirby Smith". to forward troops to the east side of the 
Mississippi.. "and contained precisely that information which 
Canby needed to plan his campaign. 
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In comparison with I and II this working example is probably 
most restricted. Perhaps just because of it, it provides an illustra-
tion for a message analysis in which the structure of the message is 
fairly simple and well understood in advance but the sheer quantity of 
combinatorial possibilities goes and is typically intended to go far 
beyond the possibility of achieving an interpretation by trial. 
Working example IV 
Literary historians find themselves frequently engaged in the 
identification of authors of unsigned documents. Controversies as to 
whom Shakespeare's plays can be attributed, whether or not St. Paul 
wrote the epistle to the Ephesians, and in which sequence Plato wrote 
his works, are still partly unresolved. 
Probably the first sophisticated quantitative approach to such 
problems was presented by Yule in his book The Statistical Study ~ 
Literature (217). The unidentified document which provided the 
challenge for this investigation was a small but well-known volume 
entitled De Imitatione Christi et Contemptu Omnium Vanitatum 
Mundi henceforth called Imitatio. The authorship was and still 
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seems to .be vigorously disputed. Among the candidates to which the 
book was ascribed are St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, Pope Innocent III, 
Gerard Groote, and most prominantly Thomas 'a Kempis (1379-1471) of 
the diocese of Cologne, and Jean Charlier De Gerson (1363-1429) of 
Paris University. 
Yule argued that "words are to the writer what paints are to 
the painter, the materials at his disposal for the purpose of creation" 
. and in order to answer any question concerning the authorship of 
a piece of literature "every element of that highly complex quality of 
the author's style may and should be taken into account, but amongst 
those elements his vocabulary -- the aggregate of words he uses 
takes an important position. It is a definite characteristic, " 
(217: 1). Consequently vocabulary samples were taken from the theo-
logical work of Gerson, from miscellaneous works of a Kempis and 
from the unidentified Irnitatio itself. 
While working on these texts, Yule perceived an analogy be-
tween his data showing numbers of words used once, twice, thrice, 
etc., and data showing number of persons of a finite population being 
involved in 0, 1, 2, 3 ... accidents during a given period of exposure. 
The theory of accident distribution had received a great deal of atten-
tion during that time and led him to develop several statistical indices 
by means of which various features of the vocabulary distribution 
within written texts could be comparatively stated. 
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Supplemented by numerous data concerning variations of these 
indices within the different works of one author, concerning variations 
among different authors writing in the same subject area and data 
about sampling affects, the three documents in question could be com-
pared. The vocabulary indices of the Imitatio exhibited a considerably 
higher degree of resemblance with the ones of the admitted works of 
~ Kempis than with those of the theolDgical works of Gerson. From 
this indirect evidence Yule concluded with a high degree of confidence 
, 
that Thomas a Kempis was the author of the Imitatio and not the alleged 
Charlier De Gerson. 
This example is of interest in several ways. While the previous 
working examples dealt in some sense with conventional meanings 
either directly (I), indirectly (II), or as a check for the plausibility of 
the inference (III), Yule did not rely on such meanings in predicting 
the deceased originator of a document. His work can also be considered 
as the first attempt to use statistical methods not just in support of an 
otherwise independent inferential argument, but as an inferential 
method. We will refer to this method later. 
Working example V 
In late 1939 U. S. legislation required the registration of for-
eign agents with the State Department. The measure was intended to 
disclose the identity of persons employed for the dissemination of 
"antidemocratic propaganda." In conjunction with the enforcement 
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of such legislation, Federal courts accepted the results of quantitative 
methods of content analysis as evidence. 
Among the most prominent cases one "involved a corporation 
engaged chiefly in the dissemination of books, periodicals and other 
publications. Although a subsidiary of a foreign government (the 
USSR), 'Bookniga' had failed to register. . .• Transocean G. m. b. H., 
a news agency, was likewise indicted I for failure to register, since 
it was a 'corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of 
the laws of Germany'" (111:177). The government asked Lasswell 
to provide judicial evidence for answering the question of whether 
the information disseminated is linked to a foreign government and 
can hence be considered to be propaganda. 
Lasswell and associates (111:173-232) developed a set of eight 
tests with implicit standards for accepting hypotheses concerning 
links between foreign governments and information disseminated in 
the United State s: 
The avowal test: a simple but not very :",eliable test making 
use of explicit declarations with one side of a controversy. For 
instance Lasswell et al. compared the relative frequencies with 
which publications described themselves as authorities in what they 
had to say about the USSR in order to ascertain a possible link to 
this country. 
The parallel test: a test designed to compare statements 
and themes which appeared in the publications in question with 
those of a known foreign propaganda channel. In the Transocean case 
Lasswell found for each incongruent statement, 23 statements con-
gruent with Nazi themes. 
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The consistency test: a test to compare the consistency or in-
consistency of attitudes expressed with the declared propaganda aims 
of a party to a controversy. The analysis of public pronouncements by 
Nazi party and governmental officials led to a set of propaganda aims 
on the basis of which the affinity of various publications to Nazi ob-
jectives could be exhibited. 
The presentation test, a test determining the balance of favorable 
and unfavorable treatment given to a controversial issue. For example, 
in Moscow News, distributed by Bookniga, the number of fa;;:orable 
references to the USSR outnumbered the unfavorable ones by more than 
600 to I while the favorable references to other countries were out-
numbered by unfavorable ones in the proportion 5 to 1. 
The source test: a test designed to establish the balance of 
sources relied on regarding a controversial issue. Lasswell found 
that Moscow News relied exclusively on acknowledged governmental 
and party sources in Russia. 
The concealed source test: a test involving detailed text compar-
isons in order to discover the origins of the information disseminated. 
The distinctiveness test making use of vocabularies peculiar to 
the propaganda sourCe. Distinctive vocabularies such as party 
slogans, Fachsprachen can be indicative of dominant ideological 
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orientations. Las swell compiled a list of key political terms from 
Russian newspapers: bourgeois, class, class struggle, collectivism, 
collective and state farrns 1 cOITIITIissariat, comrade, soviets (coun-
cils), diversionism, exploitation, ... such terms appear quite 
alien when translated into fluent English text and can be utilized to 
indicate the origin of the text in question. 
The distortion test: "Objective reporting" does not necessarily 
present all details of a controversy but only those an agency considers 
essential. The nature of the omissions and additions, obtained by 
comparison, are therefore of considerable interest. For example 
Transocean and the, New York Times were, compared on some sample 
days. A contingency table revealed that 58% of the additions by 
Transocean favored foreign propaganda aims while only 30/0 contra-
dicted them. Of the themes omitted by the suspected agency, 48% 
were contradictory to foreign propaganda aims and 16% in favor of 
,them. In reference to other newspapers in this country the suspected 
agency carried a comparatively larger portion of pro foreign dis-
tortions (as implicitly defined in the method employed). 
The objective of this example of quantitative content analysis 
is closely related to the one of the Swedish state church (II). It 
represents however, one of the first attempts to systematically 
extract information from the mass media and makes use of more 
advanced methodology. 
114 
Working example VI 
During World War II all major powers monitored the mass com-
munications media of other nations, opponents, allies or neutrals. 
Mass communication in general and broadcasting in particular were 
largely responsible for organizing socio-political .actions on a grand 
scale, and offered useful intelligence as to the internal states of a 
nation at war j her ITlorale 1 intentions, expectations, capabilities j 
etc. 
One type of intelligence of particular interest to the policy 
makers is the prediction of a governing elite's planned major 
initiative s and actions. Such intere sts bestow relevance to "ques-
tions concerning the timing of the action, its precise nature and 
magnitude, its exact location, the objectives assigned to the action, 
the elite I s expectations concerning its success, and the extent and 
nature of any opposition to that particular initiative within the elite 
group." (71:133) 
"In one of the outstanding case s of propaganda 
analysis on record, British content analysts were 
able to infer that Nazi propaganda talk about forth-
coming use of a secret, unconventional air- bombard-
ment weapon was no bluff. This inference was made 
in November, 1943, eight months before the 
inception of the V-I 'buzz-bomb' attacks. 
"Promises that Germany would have a reprisal 
weapon, which began to appear in German propaganda 
as early as June, 1943,. were obviously intended to 
bolster domestic morale, which had been badly shaken 
by increasingly heavy Allied raids to which Germany 
seemed to have no answer. If the propaganda objective 
of such promises was obvious enough, the questions 
remained whether such talk was mere propaganda or 
whether a new reprisal weapon was actually being 
prepared for use on a lllilitarily important scale in the 
near future. The British analyst answered these ques-
tions affirmatively with considerable confidence. His 
inference rested upon the fundalllentaf assulllption, con-
firmed on lllany past occasions, that 'Gerlllan propaganda 
never deliberately lllisled the German people in lllatters 
involving an increase of Gerrnan power. ' 
"The British propaganda analyst also inferred that 
the prolonged delay in the appearance of the new reprisal 
weapon - - after it had been repeatedly and authoritatively 
prolllised to the Gerlllan people -- lllUSt have been due 
to delays in its tillletablenot anticipated when the propa-
ganda COllllllitlllent was lllade. This inference was 
supported by the observation that it was Goebbels' 
practice not to lllake an illlportant propaganda COllllllit-
lllent of this character too far ahead of the date when he 
expected it to be realized. Thereby, he avoided aggravat-
ing dOlllestic lllorale, which would be quickly affected by 
resentlllent over false propaganda prolllises. The propa-
ganda analyst even estilllated the maxilllulll period of 
time - - about three lllonths - - that Goe bbels would allow 
hilllself for propaganda anticipation of the event. Hence, 
when the prolllised reprisal weapon was delayed appreci-
ably beyond the tillle period, the analyst concluded --
correctly - - that the scheduled elllploYITIent of the new 
weapon lllUSt have been unexpectedly delayed. He even 
identified the approxilllate dates on which sOlllething had 
happened to cause the delays. 
"The British analyst noted that references to air 
reprisal by llleans of new weapons suddenly dropped out 
of Gerlllan propaganda for ten days beginning August 19, 
and later for seven days beginning Septelllber 11. 
o •• He found that the 'gaps' did not coincide with 'other 
events' and, significantly, that the propaganda COllllllit-
ments on reprisal and new weapons was watered down 
when such propaganda was resumed after each 'gap.' 
The necessary explanation, then, was that sOlllething 
had happened just before each of the 'gaps' that was 
connected with the preparation and scheduling of the 
new reprisal weapons. (An implicit assulllption was 
that shifts toward increased alllbiguity in propaganda 
time COllllllitlllents regarding date of .;reprisal - - a shift 
that had in fact occurred after each' gap' - - reflected 
an official Nazi estilllate of a further delay in D-day for 
the new weapon. ) 
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" .. He then was told of the British air raid of 
August 17 on the secret weapon station at Peenemunde 
and the Allied air-raids of September 7-8 on installa-
tions in the Boulogne- Calais area which were suspected 
of being launching platforms for a new type of German 
weapon. . .. (thus), his inferences provided addi-
tional confirmation of the significance of the targets 
(not fully certain at the time) and of the effectiveness 
of the raids in disrupting Nazi reprisal preparations" 
(69:341-342). 
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After the war, George (71) attempted to rationally reconstruct 
some of the procedures the propaganda analysts had followed. These 
attempts were-facilitated by the fact that many propaganda analytic 
reports listed the evidence, reasoning, and more or less explicit 
models of the situation on the basis of which the inferences were 
drawn. Moreover, historical documents, now available, permitted 
verifications of the inferences made and, hence, an indirect evalua-
tion of the methods employed. 
We will refer to some such methods later in detail but at 
present another illustration of propaganda analysis will make some 
additional points. 
Working example VII 
Speculations regarding the power structure and policy differ-
entiation within the ruling elite of a foreign nation have always been 
of interest to students of politics. For various political reasons 
information regarding the structure of such an elite is likely to be 
withheld, a fact that makes the confirmation of political hypotheses 
extremely difficult. 
Stalin's seventieth birthday, December 21, 1949, provided a 
rare opportunity for an analysis of policy orientation and degrees of 
influence of various members of the Politburo. On this occasion the 
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speeches by members of the Politburo and other officials were pub-
lished in Pravda and Bolshevik. Such speeches, it was hoped, would 
shed some light on the then frequently debated problem of succession. 
Leites, Bernaut, and Garthoff who undertook the task of analyz-
ing these speeches wrote "while the statements mentioned appear at 
first glance to express the same adulation of Stalin, they do contain 
nuances in style and emphasis" (118:317). Being well aware that these 
statements were.made publicly, i. e. not only or at least not exclusively 
addressed to Stalin, but prominently directed to the masses of readers, 
the style and emphasis was assumed to be a reflection of the speaker's 
political pos ition. 
The characteristics relevant for an indication of such positions, 
Leites et al. argued, lie in the modes of expressing nearness. For 
this, the Soviet use of language provides two distinct approaches. 
One set of "symbols of nearness and intimacy (father, solicitude, etc.) 
appear most frequently in the popular image of Stalin and (is) stressed 
for that audience which is far removed from him." The other set of 
symbols derives from the prevailing "deprecation of such nearness in 
political relationships. The ideal party member does not stre s s any 
gratification he may derive from intimacy for political ends .... Those 
closer to Stalin politically are permitted to speak of him in terms of 
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lesser personal intimacy ('leader of the party,' etc.)," are privileged 
to refrain from the crudest form of adulation. The relative emphasis 
on the Bolshevik image or on the popular image of Stalin therefore "not 
only reflects the Bolshevik evaluation of the party as distinguished from, 
and superior to, the masses at large, but also indicates the relative 
distance of the speakers from Stalin" (118:338-339). 
Leites et al. counted the number of references made by each 
speaker to the Bolshevik image and to the popular image of Stalin as 
well as to images that are ambiguous with respect to the former and 
presented their results tabularly. The table suggested the existence 
of three major fractions within the Politburo. The f;"action consisting 
of Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria (in this order) having the highest 
number of references to Stalin's Bolshevik image and hence being 
probably closest to Stalin. 
For convenience of presentation we used the tabulated results 
by Leites et al. and computed the relative political distance D 
between Stalin and each member of the Politburo on the basis of their 
assumptions as follows: 
N(popular) + 1/2N(ambiguous) o~ D $,1 
D = N(popular) + N(ambiguous) + N(Bolshevik) 
whereby N represents the frequency of respective references to 
Stalins images. Accordingly the following rank order was obtained 
(the fractions result from contrasts in the relative political distance 
within the Politburo). 
119 











The power struggle immediately succeeding:Stalin's death clearly 
confirmed the inferen'ces made. What had not been known at that time 
but becomes clear now is that the group closest to Stalin obtained i.its: . 
power from the party organization while the group distant to Stalin de-
rived :'its' , power from the more popular organs of the USSR govern-
ment. 
Working example VIII 
As was suggested in Chapter One, much of "content analysis" 
is most directly associated with mass media research and in particular 
with quantitative inquiries into the popular content of those media. One 
of the classical studies is Berelson and Salter's "majority and minority 
Arne ricans" (31). 
The analysts randomly selected short stories published in 
popular magazines between 1937 and 1943. The attributes of persons 
appearing in such stories were mapped into several category sets of 
which the three most important ones were: a) explicit or impli,cit 
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membership in ethnic groups (white Americans, Anglo-Saxons and 
Europeans, Negroes, Jews, or others); b) social roles occupied in 
the story; c) their manner of presentatiol;l (favorable or unfavorable). 
A compositional comparison of the short- story population 
with the population in the U. S. showed a striking discrepancy. 90.8% 
of the persons in short stories were lIArnericans" as compared to 
60.2% in the U. S. population. In addition, most heroes were drawn 
from this group. The minorities tended to provide the villains. The 
IIArnericans '1 occupied positions with higher socio-econolTIic status) 
were more law-abiding, and acted less on the basis of materialistic 
motives than members of the minorities. The more a person re-
s~embled the stereotype of the white American, the better, the more 
decent, honest, superior, and the wealthier he was presented as 
being. 
The interpretation of this frequency characterization goes in 
two directions, the condition affecting the publication of such stories 
and the effects they have on the reading public. 
The antecedent conditions inferred are those of the institu-
tional set up: the compactness and shortness of the stories favor the 
use of established cliches. Familiar stereotypes immediately provide 
symbols of identification for a majority of the reading public, hence, 
optimiz e s a Ie s . Changing a once established successful formula may 
decrease expected returns and is, thus, not economically feasible. 
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Although the stories are offered and accepted as entertainment, 
the "constant deprivation" of the various minorities "over a long period 
of time serves to activate predispositions of a hostile or an indifferent 
audience. Readers with latent tendencies to assign the usual stereo-
typic descriptions to groups whom they do not know, or toward whom 
they are unsympathetic, or with whom they do not corne in personal 
contact, can find support for their convenient tags, labels and aggres-
sions in such magazine fiction. As this is all the more striking a s a 
result of the implicit comparison with 'the Americans' the condition 
and behavior of fictional characters can readily be used to "prove" 
that the Negroes are lazy or ignorant, the Jews sly, the Irish super-
stitious, the Italians criminal, and so on" (31:190). 
The reported research project is generally considered one of 
the corner stones for the use of content analysis in the study of popular 
culture. Together with working examples V and VI it shows how vast 
amounts of mass circulated material can be analyzed quite suggestively, 
but it is moreover an example in which the interesting part of the 
interpretation follows more or less as addenda -- inferences as to 
the antecedent conditions and effects do not follow from the method of 
content analysis. They are intelligent speculations for which the data 
could not provide conclusive evidence. 
Working example IX 
As some of the previous examples suggest, message analysis 
can easily lead to and require quite time consuming operations. When 
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the volume of data to be analyzed become$ in addition very large, the 
task often becomes hopelessly unmanageable, And yet many of the in-
teresting probleITls in the behavioral sciences require the processing 
of large quantities of written text. A public opinion interviewer, for 
example, recording the free answers to his questions, is faced with 
the difficult probleITl of evaluation. Or, studies in sITlall group re-
search typically tape the verbal interactions that occur in a hUITlan 
group, transcribe theITl and try to make sense out of them according 
to some theoretical framework. Historians and political scientists 
have recently become interested in collecting exchanged diplomatic 
documents to study the acceleration and deceleration of hostility in 
situations of international crises (84) (142). Similarly anthropologists, 
when attempting to analyze the structure of proverbs or folktales (100) 
have to consider large collections of written records and messages. 
The common difficulties associated with such problems of analyz,. 
ing written texts have led to several attempts to use electronic computers 
that are capable of handling large quantities of data. Among the outstand-
ing solutions are two programs, the "General Inquirer" developed by 
Stone (188), and Stone, Bales, Namenwirth, and Ogilvie (189), and 
the "Concept Learner" (86) developed by Hunt, which have jointly been 
used for automatic theme analysis (190). The range of practical 
applications of these programs is rapidly growing. We take only one 
illustrative example to show the procedure and potentialities of the 
method. 
123 
A well-known study by Osgood (148) atte:mpting to test hypotheses 
regarding the writer's state of anxiety and the style of his product co:m-
pared genuine suicide notes which had been collected in California with 
notes obtained fro:m private letters received fro:m friends and relatives 
of :me:mbers of a panel. Each suicide note was then paired with a 
"pseudocide" note the writer of which corresponded in sex. Graduate 
students with no prior experiences with suicide notes were instructed to 
independently assign the:m to these two categories. They did no better 
than chance. 
Stone and Hunt (190) atte:mpting to test the perfor:mance of their 
co:mputer syste:m for content analysis, obtained si:mulated suicide notes 
by instructing subjects to write such notes as realistically as possible. 
Genuine and si:mulated suicide notes were then paired according to sex, 
age, and socioecono:mic level and given to sopho:mores for the sa:me 
task of distinguishing the:m on an intuitive basis. As a whole the 
students did better than chance with the :mean being 66% correct, pos-
ing the question: could the Generallnquirer do better? 
The General Inquirer is a co:mputer progra:m for answering 
certain questions concerning stored texts. It accepts IBM cards on 
which the original sentences only slightly edited together with :marks 
for the syntactic position of the words are punched. In accordance 
with a specialized dictionary each word is then associated with a set 
of tags presu:med to be of theoretical significance for the proble:m 
under investigation. Tags and syntactic positions are then stored on 
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a magnetic tape and provide the data base for retrieval questions. 
The task of predicting whether the writer of the note intended to 
commit suicide or not became in this context one of effectively discrim-
inating between real and simulated notes. To this end the actual source 
of each of the first fifteen pairs of notes was known to the researchers. 
These notes were compared by means of the General Inquirer. After 
asking sets of questions and obtaining the proportion each of them could 
correctly distinguish, three factors were found to discriminate: 
1. References to concrete things, persons, and places 
(higher for real notes) 
2. Use of the actual word "love" in the text (higher for 
real notes) 
3. Total number of references to processes of thought 
and decision (higher for simulated notes) 
The discriminate function derived on the basis of the scores on these 
factors was then applied to the remaining eighteen pairs of notes with 
the members of the research team not knowing their identity. After 
the prediction was made the actual sourCe of the notes was revealed 
to the team. It turned out that seventeen of eighteen pairs of notes 
had been identified correctly. This result is quite remarkable when 
compared with the near chance identification by human judges. 
The major difficulty discovered in working with the General 
Inquirer was that the human user of the program tended to be too con-
strained to find enough questions which distinguish a large enough 
percentage of the text. At this point Hunt's "Concept Learner" 
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developed to discover discriminate functions automatically was suggested. 
In conjunction with the General Inquirer it could discover distinguishing 
"themes" in both sets of documents. The Concept Learner looks at all 
the sentences in each document to see if there are one or more tags 
common to all sentences in one document that are not found in any 
sentences of the other document.' If such a single all or none question 
does not discriminate all sentences in one document from all the 
sentences in another, a heuristic procedure is employed which develops 
a discriminating tree of tags and syntactic markers until the two sets 
of documents are completely distinguished. The thoee structure so 
developed is equivalent to a sequence of decision rules determining the 
class membership of a document. 
So far both pro.grams have been applied to several problems of 
automatic theme analysis. The Concept Learner is then used to 
develop distinguishing rules for texts differentiated according to 
some criteria outside the documents, e. g. the psychological state 
of the writer, and acquires information about that criteria. The 
General Inquirer can then apply these rules to make predictions re·~ 
ferring to such criteria. 
The practical utility of such analyses by computer is obvious. 
The example is included, however, for its theoretical significance. 
Not that these two programs are meant to be satisfactory at this 
stage of development, but, in describing message analysis to a com-
puter nothing can be left implicit for a process of intuition to which 
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most of human symbolic behavior rightly refers. In some sense the 
ultimate task of understanding such analytic processes is an executable 
computer program working toward the specified goal of message 
analysis. 
Working example X 
One of the processes which have only recently been described 
as communication processes is psychotherapy (168). The psychodiag-
nostic interviews preceding intended therapeutic treatments can profit-
ably be viewed as dialogues between a patient and a diagnostician in 
which an attempt is made to assess the nature of the patient's psychic 
disturbances from his linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. 
This task has rightly been claimed to be extremely difficult. 
When a patient attempts to express himself during psychodiagnostic 
interviews, he tends to communicate several things simultaneously. 
For instance, what it is that he is talking about, what he thinks in 
general about it, what he is feeling at the moment, what he intends 
the diagnostician to think, what he wants to avoid revealing to the 
diagnostician about himself, etc. The task is rendered even more 
difficult by the experience that the dictionary meanings of the patient's 
assertions are frequently misleading. The denial of a symptom may, 
for example, alert an astute analyst to the possible presence of that 
very symptom. Or uncontrolled assertions rendered during such 
interviews would, on the other hand, yield entirely inadequate inter-
pretations if treated as instrumental. 
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The fact that the expressions a patient gives during psychodiag-
nostic interviews is very rich and must be interpreted with enormous 
subtlety, has often led to a wholesale rejection of more explicitly stated 
methods of diagnosis. Yet the protocols of such interviews can become 
quite voluminous and unmanageable and require a simplified representa-
tion of its relevant characteristics. 
Among the numerous indices which have been proposed (17), and 
normatively defined over the body of recorded data is Dollard and 
Mowrer I s discomfort- relief quotient (54). This quotient purports to 
be a measure of tension by taking into account the number of words re-
vealing some form of discomfort and those indicative of relief or 
reward. Although such measures have indicated quite suggestive 
differences of recorded texts, little is known about what they actually 
rneaBure. 
Recently Mahl argued that predictors of a patient's emotional 
state should make use of speech characteristics which are not under 
the control of the speaker. He systematically explored the correlation 
between such emotional variables as the level of anxiety and various 
types of speech disturbances (124). His results supported the belief 
that a certain. speech disturbance measure will be a useful nonlexical 
indicator of current anxiety in the speaker (125). But more work has 
to be done in this direction. 
Another way of facilitating psychodiagnostic processes has 
been suggested by Cassotta, Feldstein, and Jaffe. These researchers 
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describe a device for automatic extraction and quantification of vocal 
behavior in interviews (40) which is already in existence, and propose 
a new, more complex device of which the former will be a component 
part (61). This device is intended to be programmed to evaluate a 
patient's speech pattern and print out some diagnostic statements. 
The device is conceptualized as performing several pattern-
matching operations. The researchers suggest that "normative 
patterns of speech from other persons comparable in intelligence, 
education and socioeconomic background might be put into the machine 
memory. The computer might then be asked to compare the speech 
patterns of our patient with this criterion. Extrapolation from current 
theory suggests that schizophrenics use abstract words more frequently 
than non- schizophrenics. Another conjecture is that schizophrenics 
more frequently use words connoting social distance, such as third 
person pronouns, in preference to first and second person pronouns, 
which imply greater closeness .... It might be hypothesized that 
schizophrenics show greater variation in their range of associative 
patterns than do non-schozophrenics. 1£ shown to exist, such greater 
variation may account for the perception of schizophrenic speech as 
difficult to understand'," (61:246). 
Work with the already existing device for automatic extraction 
and quantification of vocal behavior led to the discovery of even simpler 
kinds of indicative speech patterns. "In all cases in which pairs of a 
group of nonlexical attributes were significantly intercorrelated for 
129 
norlllal persons" they were not intercorrelated for diagnosed schizo-
phrenics. Assullling the findings were confirllled with sufficient power 
for use with individuals, we could, with suitable prograllls, ask the 
cOlllputer to store frequencies of the extralinguistic llleasures as 
they were extracted frOlll speech and intercorrelate successive pairs 
of the llleasures across the interview. To autolllate the cOlllplete pro-
cess the cOlllputer could then be asked to decide ... which of the 
correlations were significant. Concolllitant use of both the lexical 
and the nonlexical analyses should enable us to say sOlllething about 
at least one kind of psychopathology" (61:249). 
This working exalllple is overtly silllilar to IX, but geared to 
another end. Although the researchers noted that llluch work has to 
be done before the envisaged computer programs can reliably he 
employed for diagnostic purposes, the work on the computer has 
already clarified several issues concerning the procedures that an 
effective psychodiagnosis will require. Making explicit what the 
solution of psychodiagnostic problellls involves and testing such 
procedures by employing cOlllputers for executing them systematic-
ally not only helps psychotherapists in their work but also provides 
much information about the possible modes of reasoning, Or analytic 
procedures a mes sage analyst may have to follow in pursuing diag-




THE GOAL OF MESSAGE ANALYSIS 
This chapter aims at an adequate formulation of the purpose of 
message analysis. The emphasis is not placed on the process of mes-
sage analysis as such but on the nature of the ends toward which the 
method can be considered a means. In this context the notion of 
adequacy is meant to refer a) to the decidability as to the structure 
of the situation in which message analysis is appropriate, b) to the 
conditions under which a message analysis can be considered as 
approaching or having reached a suitable goal, and perhaps c) to the 
simplicity or elegance of such a formulation. The ten working examples 
will be used to support our formulation and it is suggested that the re-
sulting formulation, which will be formalized in Chapter Five, holds 
far beyond these examples, showing message analysis to be a very 
general mode of inquiry. 
The Message Analytic Situation 
Let us begin by describing the message analytic situation as 
a system. This requi1~es the identification of a set of variables and 
the formulation of some constraints accounting for the nature of 
interaction between these variables. As a first approximation let 
us make an obvious distinction between two sets of variables of the 
message analytic situation, the one being labeled "message analyst," 
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the other, the environment under the analysts 1 cpnsideration, will be 
called the "object system. " 
Although some working examples appear to place individual 
persons in the role of analysts, to restrict the notion of message 
analysis to the ability of single human beings would severely limit 
its scope. As a matter of fact, the role of message analyst is more 
frequently assumed by scientific cooperatives of persons and facilities 
than by individuals. In 18th century Sweden, working example II, it 
was the intellectual elite whose members challenged each other until 
acceptable responses were found. Propaganda analysis during the 
Second World War (VI) was accomplished by organizations specifically 
designed to cope with the large volume of foreign broadcasts in a 
meaningful way. The decipherment of the old Persian language (I) 
took several generations of members of a scientific community. And 
the attempts to ascertain psychopathologies from speech reported in 
X is even conceptualized as involving no specifically human ability, 
if the work succeeds. 
As far as this chapter is concerned the message analyst will 
be treated as a whole, as a black box, so to speak, the.internal 
structure of which must be considered to be extremely important 
in determining the outcome of analysis but which can be left un-
differentiated when external criteria of adequacy are discussed. 
The object system in message analystic situations can take 
the form of an individual as in working examples IX and X, specific 
his psychology; the form of social behavior of the politburo members 
under Stalin (VII); the form of a national system of socio-political 
mobilization and coordination of war efforts (VI) or the form of the 
social use of language (I). The materiality of any actual system may 
suffice as an object system in message analysis. 
The 'message analyst and the object systems are coupled in a 
,typical way. The most distinctive characteristic of the message 
analytic situation is that the object system is only partly observable 
by the message analyst. This becomes abundantly clear from the 
working examples. 
For example, the object system of the propaganda analyst in 
(VI) was an enemy nation deliberately concealing strategically signif-
icant information. Traditionally, war situations favor the use of 
security measures to hinder the spread of such information beyond 
the national boundaries. The broadcasts which propaganda analysts 
monitored represent only a very small section of the spectrum of 
pos sible observations . 
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The incomplete observability is even more vividly demonstrated 
by the psychodiagnostic situations described in (X) in which the diag-
nostician finds himself incapable of observing the emotional states of 
his patient directly. Even the concept of "emotional state" seems to 
be a hypothetical construct effectively characterizing some funda-
mentally, inaccessible states of the patient's brain. The speech of a 
human being represents only a very small subset of those variables 
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along which the behayior of a human being may adequately be describ-
able. 
The object system which interested the Swedish orthodox clergy 
in working example (II) was the complicated international network of 
religious influence. Indicative of the existence of such a network was 
the increasing religious dis sent in Sweden and the "Songs of Zion" both 
of which were subjected to extensive analysis. 
The incomplete observability of a message analyst's object 
system becomes the real condition under which the old Persian 
language in example (I) had to be deCiphered. The empire in which 
the three languages were written and in terms of which some culturally 
important messages were carved in stone, had disappeared long ago. 
Its main body of cultural things, its social communication structure 
was not observable. Only a few records indicated its probable exist-
ence in history. 
Not a defining characteristic of message analysis, but of 
considerable consequence is the fact that the interaction between 
the observable and unobservable parts of the object system is 
typically very rich. This fact is, no doubt, the reason why the 
attempts to develop analytical methods for such situations has 
origina,ted in communications research and not in other disciplin",s 
which characteristically start with complete observability. Com-
munications research is by subject matter orientation concerned 
with some such interaction between messages and their producer or 
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between messages and their possible effects. 
Consider working examples II, V, VI, and VIII as more obvious 
cases in point. They. are all concerned with object systems the com-
ponent parts of which are not only richly interacting but also conven-
tionally conceived of as containing communication. The message 
analysts of these four examples considered their object system as 
social communication networks that link partially observable com-
ponents. 
Less obvious is the kind of interaction that underlies the Object 
systems described in working examples IV, IX, andX. They deal with 
the communication that exists between some person's personality or 
internal states and his verbal behavior. Working example VII not only 
deals with the interaction between such internal states and a person's 
verbal expressions but, moreover, with the socio-political commun-
ication network that links a mass audience with an aspect of the 
structure of a ruling elite of which the internal states of participating 
persons are component parts. 
A second distinctive feature of the message analytic situation 
is that communication between the object system and the message 
analyst is a one-way process. 
The communication with object systems which have existed 
at some point in the past, for example, is absolutely bound to be 
one-way. The analysis of messages from extinct cultures such as 
the Persian empire of working example I, or from historical figures 
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such as the possible writers of the Imitatio in working example IV does 
not have any effect on the sender of such messages. Communication is 
directed from the object system to the analyst and not vice versa. 
Analysis of enemy propaganda for intelligence purposes (VI) or 
of the power structure within a foreign elite (VII) would be greatly 
facilitated if an opportunity existed to request additional information, 
or to askfor information confirmatory to the inferences made. But 
the analyst is restricted to the role of a receiver. Although the product 
of a message analysis may indeed be assumed to have significant pOlicy 
implications, the message analytic procedures are a priorito possibly 
intended acts upon the object system and do not account for such a 
feedback. The propaganda analysis in working example VI and the 
cryptographic analysis in working example III readily exemplify such 
situations. 
Even the psychodiagnostic use of message analysis, described 
in X, exhibits the typical one-way flow of information. Although the 
protocol which serves as an input to the message analytic process is 
indeed one of an interview, i. e. of a two-way interaction between 
diagnostician and patient, the message analysis in no way affects the 
course of the psychodiagnostic interview until it is completed. The 
communication clearly originates at the object system and is trans-
mitted via a transcription of the exchanged sounds ina computer 
understandable language. 
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In this sense the message analytic situation is distinguished from 
the classical experimental situation in which the experimenter manip-
ulates at least some variables assumed to affect his observation in a 
significant way. 
Corollary to the typical unidirectionality of communication be-
tween object system and message analyst is the essentially non-coop-
erative relation between both. 
The use of ciphers as a means of deliberately concealinginfor-
mati on for unauthorized receivers is only one case in point. Another 
indication of such a relation is an attempt to provide message analysts 
with misleading information about the nature or states of the object 
system. This is often the goal of war propaganda, overtly directed 
toward home consumption but calculated to have a desirable effect on 
the opposing country. George analyzed several such incidents (71: 138) 
and Lasswell's "distortion test" reported in (V) was designed to un-
cover publications employing such techniques. 
The non-cooperative character of the message analyst/object 
system relation does not necessarily stem from conflict or competitive 
situations. The psychodiagnosticianknows of situations in which the 
patient is simply unable to freely expres s what 'the analyst is interested 
in. Similarly, in communicating short stories as entertainment to 
large audiences (VIII), the mass media made it very difficult indeed 
for Berelson to analyze the biases underlying such stories. Whether 
this is a deliberate attempt to hide information of interest to the 
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communication _researcher, or an unawareness of the service the mass 
tnedia could provide to the analyst of popular culture retnains to be 
decided; it is certainly non- cooperative. 
Non- cooperation tnay sitnply stetn frotn the fact that the object 
systetn just doesn't know of, or has no conception of, the existence 
and/or intentions of the tnessage analyst. Although sotne of the tnes-
sages written in stone were clearly addressed to future generations, 
no conceivable characteristics of thetnessage analyst could have been 
anticipated by their writer. The satneis of course true in the author-
ship probletn of exatnple IV and aU other analyses of tnessages frotn 
history. 
The essentially non-cooperative relation between object-systetn 
and tnessage analyst also distinguishes tnessage analysis frotn such 
techniques of inquiry as psychological tests, surveys and controlled 
or free interviews. In all these cases data obtained frotn such tech-
niques tnust be considered as being potentially biased by the fact that 
their gathering is stitnulated, if not by specific que stions, then at 
least by the presence of an interviewer who engages in afortn of co-
operative relationship with the object systetn. When data so obtained 
are interpreted, the effect of such a cooperative relation has to be 
accounted for quite carefully. In tnessage analysis the object systetn 
is typically unaware of the fact that it is a subject of analysis, un" 
aware as to which of its parts is under observation and unaware of 
the consequences of the analysis. Hence, tnessage analysis is an 
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unobstrusive technique, quite in the sense of Webb et al. (202). 
At this point let the weak notion of "observation" be replaced by 
a notion referring more precisely to what is transmitted between object 
system and message analyst: a "signal." To quote Zinkin: "By !signal' 
we understand a certain sequence distinguishable by its elements, Or a 
simultaneous totality of various physical states, A signal may be 
changed in the course of time and be differentiated in space. It may be 
preserved (by photography, ma~netic recording, etc.) or it may pass 
quickly from one state to another. A signal may be measured according 
[,' 
to definite parameters with the aid of physical instruments!! (218:144). 
Whether signals are produced by means of a stylus on clay or by brush 
and ink on rice paper, whether they are printed from movable type 
slugs on modern paper or recorded by hand on data sheets, the move-
ment of an electronic picture tube and the punched holes on an IBM 
card, they are not conceived of as having meaning in any conventional 
sense. 
A signal is accepted by a message analyst solely on the basis 
of the distinguishability of its inherent properties, the physical nature 
of its elements and the structure dis coverable between them. In this 
technical sense signals constitute the domain to which Shannon and 
v' 
Weaver!s information function (175) applies. Shannon and Weaver 
both explicitly avoid any semantic notion when defining the amount of 
information quantitatively. 
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A preliminary diagramatic presentation of the message analytic 
, 
situation is attemptedi'll Figure 3. Herein arrows denote "communica-
t;ion;in the indicated direction1!; boxes represent "processes!!; and the 
oval, "that which is transmitted. " 
Message Analytic Situation (preliminary) 
Object System Message Analyst 
essage 
(unobserved) ) ____ -I'''na 1 yti c 
rocedure 
Primary Components of Message Analytic Situations 
Figure 3 
In order to avoid confusion, the role of the external observer, 
in which the reader will find himself, might be clarified as well. To 
begin, the external observer is faced with an observational task quite 
similar to that of the message analyst. The message analyst obtains 
signals from a typically small portion of some object system. The 
rest of that system is inaccessible to him. The message analytic 
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situation in which suchunidirectional communication -occurs is the object 
system of the external observer. Hence, the external observer is the 
component part of a system that is superordinate to the message analytic 
situation: a meta system. 
Although message analyst and external observer are in fact sub-
ject to similar kinds of observational constraints, if the external ob-
server wants to make assertions about the observational constraints 
which a message analytic situation imposes on the message analyst, 
then he is forced to assume a less constrained vision; he is forced to 
;make the assumption that he has more complete or even perfect informa-
tion about the message analytic situation in general and the object 
system of that situation in particCllar; he must assume that he has that 
information which the analyst l~cks. As unrealistic as the assumption 
of nearly constraintless observation may appear in some cases, it is 
useful .for the presentation of the argument and avoids certain contra-
dictions provided that the two systems, the message analytic situation 
and the meta system, are kept separate in the discussion. Since many 
concepts concerning message analysis derive from the typical obser-
vational constraints which the message analyst has to face, we will 
continue to assume to have access to parts of the object system that 
. are concealed from the message analyst such that the message analyttc 
situations can be made an interesting subject of study. 
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The Predictive Nature of Content 
Having characterized the message analytic situation as a one-way 
communication process between a partly accessible object system and a 
message analyst to whom some signal is transmitted, nothing has been 
said so far about the purposive outcome of the analysis. Characteriza-
tions of purpose require consideration of some behavioral delineations 
and for the discovery of the primary focus of message analysis, in par-
ticular, two approaches suggest themselves immediately. 
The first approach would require finding some teleological com-
mitments agreed upon by writers in the field. This approach refers to 
the most popular anticipatory conception of a goal. Chapters One and 
, 
Two, in which this road was taken, pointed out the relative fruitlessness 
of such an attempt. A commitment to being quantitative and systematic 
may uniquely distinguish content analysis from entirely intuitive inter-
pretations of symbolic materials but is too broad to be considered the 
goal of this specific investigative technique. Almost all scientific in-
quiries would be included under such a formulation. 
, Considering the fact that the whole complexity of social exist-
ence is transmitted by means of interpersonally exchanged informal 
messages, a confinement to materials to which social conventions 
attribute meanings or symbol characteristics in one sense or another 
without stating the requirements imposed upon the outcome of the 
analysis is inadequate on similar grounds. 
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The a1rrlOst complete lack of explicitly expressed purpose in the 
content analysis literature may reflect the well-known fact that tech-
niques, employed originally as a tool in full awareness of the goal for 
the attainment of which they may have been designed, can become a 
value in themselves. The goal then simply drops out of the awareness 
or the concern of writers in the field. Be it as it may, the search for 
anticipatory-type formulations in the literature of content analysis has 
failed to provide clues for the formulation of what me s sage analysis is 
supposed to accomplish. 
The second approach to the assessment of the goal of a system 
requires observation of its behavior whether a goal is explicitly stated 
in advance and consciously pursued or is implicit in the technique 
adopted by a component part of that system. The concept of goal sug-
gested here corresponds to that of an equilibrium toward which a sys-
tem moves over time, a state which it tends to maintain or toward 
which it returns if disturbed. Subjectively such a state may be ex-
pressed in terms of the satisfaction with the result obtained by ames-
sage analytic technique, in terms of the plausibility of the interpretation 
advanced, or in terms of the expressed practical usefulness of the out-
come. Objectively such a goal-attaining process may manifest itself 
by the observation that the output of a message analytic process be-
comes less and less altered, causing fewer and fewer objections on the 
part of the analyst or some user, and finally reaches a definite state 
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at which the analysis, having solved the problem of investigation in its 
own terms, comes to a stop. Such a state will be called a goal. 
Several working examples may be considered from this point of 
view. For instance, working example I described how four generations 
of scientists worked on the problem of deciphering a language. The 
emergence of such mysterious patterns on rocks, assumed to be man-
made, posed nothing but the problem. The discovery of the word-
distinction-sign, considered as a milestone in the analysis, was far 
removed from a solution. Nevertheless, more scientists became 
stimulated by this discovery and contributed to the search. Numerous 
speculations andhypotheses were proposed and successively elimi-
nated, among them being all premature attempts to assign phonetic 
values to the distinguishable elements, i. e., the signals composing 
the text. The extensive frequency tables which were compiled for 
letters, words and simple relations between them contributed very 
little to the deCipherment until a few short repetitive sequences of 
figures were found to represent some property outside the texture of 
the script, something that could have been a cultural standard of the 
old Persian empire and independently transmitted to medieval 
Persia: the habits of using official titles. Then one piece after 
another from the known history of the region became associated 
with textual elements. The message analysis clearly stopped, reached 
its goal so to speak when all signals could be related or explained in 
terms of some events consistent with the history of the old Persian 
144 
empire as far as it was known; when this interpretation could even be 
extended to other excavated documents of a similar kind; and when the 
proposed' reading of the text caused no serious objections from the 
learned community. 
This goal of deciphering a language, it seems, can be described 
as a state in which the analyst is capable of making assertions about 
that part of the object system which he can I).ot observe, the part which 
is considered to encompass the antecedent conditions of the signals 
transmitted. Conversely, the inability to draw such inferences seems 
tobe accompanied by a subjective state of dissatisfaction indicative of 
the lack of goal attainment. The dissatisfaction which has until recently 
been asserted concerning the knowledge of the Etruscan script and 
Minoan Linear B, a dissatisfaction which is still heard when some 
of the 25, 000 year old north-west Indian scripts such as those of 
Harappa and Mahenjodaro (52:286) are discussed, are cases in point. 
Grammars of such writing systems can be relatively easily formulated 
,'on the basis of the material found, and this was almost all that was 
known about the Etruscean language until very recently some names 
could be identified in the written texts. 
While the inferences toward which the deCipherment of a 
language tend are more those of a traditional sem~ntic interpretation, 
the inferences that are of interest to the psychoanalysts in working 
example X, are clearly not of the conventional linguistic ty.pe. As 
Mahl suggested, inferences as to internal emotional states of a 
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patient are most profitably based on speech patterns not under conscious 
control by the speaker. Similarly the analyst of propaganda de scribed 
in working exalTIple V suggested ,a set of tests which do not produce any-
thing silTIilar to what is customarily referred to as i'meaning." The 
!ltnanifest nle~nings'r ,in Berelson1s conception of content analysis are 
even completely ignored in Yule's inference about the authorship of a 
document on the basis of its style. Rightly claiming that thecolTIplex 
expressions of industrialized culture in the modern lTIass lTIedia are 
not sufficiently understood, or, that we have not learned how to look 
c" 
at television, many c]lltural critics such as McLuhan (134) (135) point 
in the salTIe direction, demanding inferences frolTI the surface appear-
ance of complex social systems to their internal operations, from 
signals :t6'.their source. 
Whether the analysts whose work was described in the working 
examples call their task the deCipherment of a language (I), or their 
method quantitative selTIantics (II), cryptography (III), literary re-
search (IV), propaganda analysis (VI), content analysis (V, VII, VIII, 
IX), text analysis (IX), psychodiagnosis (X), in all cases the goal 
seelTIs to be related to the =king of inferences frolTI signals to 
sOlTIe unobserved components of an object system frolTI which those 
signals were obtained. It is therefore telTIpting to equate "content" 
with what a message analyst inductively infers frolTI a given signal. 
Although we indeed wish to associate this terlTI with the output of a 
lTIessageanalytic procedure, such a simple equation needs further 
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elaboration for two reasons. 
First, the term "inference, " which according to Webster refers 
to any outcome of a normal thought process, to a process of arriving at 
a conclusion or of accepting .an opinion on the basis of available evidence, 
etc. (204: 1158) is much too weak to serve as a defining characteristic of 
message analysis. Persons may infer all sorts of things from received 
signals which mayor may not have been intended by its sender, which 
mayor may not be appropriate in the existing situation. Especially a 
methodological analysis of signals as messages cannot rely on some 
thought process qua thought process. Extensional criteria for the ade-
quacy of an inference have to be applied from outside the inferential 
procedures; this specifically requires us. to consider the outcome of 
the inference, not whether some inferences have been made. Hence, 
the process of inference must be considered a means and not an end of 
message analysis. 
Second, the incomplete observability makes a direct link be-
tween observed and unobserved components of an object system 
impossible. The message analyst cannot point to what is not obser-
aQle to him. Although this argument is straightforward, the working 
examples can provide additional illustrations: the'psychodiagnostician 
in (X) attempting, as we used to say, to infer some internal state 
from a person's speech behavior is not ever likely to observe such 
a state. Psychopathologie s such as "schizophrenia" or emotional 
states such as "anxiety" are hypothetical constructs operationally 
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defined in some technical discourse and in conjunction with practical 
behavioral problems. Similarly the goal of deciphering the old Per-
sian language (I) was not one of denoting the cultural objects and 
object constructs to which it may once have referred but that of a 
translation into a modern language in terms of which the historical 
context of this script's origin was adequately representable. 
The point which needs to be made is that because the object 
system is only partly observable and the message analyst is abso-
lutely bound by this limited access not under his control, his products 
need to be mapped into a notational system capable of representing 
all of the possible states of the object system as a whole or at least 
as much of it as the analyst is intere sted in. 
One example of a representational system is the state space 
of a system within which each point represents one of the object 
system's possible states. In effect Mahl adopted such a representa-
tional system when conceptually manipulating states of anxiety. 
Similarly a behaviol;al space, each point of which represents one of 
the pos sible behaviors of a dynamic system, can be considered a 
representational system. Another possible realization would be a 
formal language limited to and capable of representing just the 
features of the object system under consideration. In the weakest 
case, a natural language such as English may be supplemented by 
a set of well-defined scientific terms and some general theoretical 
assumptions concerning the object system constituting what is 
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commonly. called a special discourse. The representational system in 
working examples I and VIII demonstrates this case. In the domain of 
social and psychological systems the current presystematic message 
analysis most frequently uses the latter. Whether a message analyst 
makes assertions about anticipated military actions by an enemy 
country, predicts the possible social consequences of mass media pro-
ducts, detects interpersonal relationships within a ruling elite or 
diagnoses the pathology of a patient, he finds himself confined to a 
representational system as sumed to be adequate for representing the 
object system of his concern. 
According to our terminological distinction between observed 
and unobserved components of an object system, the" signal" must --
in accordance with its definition advanced above - - be understood as 
a direct representation of the observed parts of an object system in 
the representational system, while the term "content" can designate 
only a notational element in the representational system as far as it 
refers to the unobserved part of the same object system. 
With the establishment or recognition of the necessity for a 
representational system as a third constituent part of the message 
analytic situation, a system that is intermediary between object sys-
tem and message analyst but perfectly accessible to the latter, the 
opportunity is gained to locate more concisely the domain and range 
of the message analytic procedure: they are contained in the repre-
sentational system. The operations that account for the intuitive 
149 
notion of inference have to be conceived as defined in terrns of the nota-
Hons of a representational system that is capable of representing not 
only observed states of an object system (signals) but also its unobserved 
states (contents) that are of particular concern to message analysts. 
The pre-evidential character of the outcome of a message analy-
sis, the message content representing not facts as a signal doe·s, but 
conceivable facts, makes our notion of content predictive by definition. 
These predictions need not refer to future steps in time. They appear 
simply as results of operations within the representational system and 
outside the signals obtained. Specific choices among the notations re-
ferring to yet unobserved parts of a system, operations that lead from 
a set of actual observations to a set of possible observations or the 
ascertaining of the implications of given evidence for the solution of 
a problem must be considered as the making of predictions although 
not necessarily in the specific sense referred to here. 
Figure 4 informally depicts the message analytic procedure 
as an operation defined over the notations of a representational 
system. Note that domain and range of this procedure, the message-
signal and the message content must by definition of mes sage be 
disjoined in the representational system. Note further that the 
Figure presents the situation only from the point of view of the mes-
sage analyst. 
It should again be emphasized that such a notion of content 
makes the material nature of the object system, i. e. whether it is 
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a social, biological, or artificial system, appear entirely irrelevant 
as well as the question of whether meanings are conventionally asso-
ciated with the signals so analysed. A reiteration of our ten working 
examples in the terms advanced so far may make this point clear. 
Representational System 
Message Analytic Procedure 
Representational System (representing an object system) con-
taining Domain and Ran·ge of a Message Analytic Procedure 









The social use of language in the old Persian 
empire 
Figures carved in stone 
(Historical) events in old Persia 
International network of religious influence 
Text in a song book 
Communication between a foreign religious 
sect and religious dissenters in Sweden 
























Working examEle IX 
Secrecy systems in military communication 
A cipher 
A clear referring to military actions 
Covariation of literary styles and identities of 
writers 
The text from an unsigned book 
The author 
International news network 
The output of suspected organizations 
Links to foreign countries 
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National system of social-political mobilization 
Radio broadcasts 
Preparations of major actions 
Public behavior of a governing elite 
Text of speeches 
Social distances between members of an elite 
Public media (organization and mass audience) 
Fictional short stories 
Socio-economic conditions of production, social 
psychological effects 









The writer's readiness to commit suicide 
Human psychological behavior including speech 
Recorded speech 
A psychopathology or emotional state 
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Concerned with the TIleaning of assertions of natural language, 
Rapoport caTIle to reTIlarkab1y siTIlilar interpretations of "content. " 
The atteTIlpt to sharpen the concept of TIleaning irOTIl the point of view 
of operational philosophy led hiTIl to the straight forward postulate that 
an assertion becoTIles eTIlpirically TIleaningfu1 only if it iTIlplies SOTIle 
predictions. He therefore defined "predictive content" as "the totality 
of predictions iTIlplied by an assertion" (167:37). Thus, the assertion 
TIlade by the British propaganda analyst in VI: 
It is beyond reasonable doubt that GerTIlany possesses 
an offensive weapon which her leaders believe: a) is 
of a type unknown to the Allies, b) cannot be countered 
within a short period. . .. (will) COTIle into use not 
before the TIlidd1e of January 1944, and not later than 
the TIlidd1e of April. " 
can be viewed as iTIlplying a rather specific set of predictions of the 
forTIl: "If SOTIleone were to conduct a search in GerTIlany he would 
find a new weapon. If he were to ask her leaders, he would find theTIl 
believing such and such about it. If nothing were to interfere before 
the tiTIle specified, direct experiences would prove TIle correct." 
SiTIlilarly, the inferences described in working exaTIlple VIII could be 
viewed as iTIlplying such predictions as: "If a study of the attitudes 
toward ATIlerican TIlinorities as a consequence of exposure to TIlag-
azine fiction were conducted, such and such would be the result. " 
Even TIlore striking is the interpretation of the outcoTIle of cOTIlputer 
speech analysis in (X) as predictive content. "Schizophrenia" indeed 
does not refer to any single observable phenoTIlenon and TIlay not even 
refer to a patient's internal state in as cOTIlplicated a TIlanner as it 
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may be defined. If it is a therapeutic term then it is very likely to 
imply that a certain set of treatments, applied to the patient so 
labeled, will yield a certain result. Many psychopathologies are 
explicitly defined in terms of anticipated consequences of a treatment. 
With this interpretation by Rapoport, our concept of content is 
quite in agreement. It also requires an unobserved environment 
toward which the predictions apply and in the context of which they 
are potentially dis confirmable . It would not be in agreement, how-
ever, with the notion of "meaning" expressed in a question like: 
"What is the meaning (or content:) of the set X of movies?" Our mes-
sage analyst to which such a question may be posed would have to 
simply refuse an answer on the ground that no object system is 
specified and hence no message analytic situation exists, implying 
that any prediction would be fortuitous. Consider only the fact that 
the number of possible content analyses in Berelson's (27) and 
Miller's (136:95-96) sense that can be applied with the highest 
degree of reliability is an exponential function of the number of 
distinctions that can be made in the signal and consider the number 
of elements that can be distinguished within a single movie! If 
such a question were to be asked, however, in reference to some 
specified audience, the film-maker, the industry that produces and 
distributes them, the culture in which they survive, etc., i. e. if 
an object system were to be delineated of which the set of movies 
in question could be considered an observed part, then the question 
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becomes one of message analysis in our sense. In this case the intuitive 
notion of "meaning" may become equivalent with our predictive notion of 
content and is, so far as the conditions of a message analytic situation 
are satisfied, disconfirmable in principle . 
. External Criteria of Adequacy 
The notion of the predictive nature of content is not purely 
nominal. It has an important conotative implication: it opposes the 
idea of an objective truth inherent in a message. It requires (a) that 
the content inferred must at least be potentially disconfirmable and 
suggests (b) that the truth may be assessed in degrees rather than as 
an "either orO proposition. 
In either case some external evidence must be available 
after a message analysis has been attempted such that the adequacy 
of the content selected on the basis of the signals received can be 
evaluated. This external evidence that represents the unbound part 
of the object system in the representational system may be called the 
vaHdating signal. By comparing the inferred content with the validat-
ing signal the validity of a message analysis procedure may be 
established, and the appropriateness of the choices regarding the 
content assessed. 
It could therefore be argued that the goal of message analysis 
is a maximization of valid content, that as many inferences as 
possible should be drawn from given signals, and that the knowledge 
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about the unobserved part of an object system should be pushed to its 
upper limit. 
Such a goal however, seems to be an altogether unreasonable 
one. Reconsider only the fact that the systems a message analyst 
tends to deal with range from single human individuals (IV, X) to 
whole nations in the situation of a war (VI), systems that contain a 
vast quantity of unobserved components and an extremely complex 
internal organization. To demand from a message analyst a perfect 
determination of the states of such complex systems on the basis of 
extremely.lhnited observations would be unrealistic for two reasons. 
First, Ashby has shown that adaptive behavior is variety limit-
ing (13:58-70) i. e. that any adaptive system, any system that behaves 
toward some goal or possesses some intelligence, tends to suppress 
the variety. in the signals it produce s. Many. - - :r1hough not all --
object systems of message analytic concern must intuitively be con-
sidered "intelligent," "adaptive" or "goal- oriented." As a corollary 
, 
to Shannon's eleventh.theorem (175:39), the complexity of a source 
that can be inferred on the basis of the signal it produces is absolutely 
bound by the variety the signal exhibits. These propositions lead to 
the conclusion that to the extent an object system posses ses adaptive 
characteristics the message content inferred can only predict a 
limited segment of the unobserved part of the object system. 
The second reason is a more practical one and refers to the 
message analyst's capacity to process information. His capacity to 
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process signal information is limited by the nature of his normal mental 
and computational facilities. That message a,;,alysis tends to require a 
relatively high attention to such information processes is indicated not 
only by.the frequently heard complaint that (even the relatively simple) 
content analysis is too time-consuming, but also by the recent attempt 
to computerize certain routine procedures of such processes. Consider 
the threatening complexity the message analyst has to face who attempts 
to analyze the messages circulating within a social system; the analyst 
must rigorously limit his task to a manageable size. The information 
processing facilities he has at his disposal bind him to accept only 
those investigative problems which can be solved within a reasonable 
period of time. 
In practice the message analyst accepts such a restriction by 
adopting specific interests, a narrow point of view, or by devoting 
himself to certain limited practical or theoretical problems. As the 
history of content analysis vividly. indicates such interests are 
typically derived from the prevailing cultural climate. Around 1900, 
for example, mass media content analysis was very much concerned 
with ideas associated with the "decline of culture"; in the twenties,. 
with the "effects of propaganda, ideological warfare and commer-
cialism on the individual"; now peace research and political science 
draws novel inferences from the same type of material. 
The working examples show mOre specifically that message 
analysts tend - - consciously or unconsciously - - to focus only on a 
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fairly limited part of an object system. The psychodiagnostician in work-
ing example X, for example, directed his attention only on certain psycho-
pathologies or therapeutically relevant emotional states. Among the 
numerous contents that could have been inferred from recorded speech 
but were excluded by the analyst's point of view are those refe rring to 
ethnolinguistic characteristics, those of socio-economic characteristics, 
intelligence, education, etc. The analyst in working example V ex-
plicitly directed his research toward the detection of sources of foreign 
propaganda in the United States. He thus excluded all those contents 
that provided neither positive nor negative evidence about an agency's 
transmission of foreign propaganda. For example, those contents that 
refer to antecedent conditions or possible effects of the messages, as 
--~----
they are of concern in VIII, were declared irrelevant to the problem. 
Similar and most obvious is the restriction imposed upon the analyst of 
war propaganda described,in VI. The analyst was only rewarded for 
and consequently only interested in those inferences that were assumed 
to have some significance for the wartime policy-makers. Other ir-
relevant inferences were just not made or simply not communicated. 
The point that needs to be made is that the message analyst 
facing relatively complex and possibly adaptive systems typically can 
not obtain perfect knowledge about the whole system from the obser-
vation of a very. limited part of it. Rather, he is forced to select 
contents referring to a limited "problem domain" within the representa-
tional system, a domain which derives from a specific interest, value,. 
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or problem adopted by or imposed upon a message analyst. 
The goal of message analysis could now be limited to maximizing 
the valid content within a problem domain that is delineated in advance. 
But this goal is still to simplistic for it does not consider the fact that a 
message analyst may make several kinds of errors when attempting to 
appropriately select among the possible contents on the basis of signals 
received. Some notion of the "degree of accuracy" of a prediction or 
some notion of the "degree of completeness" of a prediction has to be 
considered in formulating the goal. 
When making specific content inferences the message analyst 
always seems to be susceptible to two basic errors which have different 
effects on the appropriateness of the content selected. The most con-
spicuous error appears when the content inadequately represents an un-
observed part of an object system, i. e. when the content "says things 
that are not so." This "error of commission" which corresponds to the 
degree of accuracy of a prediction referred to earlier is largelyinde-
pendent from another error, the "error of omission" which appears 
when the content ranges only over a section, not over the whole problem 
domain", i. e. when the content fails to represent what it is expected to 
represent. This error corresponds to what has previously been men-
tioned as the degree of completeness of a prediction. 
'While it is fairly obvious that a goal-oriented message analyst 
has to suppress both errors as far as possible and it is, hence, easy 
to agree on the desirability and undesirability of the extreme values 
of the assumed continuum, it seems difficult to evaluate the desir-
ability and undesirability of the intermediate values of that continuum 
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on which both errors have differential effects. 
The difficulty is increased by the fact that the message analytic 
situation does not permit a message analyst to directly recognize or 
assess an errOr of cOrpnlission he commits in selecting a content while 
he may control his error of omission provided that his problem domain 
is adequately specified. An arbitrary extellsion of the inferred content 
that ranges only over a section of the problem domain may indeed elim-
inate the error of omission but only at the expense of increasing the 
error of commission, that error to which he has no immediate access. 
The message analyst is therefore burdened with a difficult task of 
optimization. 
The differential weights which the two errors carry depend 
entirely on the situation in which the message analyst finds himself, 
and depends on how the conduct of the message analyst is. tied to the 
quality of his product, regardless of whether the rewards are imposed 
on the message analytic situation by an external observer or by some 
other source. 
Working example VI depicted, for instance, a situation in 
which the inferences of a war-propaganda analyst were utilized for 
strategic decisions of possibly crucial political importance. In such 
a case one should expect that the accuracy of the content is of greatest 
significance; hence, the error of omission may have to carry less 
weight than the error of commission. 
160 
Similarly the extreme caution with which psychodiagnosticians 
approach the problem of predicting psychopathologies from the speech 
of a patient indicates the great weight which the accepted responsibility 
. for the mental health of a human .being bestows upon errors of commis-
sion. Although the reported results were quite convincing indeed, the 
researchers warned against immature generalizations and concluded 
that more work is required before an adequate computer diagnosis 
could supplement the work of a psychotherapist. A" wrong diagnosis 
would not only. affect the life of a patient, but its publicity would 
seriously harm the analyst's future conduct as a professional. 
On the other hand, if the determination of the authorship of the 
unsigned Imitatio, described in working example IV, turned out to be 
false, the consequences for the literary researcher or for those who 
use his results could be estimated as less serious. That is not to say 
that such a task is merely an irrelevant intellectual exercise, but that 
the error of commission, the direct assessment of which is apparently 
very difficult anyway, carries less weight than the error of omission. 
The imaginative inferences in the addenda to the content analy-
sis of mass media fiction, reported in (VIII), similarly seem to de-
emphasize the error of commission in favor of a speculative extension 
toward the problem domain, circumscribed by the topic "racial pre-
judice." Validation would indeed be very difficult, and so far as is 
known nobody has attempted, to gather validating evidence regarding 
the inferences Berelson and Salter made. The study is, however, 
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wen known, frequently cited and reprinted for its stimulating interpre-
tation indicating an emphasis on reducing the error of omission rather 
than that of commission. 
The last two examples represent in a sense extremes in which 
either the complete lack of independent evidence hinders an assessment 
of the inferred content's error of commission (VI), or the way the in-
ferences are stated makes an assessment of that error extremely diffi-
cult if not impossible (VIII). Even if this error is not known in most 
of the caSes which the working examples represent, the claim that the 
inferences made: doihdeed represent some unobserved part of the 
respective object system, is maintained with different degrees of 
certainty. In other words, even in situations of extreme lack of 
direct evidence in support of the representativeness of the content, 
the goal of message analysis again seems to focus on a valid repre-
sentation of some unobserved component of a partly observable 
system. 
In full awareness of the empirical difficulties of evaluating 
the errors of omission and commission, let us assume that the con-
tent selected by a message analyst is evaluated by the external ob-
server by means of comparison with what may be called a "validat-
ing signal." Such a signal is assumed to constitute precisely that 
observation which the message analyst is lacking, represents, for 
instance, the unobserved part of the object system within the problem 
domain, and is of course accessible only to the external observer or 
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after message analysis has been completed. The extent to which content 
and validating signal correspond, the extent to which the selected content 
adequately represents what it claims to represent, i. e. the extent to 
which the content is valid could then easily be assessed. Assuming a 
quantitative measure function for content, the amount of valid content 
contained in the output of a message analysis could then be measured. 
Errors of commission and omission then appear respectively in the 
quantitative differences between validating signal, content and valid 
content, and constitute quantities that need to be eliminated as a mes-
sage analysis progresses toward the goal. 
Given the risks involved in making wrong and/ or incomplete 
predictions, i. e. given the differential weights acrued to the content 
errors of commission and omission, or more specifically the mone-
tary rewards and punishments associated with each of them, the 
message analyst's goal becomes finally that of selecting contents in 
a problem domain in such a way that the rewards are'maximised. 
If these differential rewards are set up favorably, the quantity of 
valid content may become an optimum. 
As we have shown, optimization of valid content is not always 
a goal, at least not in content analysis. Often speculative inferences 
are rewarded highly without controlling for errors of commission. 
On the other hand, in the more rigorous sciences, errors of com-
missions are punished highly in comparison with errors of omission, 
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in the case of which the results of message analysis so evaluated exhibit 
a different picture. 
Message analysis, as an attempt to appropriately select contents 
in the predictive sense as a consequence of signals received, as an 
attempt to make valid content inferences from signals, as the scientific 
treatment of data as messages with specific contents; is then involved 
in a complicated optimization process. This process attempts to induce as 
much as possible from given observations to determine unobserved 
states of an object system's affairs within the dimensions of a specified 
problem domain and attempts to avoid errors that are related to the 
validity of the content inferred and to the rewards imposed on this 
activity. 
'Summary of Definitions 
In concluding this chapter the definitions of the technical terms 
may be listed below. The informal diagram of the message analytic 
situation in Figure 5 gives an overview regarding most of the terms. 
The message analytical situation is composed of essentially 
three subsystems: the object system, the message analyst, and the 
representational system. 
The object system consists typically of many interacting com-
ponent parts and is only partially observable by the analyst. 
The representational system is a specialized (formalized or 
disciplined) language or· notational scheme, perfectly acces sible to 
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the message analyst and capable of representing all conceivable states 
of the object system or at least those within the problem domain. 
A problem domain delineates within the representational system 
those component parts or dimensions of an object system that are of 
special interest to the analyst. 
A signal is transmitted from the object system and accepted by 
the analyst just on the basis of its distinguishability from other signals 
Or the distinguishability of its elements. The signal represents states 
of the observed part of an object system in the representational system. 
A content refers to states of the unobserved component parts of 
an object system and is a member of the set of possible representations 
that the representational system offers for selection before a signal is 
received. Specific choices make content always predictive. 
A message is a signal that has some consequences regarding 
the selection of contents in a given message analytic situation. 
The message analyst is a material interpretation of some ~­
sage analytic procedure, the domain and range of which are disjointly 
defined in the terrns of the representational system. More operationally, 
the message analyst makes appropriate choices among contents as a 
consequence of signal received, accepting a specific problem domain 
and certain rewards (i. e., the different weights the content errors 
may carry) as his parameters. Within these parameters, the goal of 
a message analytic procedure is to minimize errors and to maximize 
the rewards such that valid content may become an optimum. 
165 
A validating signal is a signal that represents states of the un-
observed part of an object system. Revealed a posteriori to a message 
analysis, it may be used to determine the appropriateness of the selec-
tions made, to validate the message analytic procedure or to determine 
the quantity of valid content. 
Message analysis, then becomes (a) any method for appropriately 
selecting (inferring) contents (in the predictive sense) as a consequence 
of (from) signals received. The term may also be defined as (b) a 
systematic attempt to make specific and potentially valid content 
inferences, or as (c) a scientific manipulation of given data as messages 
about unobserved components of a system. 













Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation (informal) 
Figure 5 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AN INFORMATION CALCULUS 
FOR MESSAGE ANALYSIS 
The following chapter is an attempt to treat previously dis-
cussed subjects more rigorously. To this end a calculus has to be 
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developed in terms of which informational aspects of message analy-
sis can be treated more adequately, As far as the information cal-
culus will be formulated in this chapter, it will be primarily geared 
to state the goal of message analysis abstractly. For this purpose 
the explication of only one type of information, the quantity of infor-
mation carriedby a signal, seems to be necessary. Other kinds of 
information will be taken up in Chapter Seven after some of the 
distinct empirical problems of message analysis have been discussed. 
It will be seen.that other quantities of information to be defined later, 
are based on and expressed in terms of the fundamental ideas pre-
sented in this chapter. Furthermore, it is assumed that the calculus 
will be useful n.ot only in message analysis but that it will also provide 
the basis. for a non- statistical information theory for a range of situa-
tions in which observations are utilized for purposes of prediction, 
situations more complex than the one of our immediate interest. 
Preliminarie s 
The notations which will be used in the following are mainly 
set theoretical ones based on Ashby's "Set Theory of Mechanism and 
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Homeostasis'" (IS), an approach to formalization which draws heavily on 
Bourbakiis '''Theorie des Ensembles; Fascicule de R~sultats" (33). In 
cases where we deviate from this approach suitable definitions are given. 
To' start with the nature of the representational system, let us 
assume a relatively simple object system which,however, has very 
many interacting components. Let each component be represented by 
the set of states it can take. The set of states could be stages of inter-
national conflict, levels of deterrence, measures of tension, positions 
of the moon, authors of documents, indices of stylistic features, letters 
of an alphabet, the presence or absence of a symptom, scores of an 
aptitu:letest, measures of symbol entropy, expressed political ideas, 
historical events, steps in time, '" anything that might interest a 
message analyst at some time .and for some purpose. The "set of 
states a component may take" is meant to include such things as "values 
on a variable, It 11positions along, ·a-·.·~.in1ension, II "indices on a scale, 11 
"measures" of some attribute, implying no metric, however. Each 
component of the object system needs neither to be represented by 
the same set of states, nor need their states be differentiated along 
one dimension only. 
Let the set Z represent the component parts of the object 
system. Zls elements .,4, B, C::, J), ... ,7. represent each com-
ponent by the set of states it can take . The representational system 
into which such an. object system can be mapped then becomes the 
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product of the elements in Z. This product set or state space of the 
object system as it is often referred to, may be written: 
= g2 /1/ 
... " 
where: 
... , 1J = Z /2/ 
Note: Our notation for the product set gZ should not be confused with 
a similar notation that Bourbaki use s to denote the set of all mappings. 
The typical element of ov-r many-dimensional space is a many-tuple 
which in accordance with /1/ may be written in two equivalent ways: 
... , :z > = /3/ 
where: 
O1EJr freE -tsC ... j , and (s)Z EO gZ /4/ 
If the object system is such that it can take only one state at a 
time, then its behavior becomes a trajectory within the state space. 
We could consider another representational system, capable o~ repre-
senting all possible behaviors of the object system, in the case.of which 
a. behavioral space would have to be taken to represent all possible 
trajectories an object system may occupy in the same way as it oc-
cupies a state. We could consider representational systems which 
are quite different from our many-product set, but we want to focus 
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only on the simplest object system that is complex enough to serve as a 
. basis for explicating the terms of our concern and leave representational 
systems capable of representing more complex object systems for a 
later extension. Such a restriction does not however, in any way affect 
the generality of the argument. It serves only for the clarity of the 
presentation. 
The previous chapter led to the conclusion that the message 
analytic situation must be characterized by the incomplete observability 
of an object system and by the message analyst's attempt to infer or 
predict some unobserved event on the basis of those observed. In the 
framework of the representational system defined above, incomplete 
observability can be identified with having aCCesS not to all members 
of the set Z but .only to a proper subset, say, E thereof. Thus, an 
incompletely observed state of the object system; the typical signal of 
which is to be subjected to message atfalysis becomes equivalent to a 
fraction of a many-tuple ranging only over some of the state space's 
dimensions. Such a signal can be regarded as an element of a sub-
space of the object system's state space. 
In the notations of our representational system such a signal, 
i. e., incomplete observation can be written as follows: 
whereby E c Z /5/ 
Specific signals within a space may be individualized by subscripts, 
fo am le to X ress that {S) E J. {S)E.J. •... If the set of components, rex p, ep .r1. 
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variables Or dimensions, or more adequately, the sets of states those 
components may occupy in conjunction need not be referred to ex-
plicitly, then the superscripts denoting such sets maybe omitted. For 
example, some signal may be denoted by the symbol (s) or (s)i and 
some space simply: by. g 
Given the signal (s)E the message analyst knows the actual 
state of the object system to be in the subset (s)E ><: gZ-E of gZ 
Given in addition his problem domain denoted by the subset D of Z 
the message analyst is informed that the content to be .inferred from 
that signal will have to be found among the members of the subspace 
gD-E. Such conclusions are fairly obvious and indeed implicit in the 
structure of Our representational system conceptualized as a product 
set. The operation accounting for these implications is essential for 
the information calculus to be developed. It is related to the "opera-
tion of projection" which, applied on a state space or any subset of it, 
simply picks out a subspace. Customarily defined as a mapping (15:14), 
the operation of projection is: 
gZ ___ ..... _ QG 
When operating on a sing~e element, it produces an element having 
fewer components: 
Z prG (s) 




course, inversely related to the idea of considering a set of an object 
system's components which is larger than the set of those actually ob-
served. In fact the subset containing the actual state of the object system 
which is impliCitly known when a signal is received can be obtained by 
applying the inverse of prG on the signal. According to the definition 
of the operation of projection its inverse produces the following set: 
= 
G (s) x f (S)Z-G} = (s)G x gZ-G /8/ 
For the intended development of our information calculus for 
message analytic situations, a more general notion of projection is , 
needed which will be termed "cojection" for it involves two jOint oper-
ations based on projections. The term has been suggested by RObinson.'3:c 
We start with a definition of two projections wherein E and F are two 
arbitrary subsets of Z and the * distinguishes them from those having 
the total state space gZ as domain: 
':'prE gEU F .. gE /9/ 
and 
::'r:prF gEUF ;0- gF /10/ 
3T . Thatcher Robinson, personal communication. 
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With /9/ and /10/ the operation of "cojection onto F" can now be defined 
as follows: 
= 
gE gF /11/ 
Whereby the domain of the projection is always to be understood as indi-
cated by the dimensions of the operand. The cojection of a specific sig-
nal (s)E onto F is: 
F E ~ '" -1 E 
co (s) = ~prF "'prE (s) = 
/12/ 
Note that the operation of cojection is a mapping only under the condition 
that its range is either identical with or fully contained in its domain. 
Otherwise it is not single valued. 
One of the peculiarities of cojection which will be of importance 
later on is the cojection of a null-tuple, i. e., a signal none of the values 
of which are known or specified. Such a cojection produces the whole 
space within the set of dimensions specified by the superscript: 
= 
(s)(tInF x gF-(tI /13/ 
The effect of cojections may, be more vividly demonstrated by an 
example with actual values. Let the state space be: 
gZ 
= IT ge 
e E Z 
and = { a, b 1 
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Let: five signals be given as: (s)t = <. a ... "?, (s)~ = <. b ... :>, 
(s)~ = -< ba ... >, (s)~ = <bb ... >, G (s) 5 = -<bab .. >, whereby E, F, 
and G are all subsets of Z and the dots represent components of a 
quintuple along dimensions in Z not specified by the respective signal. 
Some of the cojections are depicted diagramatically in Figure 6. 
In order to discuss the operation of cojection more fruitfully 
another operation has to be introduced which maps set theoretical 
notions into the natural number system. The operation referred to 
provides a basis for translating expressions of the algebra of sets into 
those of cardinal arithmetic. Cardinal arithmetic is required for ex-
pressing quantities within the representational system numerically. 
Let A be any set and a be a cardinal number representing the number 
of elements in A, the operation denoted by, the symbol # may be 
interpreted as an enumerator of the elements contained in its operand 
and be written: 
a = #A /14/ 
With the operation #, some of the fundamental operations of 
the algebra of sets such as union and product can be equated with such 
ordinary operations as addition and multiplication. Let, for example, 
A and B bedisj oint sets, then: 
















coZ (aa ... )}--,,--'I 
rt'-t-:::==========:;;::.(ba ... ) co 
(baba'a)} (baa .. )} 
(babab) 1....J---=== r (bab .. ) 
(babba) coZ ( ) aaa .. 
(babbb) . (aab .. ) (abaaa) (aba .. ) 
(abaab) (abb .. ) 
(ababa) (bba .. ) 











F (ab ... )}_coE~_---t .. _.(. b ... ) 
-----'-------co .. (bb ... ) 
(bbbba) 
(bbbbb) 
(s)~ " (. a ... ) 
E (s)2" (. b ... ) 
F (s) 3 " (ba ... ) 
F (s) 4 " (b b .. ; ) 
(s)~ " (bab .. ) 
. ' .. 
Operands and Transforms of some Cojections 
Figure 6 
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For any set A and B: 
#A x B = #A #B /16/ 
Consequently: 
# gAVB 
= = /17/ 
Moreover, # leads to various inequalities and equivalences, for example: 
implies 
implies 
#A < #B 
#A = #B 
If each component g has the same number of elements: 




The possible signals that can be obtained from an object system 
and that can be distinguished in the respective state space is not just the 
set of elements in gZ, but the set of all many-tuples (s), ranging over 
all possible subspaces of the state space. 
With IPz denoting the set of all subsets of Z 
The nU11lber of signals distinguishable in 'gZ is: 
# f (s)EG IPz J = (1 + #JI-) (1 + #Bl (1 + #"(j (1 + #XJ 
because any (s)E can be construed as taking anyone value within the 
set E of sets of states or as being not accessible. That this number 
is 11luch larger than, the nU11lber #gZ of ele11lents in the total state 
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space is easily Seen by converting the above expression into the following 
form: 
= 1 + M+ #.B+ ... + #J+ #JtxB + #Ji"L + ... + #Q Z 
i. e., it is the sum of all nul-tuples, all simples, all couples, all triples, 
.... , all elements in the state space. 
The previous chapter showed message analysis to be a problem 
of making appropriate selections within some domain delineated by terms 
of the representational system and referring to unobserved components 
of the object system. The goal of "optimizing valid content within a 
. proble·m domain" presupposes a quantification of the appropriateness of 
a selection. Since the number of decisions that are to be made by an 
analyst can most reasonably be assumed to be strictly finite and enumer-
able, it is suggestive to apply some of the well known infOrmation meas-
ures on the effective number of alternatives presented to him. As 
appealing as such a suggestion may seem; the task is rendered difficult 
however, if confined to the concept of information as advanced by 
Shannon (175) and Wiener (209). The four main reasons are as follows: 
Firstly, it seems to be impossible to assign priori relative 
frequencies to the alternatives within the behavioral space of an object 
system. A representational system represents not only actual but also 
possible signals that maybe preconceived by a receiver or message 
analyst on purely logical grounds. It contains not only the observed 
but also, and most importantly for the message analytic situation, 
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preconceived and yet unobserved states of the object system's components 
that may be subject to prediction. The representational system is imposed 
by an analyst on the object system. Hence a statistical treatment of both 
observed and unobserved states would indeed be vacuous. 
Secondly, a simple counting of the number of characters in a 
signal or an assessment of the frequency with which such a signal or its 
characters has been obtained in the past does little to account for' the 
referentiality of such a s.ignal to an object system's components repre-
sented in the representational system. Such notions as "the amount of 
knowledge about the object system conveyed l>y a message "cannot be'ex-
pressed by merely measuring some characteristics of the signal itself 
which carries that knowledge. In traditional stochastic information 
theory notions such as "the validity of the inferred content", have' ,no place 
because the former cannot handle semantical aspects of signals. These 
notions typically require the viewing of a signal in the larger context of 
,an priori representational system. 
Thirdly, a treatment of the alternatives available to the mes-
sage analyst for selection' as "equiprobable" , the assumption' of which 
has proven helpful in other situations of complete uncertainty, "would 
seriously violate the systemic character of the state space. Or" stated 
differently, the "logic" implicit in a rep'resentational system accou.nting 
for some other than statistical dependenCies would be neglected if all 
possible signals within such a system were treated as equally likely. 
This is not to say that probabilistic notions are completely irrelevant 
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for our interests but that some other form of dependency needs to be 
considered which a statistical notion of information does not incorporate 
at this pOint of its development. 
Fourthly, Shannon's mathematical theory of communication 
assumes processes of information transmission to be 'ergodic, i. e., 
the transition probabilites are fixed and frequency distributions are 
equiprobable. On the other hand, one of the most significant character-
istics of message analytic situations and perhaps of all interaction, 
through messages is that the reception and manipulation of signals 
successively and irreversibly reduces the ,uncertainty, about an object 
system. The information process' in which the message analyst is 
engaged is essentially a non-ergodic process that terminates when as 
much uncertainty as pos sible is removed from the problem domain. 
Thus, several assumptions of stochastic type information theories as 
proposed by Shannon ,and Wiener are fundamentally different from those 
that have to be considered regarding message analytic situations. 
Consider an abstract example of a message analytic situation. 
Suppose we were given some signal and asked to make some predictions 
as to the actual state of the object system, i. e., we are asked to 
appropriately select some content out of the alternatives retnaining 
in the state space after a signal has been received. For purposes of 
illustration let us refer to the signals the various cojections of which 
have already been diagrammed in Figure 6. For the sake of simplicity 
let the problem domain be the respective subspace whose values remain 
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undetermined after one of the signals are given. 
Comparing signals (sh and (s) 5 ' for instance, it is quite ob-
vious that given (s)5 much more is known about the object system than 
if only (sh were to be received. The "more knowledge" that seems to 
be associated with (s)5 appears also to be connected with some notion 
of "higher confidence" in adequately selecting among the possible con-
tents of that message. Moving from (s11 via (s)3 to (s)5 we would 
even say,that the "probability" of correctly guessing the possible con_ 
tents of the message increases with the increasing knowledge about the 
object system directly conveyed by the respective signal. Without 
violating our intuition we could furthermore assert that (s) 5 is in 
some sense "richer" than (s)l ' makes prediction "easier" than (sh ' 
or carries "more information" than (s) l' In the same sense (s) 1 and 
(s)2 could be said to carry the same amount of information although 
they are different signals. The same can be said for (s)3 and (s)4' 
Note that such notions have little to do with those explicated in Shannon 
and Wiener's statistical information theory. The notion of probability, 
for example, is not based on any frequency of selections. It is a 
probabiJity,priori to any frequency and uniquely dependent on the 
nature of the representational system chosen. Needless to say, no 
statistical extrapolation of the signals can account for such intuitive 
notions of probability and consequently it cannot account for the notion 
of information of our immediate interest either. 
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Conversely, given (s)5 the knowledge conveyed by it includes 
what (s)3 and (s)l could convey and this is true regardless of how 
frequently either of the signals have been observed. The fact is that 
(s)3 is a projection of (s)5' and (s)l can similarly be obtained from 
both (s)3 and (s)5 by simply omitting some of the signal's components. 
Both (s)3 and (s)l can be inferred from (s)5 with absolute certainty 
and can be said to be redundant with respect to (s) 5' Under these con-
ditions our intuition leads uS to assert that (sll contains no information 
relative to (s)3 and (s)5 just as (s)3 contains no information relative 
to (s) 5' It should again be noted that the concept of information which 
is used here informally refers neither .to Shannon's entropy (175). nor to 
McGill'.s· uncertainty (132) nor to a measure of rarity or surprise value 
as. the statistical information measures have often been interpreted. 
The crux of the matter is that the example and its interpretation 
just mentioned, does not deal with a frequency interpretation of prob-
a bility but with a logical interpretation of probability, a distinction 
which has been made clear in Carnap's work (37). Similarly, the 
notion of "information" as used here derives from the logical interpreta-
tion of probability and is probably the one Cherry envisaged when 
saying" ... when we solve a set of simultaneous equations we do not 
really obtain neW information; the various steps and the final solution 
represent transformations (or 'codings ') of the information which was 
contained implicitly in the original equation" (42: 389). The idea that 
there may be many concepts of information, a statistical one, a 
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semantica1one, etc., all of which can be said to be specific interpreta-
tions of a general information calculus has been presented by Bar-
Hillel (22). 
The diagram seems in a sense to "explain" some of the intuitions 
we asserted regarding the amount of information carried by an incomplete 
observation. We suggested that signal {s)3' being in some sense 
"richer" than the signal '{s)l' carries more information. Now the 
diagram depicts the immediately striking fact that the number of elements 
remaining in gZ after (s)3 has become known is indeed much smaller 
than after only {sh has been obtained --not to speak of the further re-
duction of the variety of elements among which the state of the object 
system will have to be found after {s)5 has been cojected onto Z. On 
the other hand, going from (s)5 to {s)3 or to (s)l ; and from {s)3 to 
(s) 1 ' the variety remains unaffected neither increasing nor decreasing. 
This fact may account for the intuition that a signal which is only a 
fraction of a another carries no information and is perfectly redundant 
with respect to the latter. 
, The diagram is such that all cojections which do not increase 
the variety found in their operands are depicted by left-to-right arrows. 
It happens that these cojections are projections as defined in /8/. On 
the other hand, cojections depicted in the diagram by right-to-left 
arrows are not mappings. They are the inverses of projections and 
may be called extensions which never decrease the variety found in 
their operands. Compare by means of the diagram the number 
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#C(lE(S}~ = 1 obtained by a projection with the number #coG(s}~ = 4 ob-
tained by an extension. 
How these cojections are termed appears to be secondary. But, 
that the intuitive noti(ln of information in the sense of the specificity of a 
signal is intrinsically related to the varieties obtained after cojections 
have been applied on subspace of a state space and elements thereof, 
seems at least suggestive of the following: 
A Derivation of the Signal Information Function 
The introduction of this chapter developed the basic tools for 
our information calculus. It,enables us to formulate the requirements 
which a measure function for "amount of information carried by a 
signal, " or briefly, "amount of signal information," should satisfy. 
These requirements will, at first, be discussed informally. 
The most general requirements on this measure function is that 
it should be a continuous function of the signal's specificity or the degree 
to which a signal represents the object system within a representational 
system. 
The measure function should yield quantitative statements 
representing some signal characteristic in reference to a representa-
tional system which are amenable t(l some algebraic operations. More 
specifically, measures of signals that specify different parts of an 
object system and that are in this respect independent of each other, 
should be additive. 
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Suppose a set of signals are received in the form of punched 
cards. It seems close to our intuitive conception as to a proper meas-
ure of information that two punched cards have, as Shannon suggests, 
twice the capacity to store information as a single such card. Anal-
ogously, if an object system is composed of many identical components, 
a signal representing the state of two such components should contain 
twice as much information as a signal representing the state of only 
one. 
If the set of received signals, for example, punched cards, 
written text, numerical record etc., are only replicas of each other, 
then the information function should not be affected by the number of 
identical signals received. On intuitive grounds the first of these 
signals contains all information that is obtainable from the set, the 
remainder can be considered redundant and therefore should not con-
tribute to the measure. Note that this notion of redundancy is quite 
different from the concept of redundancy in Shannon's statistical in-
formation theory where it is a me·asure of a constraint. 
If a receiver or message analyst defines his focus of attention, 
area of interest or problem domain to be a particular set of an object 
system's components, some signal should be measured as carrying 
information only to the extent that it has specificity within the set of 
dimensions that denote the priorily defined focus of attention. And 
yet, the function should still remain a measure of the amount of infor-
mation the signal carries and not vary with the amount of ignorance 
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prior to the reception of that signal. This requirement becomes im-
portant for differentiating relevant from irrelevant information and 
should permit us to consider arbitrarily chosen parts of an objelOt system 
without affecting the quantities measured with one exception: the size 
of the a'rbitrarily chosen part of an object system should determine the 
upper limit of the amount of information a signal may carry within the 
delineated focus of attention. This requirement is also quite natural. 
1£ a signal provides all information of interest, there is nothing to be 
, ' 
added to the quantity of information possessed by receiving more signals 
of whatever kind. This requirement particularly makes the difference 
between our measure of information and a statistical measure of infor-
mation quite an obvious one.' 
Under the assumption that the particular sequence in which a 
variety of signals of an object system's components are received is 
merely a p:"oblem'of observation and hence does not provide informa-
tion about that system, the measure function should not be affected by 
the order in which these signals appear. 
Two or more received signals may 'represent components ,of 
the object system as being in mutually exclusive states. In such cases 
the measure function should take an indefinitely large value. On 
intuitive grounds contradictions of this kind in no way reduce the un-
certainty regarding an object system., When such contradictions appear, 
they indicate that the representational system chosen is not powerful 
enough or that it is incapable of adequately representing the object 
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system from which the signals were obtained. In some sense such 
signals can be conceived as carrying mOre information than the repre-
sentational system can handle. Hence, the measure function is then 
expected to assume the value of infinity. For example, the same 
place cannot have two different colors at the same time. At least 
within the common representational systern"colors are mutually ex-
clusive. An observation of incompatible states would lead to the 
collapse of the representational system. In a more powerful repre-
sentational system which includes, for example, observer differences, 
such incompatibilities may become resolved and observations to this 
effect may then become manageable and contain finite quantities of 
information. 
After this informal discus sion of the properties that we expect 
a measure function of amount of signal information to possess, we 
will state these requirements more formally. Just for the derivation 
of the function (i. e., just in this section of the chapter), the particular 
subspace which is of interest to the analyst or receiver will be denoted 
by the set G of dimensions that constitute a subspace of the state 
space gZ representing an object system and the two sample signals 
(s)E and (s)F will be considered with sets· E and F both contained 
in Z, delineating the components represented by each signal. 
Axiom 1: the value of the measure function f is not to exceed 
a certain maximum that is determined by the size of the subspace 
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denoted by the set G of dimensions of interest to the receiver or mes-
sage analyst, i. e. , 
G being fixed or known, 
where by equality is obtained when G £ E . 
Axiom 2: The value of the function is to remain invariant for all 
arbitrarily chosen dimensions of subspaces that are merely extensions 
of the subspace of which the received signaL is an element, i. e. , 
(s)E being fixed or known, 
f{G, (s)E) = invariant for any G, ESG. 
Axiom 3: If fractions of a signal are taken independently, then 
the. value of the measure function is to remain invariant to any order or 
arrangement in which these signals are considered, i. e. , 
for any E, F and G, 
f{G, (s)EUF) =. f{G, {s)Eand (s)F) = f{G, (s)F and (s)E) 
the non-committal "and" denoting an operation to be defined according to 
the axiom. 
Axiom 4: If the members of a set of signals represent no 
common components within the dimensions of interest to the analyst, 
the!). the value of the measure over all signals is to be the algebraic 
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sum of the measures obtained from each individual signal, i. e. , 
whenever (GnE) n (GnF) = (/J, 
f(G, (s)E and (s)F) = f(G, (s)E) + f(G, (s)F) . 
Axiom 5: The measure is to be a continuous function over the 
number of elements that its arguments delineate within a representational 
system, i. e. , 
f(G, (s)EUF) is continuous 
Theorem: The only function satisfying the five axiomatic require-
ments IS: 
= clog 
where c maybe any constant. 
Proof: From /12/ and /16/ follows: 
and 
= = 
Suppose now G=E, then according to both axioms 1 and 2: 
£(G, (s)E) = f(G) = F(E). 
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By axiom 1 the value of the measure is not to be affected by any signal's 
specificity outside the space denoted by G. In the cardinal arithmetic 
expressions above, it is easily seen that under the condition G=E the 
number of elements in the signal's cojection onto G is always one and 
remains unaltered for any E (s) , G~E 
G ensures that #gE-G is eliminated. 
The operation cojection onto 
By axiom 2 the value of the measure is to be invariant for any 
G, E£G in which case the measure is solely to be a function of the 
specificity of the signal. Suppose a few dimensions, constituting a space 
having, say, m elements, were added to G. The new space denoted 
by G' then has m times as many elements and so has the cojection 
E . 
of (s) onto G' m times as many elements. Axiom 3 requires now 
that the number of elements in gG~E in the expression above to have 
no effect on the measure function. These quantities vary exponentially 
with the number of dimensions in the arbitrarily chosen space denoted 
by G. The only way of effectively compensating these joint variations 
is by dividing the quantities in question. Hence, the only function that 
satisfies axioms 1 and 2 jointly is, 
= g 
G #co g 
G E #co (s) 
where g is a function that needs to be determined by other axioms. 
Thus when G s;;;: E, 
E f{G, (s) ) = g #coGg G E #co (s) 
= = 
thereby satisfying the requir·ement ofaxiorrl 1. When E s=.G, 
= = g 





By axiorrl 3, which can be taken up quite independently of .the other 
axioms, 
= = 
Since signals in this expression rrlay pertain to several different spaces, 
"and" rrlust include a standardizing operation for which cojection has 
been defined and an operation that is associative and cOrrlrrlutative. Apply-
ing coE U F on the signals in the above expression Yi.elds: 
= 
= 
(s)F x gE-F 
whereby 
Therefore, the only operation that satisfies the requirerrlent set forth 
in axiorrl 3 is the intersection of these cojections. Thus "and" can 
only be defined: 
E F (s) and (s) = = 
., 
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= g #GGn(EUF) 
Axiom 4 requires the measure for a set of individual signals to be 
additive whenever these signals represent no common component within G. 
In conjunction with axioms 1, 2, and 3, axiom 4 requires the function to 
have the following property: 
= + 
Simplified as it has been done above, axiom 1 through 4 requires 
g #GGn (EU F) 
= + 
Under the stated assumption that (Gn E)n (Gn F) = (/J, it is always so 
that 
GGn (EU F) 
= x 
The requirement axiom 4 imposes on the function then.becomes more 
clearly expressed as: 
g + 
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It is well known that the onlyfunction that has this property and confirms 
to axiom 5 by being continuous is: 
g (x) = c log x . 
Hence, the measure function for amount of signal information that satis-
fies the requirements put forth by the five axioms can only be: 
= clog 
Q.E.D. 
G E G F #co (s) nco (s) 
~" .. 
There is no reason to assume the constant c to have any value 
other than +1. The basis of the logarithm is arbitrary. But, for accord-
ance with other information theories we can assume it to be 2 whenever 
practical computations are made. Hence, the values of the function are 
expressed in "bits." Moreover, we wish to express the function for any 
set {. .. , (s);, . .. J of signals and therefore define the amount of infor-
mation carried by a set of signals as: 
G SI ( ... ,(s)i"") = log /21/ 
It is easily shown that the informally stated requirement concern-
ing contradictory signals is implied by the five axioms. Consider two 
signals E F (s) i and (s) j that are mutually exclusive within G, i. e. , 
(s)~n Fn G 
1 






which is in fact equivalent to 
= 
in which case 
= log = +00 
Q.E.D. 
Our measure function for amount of signal information exhibits 
a superficial resemblance to "-logZPi'" the amount of statistical infor-
mation that is associated with a single signal out of a set of signals that 
are characterized by their occurrence with certain frequencies. The 
expression derives from Shannon's work (175) although it has been 
formally introduced only by others, for example, Fano (59). Conse-
quently, Pi is the frequency interpretation of probability and ought not 
to be confused with our expression right of the logarithm. Our measure 
function is more similar to Carnap and Bar-Hillel's amount of semantical 
information conveyed by a statement: "inf(i) = -logZ m(i)" (Zl) (38), 
whereby m is a measure function defined over the range of statements 
that do not imply the statement i. 
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Although formally similar to the measure of statistical informa-
tion and to the measure of semantical information in that they involve the 
logarithm of some proportion, our measure is concerned with the spe-
cificity of a signal within <in arbitrarily chosen domain of interest' to the 
receiver and with respect to an object system from which the signal pre-
sumably originated. Insofar as signals are being measured in their 
capacity to represent components of an object system, One might con-
ceive of our measure as being a measure of the amount a given signal 
represents. It should be noted that the specificity of a signal still has 
little to do with the content we are ultimately interested in. 
In our definition, the expression to the right of the log<irithm is 
a proportion of the number of alternatives within a space denoted by G 
and the number of alternatives that remain in that space after a signal 
has become known. In other words, the information measure is based 
on the proportion of the varieties ina deSignated space a priori and a 
posteriori to cojections of a set of signals onto the dimension of that 
space. This fact leads us to a rather convenient interpretation of our 
quantity of information as the difference between a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge within a given boundary. More formally, let 
= log # coG g /22/ 
and 
G 
U ( ... ,(s)i"") = log # 0 coG (s)i /23/ 
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then our function for arrlOunt of signal information becomes: 
G Sl ( ... ,(s)i"") = G U ( ... ,(s)i":') /24/ 
With this intuitively meaningful equation of information with the 
difference between two different states of knowledge, the function be-
comes a recognizable explication of the kind of information concept 
which is made use of when asserting that an experiment yields informa-
tion about some object tested; that a photograph contains information 
about something depicted; when claiming that television presents more 
information in subject area X than in subject area Y, or when judging 
a person as being informed or not informed. It is the kind of information 
that is necessary for the making of decisions concerning a delineated 
aspect of someone's environment and is therefore sought and paid for 
by purposive organizations. It can be conceptualized as successively 
and irreversibly eliminating the uncertainty within a given domain of 
interest to the receiver of the signals. By permitting an arbitrary 
delineation of a particular focus of attention to which the assessed 
quantities refer, the measure function accounts fo1' differential evalua-
tions that a receiver may impose on the specificity of a signal thus 
differentiating between relevant and irrelevant information according 
to a receiver-specified interest or purpose: 
Some distinctive values of the signal information measure 
SlG( .•. , (s)i"") = 0 implies that U G = U G ( ... , (s)i"") and 
indicates that the signals carry no information with respect to that part 
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of the object system represented in the set G of dimensions. If the 
amount of signal information in Z (Z encompassing the whole state 
space) is zero, the signals must be considered empty Or not received. 
According to /13/, UZ((s) <)I) then as sumes its maximum value. 
SIG (. .. , (s )i' ... ) = UG implies U G ( ... , (s)i' ... ) = 0 and indi-
cates that the set of signals perfectly specify the state of the object 
system represented by gG. The set of signals can then be said to 
have carried precisely the amount of information required to remove 
all uncertainty in gG 
SrG ( ... , (s)i' ... ) = 00 indicates an indeterminacy in the sub-
space denoted by G due to contradictions that the representational 
system cannot resolve. For example consider the diagram in Figure 6. 
The cojections of (s)2 and anyone of (s)1' (s)3' or (s)5 never have 
any common element as long as E is included in the respective sub-
space G. Hence, their intersection is always the empty set. The 
measure then indicates the presence of two or more signals that are 
mutually exclusive within the assumed representational system. 
Dependencies Between Signals Mfecting the Measure 
When two signals contain the same information, one of them 
may be said to be redundant with respect to the other. A set of signals 
mayor may not contain redundancy depending on whether and the ex-
tent to which the specificity of one signal is already implied by some 
other signal. The quantity of redundancy of a set of signals can be 
defined as follows: 
G R1 (ooo,{s)o,ooo) = 
1 . 
G Sl (ooo,{s)i'ooo) 
or expressed in relative terms, taking values between zero and one: 






If two signals are identical, {s)i ;:: {s)j' their cojection onto 
G produces identical setso Therefore: 
G G 
SI {(s)i' (s)j) = SI {(s)i) = 
whereby the relative redundance becomes riG{(s)i' (s)j) = 005 0 
If two signals are independent in G, Leo (Gn E) n (G(l F) = Q; , 
then according to axiom 4: 
= + 
and relative as well as absolute redundancy assume the value zero. 
. E If two slgnals are such that (5) is a fraction of, derivable 
from, Or already specified by the signal (s)F in G, io eo, 
= 
= 
from which it follows that 
# gG- F 
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whereby 
Consequently only (s)E contributes to the redundancy of the set of 
signals: 
= 
With the exception of the case where two signals are mutually 
= p, the amounts of 
joint and individual signal information are related in the following way: 
+ 
Measures of the amount of signal information conditional on 
some given s1g'hal can be defined in analogy to Shannon's conditional 
entropy. Suppose the amount of information conveyed by the signal 
(s)i is to be assessed, the signal (s)j being given or known, we define: 
. G G 
SI ((sli/(s)j) = SI ((s)i' (s)j) 
= UG((s)i) 
= log /27/ 
The relation between the amounts of conditional information and of 
redundancy follows from /25/ and /27/: 
= 
G 
SI ((s)i) /28/ 
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If two signals are free of contradictions in G or the contradictions 
are intentionally to be ignored, then the amount of conditional information 




= log #co (s) 
#coG(s)En coG(s)F 
= log 
#(s)G() F x gG-F 
#(s)Gn Ex gG-En (s)Gn F x gG-F 
= log 
#gG-F 




= UG - F - UG-F((s)E) = srG - F ((s)E) /29/ 
Among the many specialized information measures that can be 
defined in terms of our calculus is a measure of the amount of valid 
information. This measure is needed to state the goal of message 
analysis formally. Suppose a message analyst takes a guess as to the 
state of a set G of an object system's components and this guess is 
only partly correct. We wish to have a measure of how much of this 
guess was valid. This entails the comparison of the guess with some 
validating evidence and requires the definition of a special operation 
"(}"" that picks out those dimensions E' of the guess (g)E that are 
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in agreement with the validation signal (v)F .. Let the operation <r 
induce a mapping: 
E---E' = { e leE E and coe(g)E = 
/30/ 




The names of information functions that include the operation iY will be 
prefixed by a capital V. Consequently the amount of valid signal info.r-
mation is then defined as: 
= log /31/ 
Since by definition /30/ of the operation (t, E'£; E, it follows from 
/31/ that: 
G / F VS1 ( ... , (g)i' . .. / (v) ) G S1 ( ... , (g)i' ... ) . /32/ 
The Goal of Message Analysis 
After having developed the foundation of an information calculus 
assumed to be adequate for message analysis and after an attempt has 
been made to show some typical properties of the suggested measure 
function, we are now equipped to formulate the goal of mes sage analysis 
mOre concisely and in more elegant terms. For the sake of simplicity, 
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the symbols referring to the state space of an object system will be used 
throughout, keeping in mind that the formulations are meant to be general-
izable to other representational systems as well. 
As it was developed in the last chapter, the diagram in Figure 7 
depicts now formally the message analytic situation as a system having 
an ()bject system, a representational system and a message analyst as 
its, components. Although the message analyst has only limited,access 
to the object system of his attention, it should always be understood that 
the external. observer, from whose point of view the me s sage analytic 
situation is depicted, assumes that access of which the message analyst 
is lacking. This assumption, it will soon be recognized, is a prerequisite 
to formulating the goal of message analysis unambiguously. 
Let the object system be represented within the set Z of dimen-
sions constituting the state space gZ; and the signal (s), specifying 
some subset of variables in Z, be received. The first condition 
which the message analytic situation must satisfy can be formulated as 
follows: 
The object system ~ incompletely observable if 
o 
__ U Z 
"'" 
suggesting that a problem of message analysis may exist. The concept 
of a message always requires some inferences beyond the factual ob-
servations which are meaningless in isolation. Message analysis there-
fore becomes empirically relevant only if the amount of information 
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Object System Representational System Message Analyst 
gZ 
~ ____ --I-__ (s)S ___ -f-_____ .... 
z - S 
(c) __ ------\-------" 
'-_____ ~--~_(v)Z-S 
£ 01, (3, DJ 
Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation (Formal) 
Figure 7 
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conveyed by the signal is markedly larger than zero. This amount of 
information should not, however, be too large for two reasons. Firstly, 
if it equals the maximum uncertainty concerning the object system's 
state as a whole, the system is perfectly specified and no need for in-
ferences arises. Secondly, if it exceeds the maximum uncertainty, the 
, 
signal contains contradictions and cannot be utilized for inferential pur-
poses within the representational system chosen. 
Our conception of a message requires some predictive efforts, 
some inferences on the part of the message receiver and, hence, the 
appropriate selection of some content, denoted by (c), over the vari-
ables in Z but not included in those of the signal which is presumed to 
carry that content. In other words, signal (s) and content (c) of a 
message are not to be redundant. Therefore the second' condition which 
the m"",sage analytic situation is required to satisfy is: 
Some signal is treated as ~ message if: 
o -< SIZ((c)/(s)) 
If and only if condition /**/ is satisfied the content inferred from a 
given signal can be considered predictive. If only condition /*/ is 
satisfied and the amount of information carried by the content condi-
tional to the signal is zero, then t~e content is merely descriptive of 
what has been observed directly or is already specified by receiving 
the signal. In such a case no references are made to unobserved parts 
of the object system, and in fact the signal being known, the content is 
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perfectly redundant. Under condition / **/, the arrlOunt of 'conditional 
information may indeed approach the maximum arnount of uncertainty 
regarding the unobserved part of the object system, claiming perfect 
knowledge in spite of incomplete observability. 
Unfortunately, both conditions, /c*/ for the incomplete obser-
vability of an object system and /,:d.'/ for something being treated as a 
message, can only serve as a prerequisite, not as a basis for formulat-
ing the goal of message analysis. This becomes immediately evident 
by the following two reasons. Firstly, as it has been argued in the 
previous chapter, a simple maximization of content cannot be a reason-
able goal of message analysis. The reduction of most of the remaining 
uncertainty concerning the object system after a signal has been sent 
and received may not only be an impossible task, but also irrelevant 
to the interest and specific problems which motiva,te an analyst to 
employ such a mode of inquiry. We therefore settled on a more 
limited task. A problematic area of interest to the analyst may define 
a specific problem domain D of Z within which appropriate selec-
tions of predictive content are significant to the conduct of the analyst. 
The diagram in Figure 7 depicts D to be externally imposed on the 
message analyst, but it could as well be viewed as the correlate of an 
intrinsic goal of the message receiving system. Under this objection 
condition /*"/ could be modified by replacing Z by the set D of the 
problem domain I s dimension within which information is declared 
relevant. 
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Secondly, any arbitrary selection arpong the contents not specified 
by the signal in D would already satisfy the modified condition /"~,/ re-
gardless of whether the prediction is valid or not. Therefore the amount 
of information conveyed by the inferred content conditional on the signal 
would in no way measure the effort on the part of a message analyst to 
"correctly" infer the content of a message or to "adequately" predict 
some inaccessible state of the object system's components unless the 
information is valid. Consequently, a statement of the goal of message 
analysis cannot solely be based on simple quantities of information that 
the analysis is to yield; but to a significant degree, on the quantity of 
valid information that is associated with the inferred product of treating 
some signal as a message, If appropriate selections are required to 
satisfy a certain goal, then a criterion of appropriatenes s must be 
given. Note that the first objection to accepting condition /~,*/ argues 
for an intensionally defined value of information gained from messages, 
while the second argues for an extensionally defined value of information 
provided by a message. A statement of the goal of message a analysis 
will have to include both. 
These two arguments suggest looking for a reasonable goal 
within the following inequality in which the validating signal (v) Z-S 
serves as external evidence against which the inferred content is 
validated. The inequality derives from /27/ and /32/ and reads: 
o .:;;. VSID((c)!!(v)!(s)) < SID((c)!(s)) ~ UD((s)) 







A message analyst must not, of course, be considered "ideal. " 
He is susceptable to various kinds of errors two of which appear in the 
inequality above. Firstly, the predictive content may refer only to a 
portion of the problem domain not specified by the signal. This error 
may be called "error of omission." By analogy to the conventions of 
statistical inference Simon (178) called such an error Type I error. 
It 4ppears here as the difference between the amount of information the 
content conveyed and the uncertainty in D, both conditional on the signal 
received. Secondly, given the signal, there is the "error of commis-
sion" which can be defined as the difference between the amount of in-
. formation the inferred content conveys and the amount of validated 
information of that content in D. This error would, by analogy to the 
above suggestion, be called Type II errOr. 
The message analyst has to minimize or to avoid both of these 
errors according to the extent each affects his future conduct. In 
some situations it maybe more important to infer as much relevant 
information as pos sible even though it includes invalid information, 
in some other situation emphasis may be placed on the validity of the 
inference. Let 0( therefore be a non-negative constant of merit 
associated with the worth of each unit of valid information, and (3 a 
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non-negative constant of penalty representing the punishment for errors 
of commission. 0( and (3 may be conceived of as monetary values. Let 
the total value of the product of a message analysis be defined as the 
quantity: 
O(VSID«c)II(v)/(s)) - (3(SrD «c)/(s)) - VSrD«c)II(v)/(sl)) 1341 
Then the goal of message analysis can be characterizeq. as an optimiza-
tion process applied on the product's value whereby the amount of pre-
dictive information in D tends toward its maximum and invalid prediC-
tions toward their minimum depending on the value associated with each 
of them. Hence, according to the conclusion of the previous chapter and 
the above considerations-: 
A message analyst must be considered goal-oriented, i. e. behav-
ing toward the goal of message analysis if, considering his initial state 
of having received a signal satisfying 1"1, the inferred content satisfy-
ing I*~'/: 
(read the arrow as "becomes") whereby it is implied that: 
o < VSrD«c)I/(v)/(s))-_-;"~UD«s)) 
reaching an ultimate state at which neither error is present: 
VSP{(c)II(v)/(s)) = SID «c) 1 (s)) = 
·.208 
Condition I"~'*I may be considered to be a statement of motiva-
tion which directs the process of inquiries into message content in the 
way stated in I':'''''~*I toward some end stated in I***'~"'I. This process 
/***>:'1 is manifest in the successive attempts at deciphering the old Per-
sian language which indeed reached the ultimate state 1*>:0:'**1 at which 
the hitherto unreadable script was perfectly understood and subsequent 
content inferences yielded valid results. The motivation stated in /"'"';"1 
is most clearly recognizable in the situation of the war-propaganda 
analyst in VI of which George (71) could report an increase in accuracy 
of content inferences over time, demonstrating the process described 
by 1***>:'1. One could argue that the constants 0( and (3 determining the 
nature of rewards were relatively high in the propaganda analyst's 
situation as compared with their values in the situation of the mass 
media critic in VIII. The strong emphasis on pragmatic validation in 
the caSe of the former and in the case of the latter, on intuitively 
determined face validity only exemplifies two different consequences 
of the two variable s of the reward as defined in 134 I. At any rate the 
process of increasing certainty 1****/ is also observable in the 
illustrated attempts of psychologists to analyse human speech (X) 
and written texts (IX) with the purpose of making inferences as to 
the psychological states of the speakers. And it is finally the hope 
of reaching a state /'~**':'*/, Or at least of corning closer to it 
(/':":"'*/), that motivates many content analysts in their search for 
an understanding of the intricacies of modern industrialized culture 
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by analyzing and making inferences from the products of popular mass 
media (V) (VII) (VIII). 
The ultimate state /*****/ of message analysis seldom seems 
to be reached and can only be considered an ideal. One must rest satis-
fied when the conditions of reward /~,~,,:,/ are defined in such a way that 
the process /,~,~,~*/ of inquiries into message content tends toward this 
An Application to Working Example III 
One of the fundamental postulates in cybernetics which has been 
formulated by Ashby is that: 
any system that achieves appropriate selection to a degree 
better than chance does so as a consequence of information 
received (14). 
The postulate· is abstractly analogous, though not identical with Shannon 1 s 
(175:37) theorem ten which concerns the quantity of statistical informa-
tion that must be supplied to restore a noisy signal. The postulate has 
been shown to hold for all systems known so far, and states that under 
very general conditions the amount of appropriate selection is bounded 
by the quantity of information utilized. 
By defining the quantity of information as a measure of the 
amount of uncertainty reduced as a consequence of signals received 
(messages interpreted, content selected; etc.), our measure function 
for information is an explication of the information concept referred 
to in the postulate. In the light of this interpretation, condition / ;p:d,~, / 
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requires a message analyst to bring some quantity of information to bear 
ona delineated problem domain, while condition /**,:,,:,*/ in accordance 
with axiom 1 states the upper limit of the amount of information required 
to obtain certainty, in that domain. The fact that information has to be 
supplied by any analyst attempting to treat some received signal as a 
message is one of the most fundamental and consequential features of 
message analysis and will pose many empirical problems of processing 
available information, discussed later. 
In order to demonstrate the information processes a message 
analysis may require and to exemplify the quantities of information 
which pieces of knowledge carry in reference to a message analytic 
problem, let us consider working example Ill. Working example III 
describes a message analysis which exhibits a structure that is most 
obviously susceptible to quantitative operations. 
Figure 8 depicts the message analytic situat.ion described ln 
III. General Canby's object system is the Confederate Army; his 
specific problem domain, Kirby Smith's intended operations.' The 
English writing system is one of the representational systems in 
terms of which the object system can be represented adequately as 
far as the needs of Canby are concerned. The telegram, presumably 
referring ,to the problem domain in question is, however,. to a signif-
icant degree formulated in terms of another representational system 
presumably representing English terms. Hence, the cryptographer 







(z)' = (c) _+-__ ---".. 
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Information 
Part of Confederate Army English Writing System Cryptoanalyst 
(s) =~\ Ciphered part of the message 
(c) = (z)' = Deciphered part of the message (=content in crypto-
grapher's terms) 
(s)' = Clear part of the message 
(c)' = Clear of the message (=content for the native English speaker) 
= Decipherment 
(s)', (z)' __ (c)' = Intuitive semantic interpretation 
Diagram of the Situation in Working Example III 
Figure 8 
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hi:m to appropriately select a:mong the possible letter sequences which 
a) could be represented by the signals, the ciphered version of the 
English text, and b) are consistent with the se:mantic and syntactic rules 
of the English language. 
The initial state of the :message analysis is characterizable by an 
extre:mely un:manageable a:mount of uncertainty resulting fro:m the fact 
that each of the 127 letters of the ciphered parts of the telegra:m can take 
anyone of the 26 letters of the English alphabet. The initial and :maxi-
:mu:m uncertainty is the uncertainty within a state space of 127 di:men-
sions each of which can take 26 values. ~f an una:mbiguous reading of 
the message is tobe achieved, it is precisely this maximum uncertainty 
which has to be effectively eli:minated by supplying a certain amount of 
knowledge to the interpretation. The amount of information required 
is: 
Note that the cryptographer's problem do:main denoted by M is differ-
ent from Canby's problem domain which represents Kirby Sm.ith' s 
possible operations. The set M of dimensions constitute a state 
space of possible letters that can be considered as replacements of 
those in the ciphered part of the telegram. Since this required amount 
of information referred to by far exceeds the capacity of. any terrestrial 
organism or technical device to systematically try and test all com-
binatorial possibilities, the cryptographer's emphasis has indeed to 
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be placed on an "effective" elimination of the uncertainty. 
The first relevant piece of information obtained by the crypto-
grapher carne from analyzing the two accompanying documents. The 
Confederate Army, it was figured out, made use of the Vig~nere 
tableau. This device involves the application of a transformation from 
a clear and a key to the cipher of a message. The key has only a few, 
between 10 and 20 letters which are used repetitively to encode and de-
code messages of an arbitrary length. The Pemberton message was 
enciphered by means of a 15-letterkey. Knowing the nature of the 
transformation it was not necessary to look for all combinations of 
127 letters in the state space denoted by M, but only for those of the 
key with which the message could possibly be deciphered. Hence, the 
knowledge "ciphered by means of a Vig,§nere tableau" introduces a con-
straint of the number of combinations within the state space relative 
to the clear and thus reduces the dimensionality of the initial state 
space by a known transformation which we will call p-. Let the new 
state space be: g V = p- gM, the esti~ated amount of information con-
veyed by F is: 
70 + 23 = 
526 + 23 bits 
Although this is an enormous amount of information, the remaining 
uncertainty between 47 and 93 bits is, however, still much too large 
for any trial and error process. Consider only the number of possible 
Z14 
10 to ZO-letter words or phrases which the English language could provide 
'-C 
as a key! 
The second piece of information the cryptographer could bring to 
bear on the message stemmed from both his familiarity with the English 
language and the knowledge of that part of the object system to which the 
message presumably referred. Knowing that "the only patrols in this 
area are the gunboats on the Mississippi" and discovering "a sequence of 
letters that can easily be replaced by 'of the river, '" which will be denoted 
here by "{k)Z'" produced with the help of the Vigenere transformation 
the fraction of the key: "TE VICTORY C." 
Note that the message analyst did not have any other validity 
check than his sense of plausibility in judging the key fraction so ex-
tracted. His argument that this fraction could not have occured by 
chance suggests a view of his sense of plausibility in terms of the 
statistical redundancy (in Shannon's sense) of the English language, 
but we are not concerned with this sort of judgement at this point. 
f and {k)Z. are quite different in effect. The former affects 
the dimensionality of the state space without specifying some value on 
its dimensions, the latter specifies 10 letters in that reduced space 
denoted by V. The amount of information carried just by {k)Z is 
therefore: 
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and the amount of information so far obtained by utilizing p and (k)2 is: 
u M _ uV + SrV ((k)2) = 573 + 23 bits. 
After having utilized (k)2' the analyst discovered the third piece 
of information in the nine letters "a crossing" fitting a certain suggestive 
letter sequence in the ciphered part of the message. This suggestion was 
again due to.his familiarity with the English language and his fragmentary 
knowledge of the nature of the object system. Applying the transforma-
tions for extracting the key this time on "a crossing" yielded "ORY COM-
PLETE which was cojectable onto the space of the remaining unspecified 
letters of the key. Let us call this third piece of information "(k)3' " 
(k)2 and (k) 3 exhibit a certain amount of redundancy (in the sense of 
our information calculus) which confirmed the cryptographer's judge-
ment concerning whether the extracted key was complete. The amount 
of redundancy of (k)2 and (k) 3 is: 




= 19 bits 
and the amount of signal information conveyed by (k) 3 conditional on 
(k)2 is; 
= 10g2 26 9 - 19 = 23 bits. 
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The complete decipherment of the message could now be accom-
plished by repeatedly applying the transformation prescribed by the 
Vig.§nere tableau on both the chipher and the key. No additional infor-
mation was needed to execute these transfonnations. The requisite in-
formation for this decipherment was provided by what we called jJ., 
(k)2' and (k)3' The resulting clear was unambiguous, made sense in 
terms of the English language and was accepted beyond any doubt, At 
this point the condition /,:,,,,*,~*/ was satisfied although no validating 
evidence other than the cryptographer's intuition could be provided. 
The quantities of information conveyed by the three successively 
utilized pieces of knowledge add up to the total amount of uncertainty 













where by the estimate for the amount of information provided by know-
ing that the message was enciphered by the Vigenere tableau (the 
latitude of .± 23 bits) became certainty. 
The behavior of Kirby Smith's Rebels could now be anticipated 
as far as Canby's planning was concerned. However, the assessment 
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of the degree to which this prediction was accurate and the mode of 
validating the inferences made, is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
While this example demonstrates the way the information calculus 
can be applied to assess quantities of effective signal information that 
are conveyed by certain pieces of knowledge, Chapter Seven will attempt 
to define several expressions for quantities of different types of infor-
mation that have so far been cast in terms of signal information only. 
CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS OF MESSAGE ANALYSIS 
When discussing the message analytic situation, the message 
analyst has to be treated as a "black box" because a specification of 
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the goal of message analysis has to avoid references to the analyst's 
internal structure, his procedures and subroutines, if objective ex-
ternal criteria for evaluating the total performance of a message analy-
sis are to be established. The task of this chapter is to break this 
black box into its essential components, to show the requisite informa-
tion processes and to outline a macro structure of an analytic procedure 
that would satisfy the goal of message analysis as stated in previous 
chapters. 
We want to reserve the term "message analysis" for a methodo-
logically conclusive inquiry into incompletely observable systems 
i. e. a methodologically verifiable treatment of data as message. 
The possible confusion between message analysis and other overtly 
similar activities which this additional requirement is supposed to 
eliminate necessitates some introductory remarks before the pro-
cedural details of message analysis and their specific empirical 
problems are discussed. 
The Methodological Commitment 
Message analytic situations as defined in previous chapters 
are indeed very common in everydaylife. Signals such as lines on 
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a television screen, black ink figures on paper, punched tapes, radio 
waves, and even car shapes, cloud formations, odors, etc. provide 
intklligent beings a basis for speculating about aspects of their environ-
ment to which they have no direct access. 
People, so.cial organizations, nations or content analysts may 
satisfythe goal requirements of message analysis without in any formal 
way allowing their behavior to become a subject of methodological exam-
ination. The domain of such behavior is generally termed and invest-
igated as "symbolic behavior" and is a behavior that is abundantly 
exhibited by many higher organisms and social systems of varying size. 
There is no reason to assume that symbolic behavior presupposes a 
formal analysis of sensory data as messages. The great efficiency 
with which symbolic interaction takes place between social organisms 
of any kind even suggests that awareness of the inferential processes 
involved cannot serve as a prerequisite for handling symbols effectively. 
For this reason, most of the analytical conceptions of symbolic behavior 
can afford to avoid references to the fundamental fact that information 
must be supplied in order to treat signals or data as messages. 
An intelligent mass media critic, (for example Berelson in his 
study reported in VIII), when attempting to infer some social conditions 
from the frequency counts he obtains from content analyzing popular 
fictions, is most certainly quite aware of his reasoning. His interpreta-
tions may have evolved in actively participating as a member of so~iety 
at large, in the course of his career as a scientist, etc. But making use 
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of a method is quite diffe rent from explicitly stating the method employed 
such that it can be subjected to methodological evaluation. It is this dis-
tinction that differentiates symbolic responses from message analysis. 
In a rudimentary way working example II can serve as an illustra-
tion of the evolution of a methodologically more satisfactory inquiry into 
messages from a hitherto entirely intuitive judgment: the process orig-
inated when the Swedish scholars refused to accept the public accusations 
made by the orthodox clergy. Although the link between the religious 
dissenters, the Moravian sect and the "Songs of Zion" seemed to be 
appealing, the evidence for such inferences were judged insufficient. 
It will be recalled that the first explicit method which emerged was a 
comparison of the counts of key- symbols found in both documents, 
the suspected songs and the authorized book of hymns. The method 
first produced results supporting the intuition. It had to be discard'ed, 
however, when other disputants proved the difference to be due to what 
is today called an error of sampling. In response to such challenges 
another method emerged that took into consideration the contexts in 
which certain key symbols appeared. The analytical technique yielded 
differences between the two documents more reliably but could not 
provide the full evidence necessary to support or reject the accusa-
tions made. So the scholarly dispute went on until explicit methods .of 
analysis emerged which under the given circumstances appeared to be 
irrefutably conclusive and withstood all tests of intellectual adequacy. 
In this example it was not the results of the analyses that were 
challenged but the methods by means' of which those results were ob-
tained. Since direct evidence for the possible link between the sect, 
the song book, and the undesired effects was virtually unobtainable, 
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the only concrete object of the dispute was the inferential method itself. 
The prerequisite of such disputes which are in essence methodological, 
is that the analytical technique employed is explicitly described and 
hence potentially replicable. 
Herein lies the fundamental distinction between a systematic 
message analysis and other forms of symbolic behavior. The former 
requires an explicit and complete map of the inferential procedure 
followed, the decision criteria employed and assumptions made during 
.the analysis while the latter requires nothing of this sort. In the 
absence of direct observational evidence the credibility of the products 
of message analysis depends solely on a methodological examination 
of the conclusiveness of the antecedent analytic process while the 
credibility of symbolic behavior has intuitive and social roots. 
An analytical procedure that is satisfactory on methodological 
grounds is of course one that has been examined before being applied 
on a particular set of signals, i. e. it is at least to some extent planned 
in advance. Such a requirement has often been attacked on the basis 
that science ought to give primacy to observations and therefore collect 
as much data as possible before designing computational procedures 
for representing them. 
One objection to the above argument is that the universe 
simply contains too much (irrelevant) information to be considered 
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by an analyst with limited capacity to process it. As we shall see later, 
one of the problems of message analysis is to suppress irrelevant signal 
information. If a message analyst is concerned with any problem at all, 
then this problem bestows differential relevance upon the possible data 
he can consider. Especially since message analysis typically deals with 
latently structured and relatively voluminous material, a recognition in 
advance of what is relevant is usually a significant part of solving the 
whole problem. To plan message analytic procedures in advance is 
therefore not only a matter of economy but possibly a matter of arriving 
at a solution at all. 
Another objection sterns directly from the content analytic 
dilemma elaborated in Chapter Two. If the analyst is completely free 
in choosing the analytical procedure after data have been collected, it 
is quite likely that he will be trapped in a methodologically fallacious 
situation which will produce only pseudo evidence. 
In scientific inquiries, it has often been suggestive to proceed 
from an uncontrolled scanning of the "symbolic environrnent, " perhaps 
guided at first by a scientist's disciplined intuition, to what is called a 
"fishing expedition" and from there via exploratory studies and tests 
of investigative techniques to analytical methods of some definiteness. 
While the state of the art of message analysis may not always be such 
that explicitly stated procedures permeate the whole analysis, the· 
iteration converging toward the methodological ideal of examining and 
planning investigative techniques prior to their actual use should be 
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recognized as a typically scientific one. 
To approach such an ideal becomes an absolute necessity when 
information processing devices ,for the analysis of messages are intended 
to be used. Here nothing can'be left to intuition. Working examples IX 
and X show what is required when computers are to be utilized for mes-
sage analytic purposes, Some of the technic",l problems involved are 
discussed in Borko (32), Hunt (86) (87), Garvin (68), Feigenbaum (60), 
North (142), Janda (90), and Stone (188) (189) (190). The researchers 
attempting to solve such 'empirical problems agree that the task is often 
meticulous and yet, as a result of this self-imposed methodological 
rigor, they are able to report quite unexpected results obtained with a 
minimum of clerical labor, Many scientists share Wrigleyls belief that: 
the electronic computer will prove to be the most versatile 
and influential scientific instrument so far invented and that 
it will playa larger role in the scientific histories of the 
future than even s;'ch obvious challenges as the microscope 
and the telescope (216:163), 
but of equal importance is the extreme explicitness that computers re-
quire in scientific research. As Holsti remarks II. , • computers impose 
rigor and discipline on the formulation of research. The investigator 
using computers for content analysis is forced to make every step of 
his research explicit .. , it is not wholly facetious to suggest that'all 
content analysis research should be designed as if it were to be done 
by computerll (83: 124). The use of electronic computers lends itself 
to the kind 'of explicitness that was missing in much pre_behavioral 
theorizing and is a pre'requisite for systematic methodological evaluation. 
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Of course the procedural details of message analysis cannot be 
specified without reference to a particular message analytic situation. 
Some such situations may require the obtaining of permeation measures 
as one of the analytical steps; some other situation may suggest that the 
presence Or absence of a particular characteristic is more relevant to 
the problem at hand; and in a third situation, the appropriate inferences 
maybe triggered by the appearance of certain abstract properties that 
emitted signal sequences exhibit. There is ample reason to assume 
that no universal algorithm can be formulated that will yield the desired 
inferences in any situation, for any object system and with respect to 
any problem domain given. 
Given the general goal of handling available information in such 
a way that uncertainty in an unobserved problem domain is to be effect-
ively minimized, we can hope to show some of the subgoals that have 
to be reached when inqUiries into messages are to be successful in the 
above SenSe. This is another way of saying that it is assumed that any 
message analytic procedure can be broken down into a few essential 
components or subroutines, each geared to a different end and posing 
different empirical problems to the analyst, and that their essential 
components can be abstracted from the specific nature of the message 
analytic situation. 
It is furthermore assumed that if enough information about the 
regularities of the object system is available and the formal properties 
of suc.h essential components are sufficiently understood, these 
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sub-procedures may then be suitably assembled such that the message 
analytic goal can be accomplished. The, es sential components sugge sted 
in the following can befor);llulated only in general terms and differentiated 
heuristically. This means that other approaches to message analysis 
Illay prefer to make other distinctions and use different labels. But it 
is believed that some such procedures are the prerequisite for any mes-
sage analysis that is satisfactory on methodological grounds. 
The following components of message analysis in the wider sense 
will be distinguished in this chapter: 
1) Recording denotes a process of transcribing .raw data into 
primarynotations that are amenable to subsequent explicit analysis. 
2) Filtering signifies a systematic reduction of data byeliminat-
ing irrelevant information or noise from available data, past or present, 
by applying appropriate operations on their structure. The output of 
this component is a transformed version of the data or a representation 
suitable for further processing. 
3) Constraint analysis attempts to discover relevant constraints 
existing in an object system and to formulate regularities that can be 
considered to account for them. This component accepts data representa-
tions as input and produces regularities that can be utilized for inferential 
purposes. 
4) Design of message analysis in the narrower sense involves 
an evaluation of the paths provided by known regularities according to 
whether and how the uncertainty in a delineated problem domain can be 
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reduced effectively. The output of this component contains specific in-
structions to be used in recording, filtering and content inference. 
5) Content inference may be regarded as the heart of message 
analysis and refers to a process by which problem-relevant constraints 
are applied on filtered data or texts. The output of content inference is 
a representation of the message content by definition. 
6) Projection refers to a transformation of the abstractly repre-
sented content onto the dimensions of the problem domain whenever 
content inferences do not already yield results in those dimensions. 
Projections may take the form of applications of analytic results accord-
ing to other objectives. 
7) Content validation evaluates the output of content inferences 
against independently received validating evidence representing some 
aspects of the object system. 
In a simplified form Figure 9 gives an informal outline of the 
empirical concern with messages which we will term message analysis 
in the wider sense. One of the research tasks that can be discerned 
among others in empirical inquiries into messages, is the analysis of 
relevant constraints an object system may exhibit or the establishment 
of regularities concerning the messages it produces. Such a task must 
be considered preparatory to the systematic treatment of data ~)' mes-
sages. Message analysis in the narrower sense is in accordance with 
the goal as defined in Chapters Four and Five. It involves recording, 
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of these components are determined on the basis of available information 
from a constraint analysis. Projection and validation are, on the other 
hand, a posteriori to message analysis in the narrower sense and maybe 
regarded optional as far as the goal of the message analyst is concerned. 
The diagram is a simplified one in so far as actual mes sage 
analyses tend to be much more complex than depicted. There may be 
interactions and iterative loops between the components and not just a 
one way flow of information. There may be chains of filters and infer-
ence procedures and not just one .of each. Lack of validity may have to 
induce procedural modifications and not just be indicative of some defect 
as the diagram seems to suggest. In short, reaching the goal of a 
particular message analysis may presuppose more complex networks 
of numerous such sub-procedures. The simplified presentation merely 
depicts the minimal differentiations among essential components and is 
primarily meant as an outline for the following discussion of the empir-
ical problems of mes sage analysis. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to constraint 
analYSis, filtering, recording, content inference and validation. The 
order in which they are discussed is not chronological. The other pro-
cedures are not discussed here. After this attempt at clarification the 
following chapter will take up the same subject in the light of the infor-. 
mation calculus introduced in the previous chapter. 
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Constraint Analysis 
This section concerns the empirical problem of analyzing mes-
sage- relevant constraints in the following steps: consideration will first 
be given to the relation between requisite information and the existence 
of constraints. Then indices of constraints are discussed showing the 
idea of constraints to bea quite general one. This leads to the problem 
of formulating the regularities that can be assumed to account for the 
discovered constraint, a problem that is quite different from just indi-
cating the presence of it. The section will subsequently be concluded 
by presenting two examples of constraint analyses as an illustration of 
the kind of empirical prerequisites of message analysis in the narrower 
sense. 
Requisite Information and Constraint 
'" 
The working examples make it abundantly clear that the goal of 
message analysis can only be achieved if a certain quantity of informa-
tionis available that can be brought to bear on given data. At the end 
of Chapter Five an attempt was made to illustrate the information 
calculus by expressing the amount of requisite information quantitatively, 
completely neglecting, however, the nature of such information. This 
is perfectly legitimate but insufficient. Shannon and Weaver (175) do 
not either offer an explication for "information" when defining a meas-
ure function for the average amount of statistical information. But· 
message analysis deals with several kinds of information; the infor-
mation that the data provide, the information that is required to make 
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specific inferences, the information that is finally obtained as message 
content, and the information that is necessary to validate content infer-
ences. Here we have to consider the nature of the information that be-
comes operationalized in filtering and in content inference which in turn 
permits us to make appropriate selection of contents within a problem 
domain. 
To show exactly what must be known when specific content in-
ferences from given data are attempted let us again examine some of 
the working examples. A simple case is the identification of the author 
of an unsigned document described in working example IV. Although a 
long list of persons were originally considered as potential authors of 
the Imitatio, evidence other than thol>e described .in The Statistical Study 
of Literature reduced this list to two persons. Hence one bit of infor-
mation was required to decide the authorship in this case. 
Yule discovered and verified for many documents with known 
authors that certain statistical indices defined over the vocabulary of 
a document varied only slightly within the works of one author but con-
siderably between the works of different authors. He found, for example, 
nouns to be most distinctive and was therefore able to characterize each 
author by the set of nouns he employed in his writing. This one-to-one 
relation between writer and his statistically represented vocabulary 
was precisely the knowledge needed to decide on the authorship of the 
Imitatio. Note that this relation could be established only after the 
document's characteristics were suitably recorded, filtered and 
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represented and that this relation was a prerequisite for making the .in-
tended content inference. 
Working example IX showed how the General Inquirer was used to 
infer the suicide intentions of a person from his personal letters. The 
example again demonstrates that the inference could not proceed invacuo. 
It was preceded by what we may call a "learning period" during which 15 
known pairs of letters (one real and one simulated) were subjected to an 
analysis that was in effect a constraint analysis. It will be recalled that 
three vocabulary variables were found to discriminate the relative fre-
quencyof 1) references to concrete things, persons, and places, 2) the 
use of the actual word "love" and 3) the number of references to pro-
·cesses of thought and decision identifiable in the text. By subtracting 
the score on the third measure from the sum of the scores on the first 
two measures a discriminate function was developed which when applied 
on 15 other pairs of unknown origin correctly distinguished 13 of them. 
The kind of information that was acquired during the learning period 
and subsequently made available for making inferences was the discrim-
inate function mentioned above. 
Evaluating the propaganda analysis efforts during World War II, 
George (71) studied numerous incidents of which only one could be re-
ported as working example VI. Inquiries into the propaganda analyst'S 
reasoning on record revealed relatively detailed "models of the situa-
tion" on the basis of which inferences were made from the ITlOnitored 
message. He found in particular that the analyst discovered and made 
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use of nUITlerous recurrent regularities in the opponent's propaganda 
behavior. These regularities sOITletiITles took the forITl of typical in-
dicators of which lists were cOITlpiled;. and sOITletiITles, the forITl of 
generalizations about the ITlajor propagandist within the political setting 
of the governing elite. Knowledge of these recurrent regularities were 
in fact a prerequisite for ITlaking the inferences intended. Thesuc-
ces sively increasing accuracy of the inferences ITlade are indicative of 
the accuITlulationof relevant inforITlation. 
While inferences in content analysis ITlainly rest on a speculative 
base, Yule's relation between the identity of an author and a statistical 
representation of his vocabulary had been investigated thoroughly; the 
above ITlentioned discriITlinate function over the General InquirerITleas-
ures had been subjected to an eITlpirical test; the knowledge of appro-
priate regularities of propaganda behavior had been successively 
acquired and verbally expressed by the analyst on the job. 
For exaITlple in V, the basic assuITlption which is iITlplicit in the 
interpretation of the series of tests designed to disclose foreign propa-
ganda in the United States refers to the nature of the cOITlITlunication 
channels between foreign governITlents and publication agencies sus-
pected to be arITlS of those governITlents. If a foreign governITlent has 
control over the cOITlITlunication channel between the events within its 
nation and a publication agency operating in the United States then - so 
it could be argued - certain essential ITlessage characteristics should 
be expected to reITlain relatively invariant throughout the transITlission 
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process. The analysis consequently focuses on such characteristics 
which would very likely be altered if transmitted through a communica-
tion channel not under the control of this government. The decision 
concerning the existence of a communication link between a suspected 
agency and a foreign government presupposes such an assumption which 
takes the place of the requisite information in our sense. 
Whether this requisite information is established by empirical 
means or assumed on the basis of sufficient intuitive experiences, it 
always affects some specific property of the object system. In order 
to show this property more clearly let us take working example VII for 
a change. Leites' knowledge about the Soviet mode of expressing adula-
tion and about the conditions under which political and private intimacy 
are expected to be suppressed in public, led him to deduce a rather 
simple relation between the number of references to Stalin's Bolshevik 
image and the number of references to Stalin's popular image on the 
one hand, and the socio-political distance of the speaker to Stalin on 
the other. Suppose the frequency of references to either of Stalin's 
images varied independently of the actual distance of the speaker to 
Stalin, then their mention could in no way be indicative of this distance. 
In other words, if no dependency between the respective variables 
could be expected to be persistent, nothing could be inferred from 
one to the other. Persons politically closer to Stalin were not per-
mitted, however, to express personal intimacy to him in public while 
those mOre distant felt compelled to use crude forms of adulation. 
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The behavior of the persons comprising the object system in question 
was confined with certain normative or otherwise accepted limits. In 
other words: the object system possessed a constraint. 
Whenever a system cannot utilize its full combinational possi-
bilities and is compelled to behave within a subset of it; or, whenever 
a systeIn possesses some internal structure, some invariant relation, 
some persistent regularity, we say that a constraint is present. The 
kind of information that a message analysis presupposes is existentially 
linked to the existence of such a constraint. 
In working example IV Yule discovered, formulated and applied 
a relation symbolically accounting for that constraint which is present 
in an author's uSe of his vocabulary. In V, Lasswell assumed with 
sufficient confidence the existence of a constraint concerning commun-
ication links within a socio-political organization. In VI the propaganda 
analyst utilized the constraints that persisted in the particular social 
situation within which the propaganda analyst operated. In attempts to 
analyze some data as messages it is always a constraint of the object 
system that the requisite information represents. 
Fisher is probably the first who identified the presence of a 
statistical constraint within obtained data with an amount of informa-
tion that they convey. Concerned with evaluating research designs 
he took the inverse of the sampling variance to "measure the quantity 
of information supplied by the experiment of the particular value to 
which the variance refers" (63:196). Thus, if the frequencies are 
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equally distributed over the values of a variable, the standard deviation 
is infinity and Fisher's measure of information assumes the value zero. 
As the experiment yields narrower statistical distributions Fisher's 
quantity of information assumes some larger value indicating that some 
constraint is present. 
Fisher's measure is of course mainly of historical value. But 
the idea of identifying the discovered severity of a constraint with an 
amount of information is most certainly not an obvious one. It has 
been utilized in the mathematical theory of communication and will 
provide the basis of our information calculus to be further developed 
in Chapter Seven. 
Discovering Constraints 
It can be taken as evident that message analysis presupposes 
the object system to possess some relevant constraint, or, to form-
ulate it more pointedly, that message analysts must have available 
some adequate representation of whatever accounts for the constraints 
present in the object system, a representation that we could identify 
with the requisite information. Consequently, one task of message 
analysis in the wider sense is to discover constraints that are relevant 
in a particular situation. In order to accomplish this,evaluative 
criteria must be at hand that permit the making of decisions as to 
whether or not a constraint is being observed. 
As we suggested, no confusion should be made between infor-
mation and a measure of the amount of information. Similarly, a 
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constraint should not be confused with a measure of its severity, intensity 
or strength. It is only the latter which provides criteria for decisions 
concerning whether it is feasible in a particular situation to attempt the 
formulation of the regularity that accounts for the constraint observed. 
Since the existence of a constraint seems to be a quite general 
prerequisite for knowing anything at all about the structure or identity of 
a system, the search for constraints and consequently their quantitative 
evaluation is most common in all empirical science s. Most of the 
statistical procedures that are used particularly for testing hypotheses 
can be considered measures of the severity of a constraint. Such meas-
ures quantitatively relate a me;;l.sure of the maximum range of freedom 
within a system, or at least reference points of it,and a measure of the 
actually observed freedom and can be considered specialized interpreta-
tions of the following general form: 
severity of constraint=f(observed freedom, maximum range 
of freedom) 
If, for example. frequencies are assigned to the ith category of 
a contingency table. a Chi-Square Test "may be used. " as it is com-
monlyexpressed, "to test whether a significant difference exists be-
tween an observed number of objects or responses falling in each cate-
gory and an expected number based on the null-hypothesis" (177:43). 
In the most familiar formulation 
= L 
1 
2 ( 0i - Ei ) 
E· 1 
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The differences between observed frequencies 0i and frequencies E· 1 
estimated on the basis of the absence of any constraint show the test 
to be a particular case of the above form. The value of X2 becomes 
larger as the measured constraint becomes more severe. 
Pearson's familiar product-moment correlation coefficient also 
conforms to the same basic idea assuming, however, linear depend;"ncies 
between variables, say X and Y. The somewhat lengthy formula boils 
down to a proportion of the actually observed covariance (X, Y) and the 
maximaily possible covariance computed as the geometric mean of the 
two variances of X and Y. The coefficient takes the value one when 
the constraint is perfect and zero when no constraint is present in the 
data. 
In Shannon's mathematical communication theory (175) the exist-
ence of a constraint is. indicated in the form of the measure of redundancy. 
The name is an unfortunate result of the early engineering orientation of 
this calculus during which constraints appeared as a kind of waste of 
channel capacity. At any rate, the severity of a constraint becomes: 
identified as the difference between the quantity of information that a 
channel can maximally transmit and the quantity actually communicated .. 
Statistical constraints are not the only important ones in mes-
sage analysis and the point has frequently been made that non- statistical 
signal characteristics may in certain situations provide more adequate 
bases for inferences. Consequently measures of the severity of a 
constraint cannot be confined to statistical measures. Recently 
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Ashby (16) suggested a straight·-forward measure of this property that is 
not statistical. He traced his idea back to Wiener (208) who, already in 
1914, identified a relation, previously regarded as somewhat metaphysi-
cal, with the set R of those n-tuples in a product set G that satisfied 
the relation_ As arbitrary as a relation may be, Wiener's suggestion 
makes it at once definite and a subject of formal 6perations _ According 
to Ashby "the 'constraint' introduced by a relation R':' is most naturally 
. identified with the set G-R _ When G-R the constraint is zero; as R 
shrinks, so does the constraint become more intense" (16:9) (original 
symbols replaced) _ We will take up this argument in the following 
chapter, but the idea of a constra.int and a measure of its severity now 
seems. to be an entirely general one and not bound by some particular 
material feature of the object system from which signals are emitted. 
Although these and many more indices all boil down to measur-
, 
ing some property of constraints which we labeled "severity" for con-
venience, they cannot always be assumed to be indicative of that 
inferential quality of a constraint which the message analyst is ultimately 
interested in_ For example, Fisher's measure represents the severity 
of a constraint within one variable only_ 1£ specific inferences are in-
tended to be drawn from a given text, relevant constraints must exist 
and must be represented between at least two variables one of which 
represents some text characteristic, the other referring to the prOblem 
domain_ 
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For exaIT1ple, the successive attempts at interpreting the old Per-
sian language in I was for quite some time a test of various hypotheses 
concerning the ITlost productive syntax of the figures carved in stone. As 
long as constraints within these figures were discovered little could be 
inferred froIT1 it. Inferences started emerging when a few syntactically 
characterized figures and certain social uses of language could be assumed 
to be invariably related, i. e. when constraints could be discovered that 
go beyond the data from which specific inferences were intended or, to 
phrase it in more conventional terms, when constraints between docu-
mentary and extra docuIT1entary data appeared. As we suggested in 
Chapter Four, the constraint that finally led to inferences from these 
carved figures to historical events of the old Persian Empire was one 
that held between the old Persian writing system and a ITlodern language 
in terIT1S of which the history of that empire was represented. 
Thus it is always a constraint between at least two sets of in-
dependently observable variables that needs to be discovered and 
decided on by means of some suitable measure of the severity of the 
constraint. Multiple correlation coefficients, ITleasures of multivariate 
information transmission, Ashby's conception of a constraint defined 
in a ITlany-product set, etc., provide such indices for the inferential 




When appropriate measures indicate the existence of a sought 
constraint, the problem still remains to formally represent what intro-
duces the constraint in a system: relations, dependencies, or regu-
larities. The measures discussed above only indicate the strength of 
a constraint or its potential usefulness for a particular problem of 
inference but they do not discover the precise nature of a constraint. 
Ultimately, what is needed for making specific content inferences is 
not a measure of a constraint's severity, but a formal repre sentation 
of the regularity, lawfulness, relation, etc. that accounts for such a 
constraint. 
In this sense the wqrks reported in working example X cannot 
be considered as complete message analyses as far as their current 
development is concerned. Although the efforts are assertedly geared 
toward inferring a person's emotional state or pathology from his 
speech, Mahl has not gone very much further than to show the cor-
relationbetween level of anxiety and certain speech disturbance meas-
ures; while Feldstein, Jaffe, and Caroll are still struggling with the 
attempt to find variables of recorded speech that correlate with 
various psychopathologies. And yet if there are sufficient reasons 
to assume linear dependencies between these psychological variables 
and measures of speech characteristics then correlations provide a 
limit for the possibility of formulating relations that the intended 
inferences presuppose. 
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When actually formulated, the relations that are finally used in 
message analysis sometimes take rather simple forms. For example 
the one-to-one relation between the statistical measures over the vocab-
ulary of a set of documents with the identity of their authors in IV is so 
simple that it too easily escapes notice. But the formulation must never-
thelessbe definite in order to allow the making of the intended content 
inferences. 
In working example VII the relation, although it was not obtained 
from the empirical analysis of a constraint but deduced from some 
generally known regularity, has been given the form 
D " N(popular) + 1/2N(ambiguous) 
N(popular) + H(ambiguous) + H(Bolshevik) 
This formulation of a regularity is a well defined function that accepts 
frequencies of references made to Stalin's Bolshevik image; frequencies 
of references to the popular image of Stalin; frequencies of references 
to an image that is ambiguous with respect to the two; and also produces 
distances D of the writer of the document to Stalin. It might be argued 
that this function assumes the existence of too severe a constraint and 
that its single-valuedness may not be justified, but the formulation even 
allowing for some variance, would be considered as being well defined. 
In IX the regularity formulated to infer suicidal intentions of a 
letter's author was formally quite similar to the one above. Here too 
a few elementary algebraic operations were applied on three frequency-
like scores that came out of a General Inquirer analysis of the texts. 
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Again the question might be raised as to whether this formulation accounts 
for all the variance that writers in this situation may exhibit although the 
empirical test indicated that it comes very close to it. 
Of quite a different nature was the constraint with which the crypto-
analyst in III had to struggle. He knew in advance that the Vignere 
Tableau in conjunction with the key "COMPLETE VICTOR >';" which he 
had to dis cover, define a mathematical transformation of letter s of the 
ciphered message into those of the clear. 
Most of the few explicitly formulated regularities that have 
emerged out of content analysis and are potentially relevant in message 
analytic situations are represented in'natural language terms. For 
example Lasswell argues that 
" ... an increase in discus sian of CENSORSHIP or TYRANNY 
will lead to an increase in reference both to FREEDOM and 
to LIBERTY" (113:56). 
On another occasion, he found that changes in the frequencies of 
political symbols reflect major policy changes (108). Pool also states 
the re sult of his analysis in words: 
Those nations which have at any given moment dominated 
the world scene have generally said little that was adverse 
in 'prestige papers' about the other powers. The insecure 
or unsatisfied powers, on the other hand, have generally 
. had editorials full of hostile judgements of foreign states 
(159:62). 
North put forth numerous propositions concerning international crises 
among which the following appear: 
The higher the tension, the greater the redundancies of 
communication, the heavier the overload of channels, 
and the less the ability of decision-makers to assimilate 
the incoming messages (142:165). 
The higher the tension, the stronger the tendency of agents 
in the field to report - consciously or unconsciously - that 
information which they perceive as desired or expected by 
decision-makers at the center (142:170). 
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Such verbal formulations often even suggest certain hidden general-
ities. Compare, for instance, North's proposition concerning international 
crises: 
The higher the tension, the stronger the tendency to rely 
on habitual images and stereotypes (142:l74). 
with Osgood's hypothesis concerning human speech behavior: 
The greater the motivational level under which language 
encoding occurs, the greater will be the stereotypy of 
choices (148:298). 
But, there are serious limitations attached to the use of informal verbali-
zations as a mode of representing message-relevant regularities. 
Firstly, if the formulation refers to some regularity concerning 
the social use of language - which is indeed often the case - and is repre-
sented in the very same medium, then object-language and meta-
language may become easily confused and lead to well-known paradoxes 
and limitations. A representational system must always be "more 
powerful" than the object to be represented otherwise a constraint 
may remain unrecognized. 
Secondly, although such propOSitions, theoretical statements 
or simply "knowledge" may indeed be supported by empirical evidence, 
the way they have been established is often irrecoverably lost. This 
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is the result of an intuitive use of natural language favoring the tendency 
of statements to become independent of the events they purport to express. 
Hence, it is difficult if not often fallacious to derive filtering procedures 
from verbally represented constraints. , 
Thirdly, as many authors have shown; it is almost impossible 
to handle more than two or three simultaneou!3 relations in verbal logic 
(178). Therefore, more complex constraints of object systems can 
hardly be represented in the verbal mode of scientific discourse. The 
verbal propositions listed above may represent only inadequately simple 
structures of object systems simply because natural language is most 
capable of dealing with them. 
Fourthly, it is very difficult to transform such verbal statements 
into rules of inference because verbal reasoning is not only replete 
with logical gaps and with ceteris paribus assumptions, but also with 
considerable operational ambiguity. Thus, while a statement conCern-
ing an existing constraint might be intuitively convincing, it is often 
difficult to use this statement as an inferential operator on statistically 
represented texts. 
Unlike many empirical efforts in the social sciences which are 
directed toward and generally end with testing verbally stated 
hypotheses, in message analysis the methodologically similar task 
of discovering relevant existing constraints and formulating regularities 
that account for them is only an intermediary step. As such,the repre-
sentation of a regularity need not enter verbal discourses but it must 
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be inferentially applicable on future data, signals Or their derived repre-
sentations. In the light of the above listed difficulties with the uSe of 
verbal formulations for inferential purposes of the kind required in mes-
sage analysis, it is therefore quite suggestive to simply omit the attempt 
of idealizing a discovered constraint in the direction of a natural language 
proposition in favor of representing respective regularities directly for 
USe in content inference and filtering. Although the vividness of the 
interpretation of relevant regularitie s in intuitively more meaningful 
natural language terms may be lost this way, the validity of the outcome 
of message analysis might gain considerably. 
Two Further Constraint Analyses 
Examples of constraint analyses that are geared to represent 
regularities in a form adequate for future content inferences have 
already been given. Many of them take the form of psychological eX-
periments of which working example X and perhaps Osgood's work can 
be considered representative. Some formulations that have been used 
effectively such as Leites! work in VII are, as has already been 
mentioned, logically derived from some more general regularity known 
to the analyst. The two examples to be reported in the following,exhibit 
formal structures that are relatively uncommon in message analyses 
reported so far. In addition, the first one is interesting because in it 
an automatic discovery procedure was used that is suggestive for 
future developments. The second one is included and developed because 
246 
it deals with some non- statistical constraint of s orne complexity which 
had not been adequately tackled before. 
The first example is an outgrowth of the work reported in IX. 
The attempt to find constraints that distinguished real from simulated 
suicide notes culminated in the joint use of two computer programs: 
(a) the General Inquirer simply mapping words and short phrases that 
appear in texts into sets of tags and answering retrieval questions con-
cerning the distribution of specific tags, and (b) the Concept Learner 
asking enough retrieval questions and deciding whether they are relevant 
for differentiating the texts according to some attribute outside those 
texts. The Concept Learner thus operates on very many variables and 
stores the rather complicated constraint it discovers in the form of a 
decision tree. 
An illustrative example is provided by the comparative analysis 
of arguments for and against two legislative proposals in California 
from which sentences containing such obvious differentiating phrases 
as "vote no" were omitted. After the General Inquirer had tagged the 
texts its retrieval part was coupled with the Concept Learner. Without 
going into the procedural details - - one of the most simple constraints 
that the Concept Learner discovered within 21 sentences was accounted 
for by an ordered set of distinguishing characteristics depicted in 
Figure 10. 
The verbal interpretation of such a regularity would be that 
those opposed to the proposal are apparently preoccupied with its 
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economic costs, represented by the two distinguishing text character-
istics l1 quantitative-verbl! and "economic-verb, 11 while those in favour 
emphasize non-economic aspects of the issue. 
I 
quantitati ve - ve rb 
r--______ ~l~ ______ ~ 
r. b ) ( 
eCOnomlc-ver pro 8) 
________ ~1~ ______ ~ 
(- ) 
Culpat-subj. pro(5) 
~ ______ ~l~ ______ ~ ( I 
anti(7) pro(l) 
Discriminate Function "discovered" by the Concept Learner 
Figure 10 
The constraints that the Concept Learner discovered without any 
human aid exhibit two important properties: first, the program is 
capable of considering many valued relations quite dissimilar to the 
type of relations that are usually encountered when such indicants as 
product-moment correlation coefficients are used as in the case of 
working example X. In fact the above depicted tree includes a quaternary 
relation. 
Second, the represented relation takes a form that can be directly 
converted into an ordered set of decisions. Thus, if the relation that 
the Concept Learner finds successfully discriminates between complex 
data or texts (here sentences containing specific references) according 
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to a set of attributes (here the pair "pro" and "con") outside those data, 
the decision structure into which the above tree can be converted at once 
can be used to infer such attributes from other data Or texts that are ob-
tainedunder similar conditions. In this example the ope ration of form-
ulating a relevant regularity that can be considered to account for the 
discovered constraint becomes in a sense an operation complementary 
to content inference. 
Although the joint use of these two computer programs as pre-
sented by Stone and Hunt (190) is capable of discovering constraints, 
formulating relevant regularities and making what are in fact content 
inferences, the drawback that needs to be mentioned is that the infer-
ences amount to a simple decision between two attributes. Thus the 
quantity of information these computer programs find and utilize is 
exactly one bit. While this is a rather severe limitation it may not 
be an a bs olute one. 
The material for the second example is takan from Goodenough's 
influential "componential semantic analysis" (78) illustrating an anthro-
pological approach to "empirical semantics" by the study of Truk kin-
ship terms. The work not only provides evidence for a quite complex 
constraint that may have to be utilized for making content inferences 
but moreover demonstrates some of the differences in the task of con-
tent analysis and message analysis. 
It is quite obvious that cultures impose constraints on the situa-
tional use of their kinship terminology, thus encouraging the formulation 
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of regularities that can be considered to account for such constraints. 
To represent these regularities Goodenough made use of a hypothetical 
construct that is identical with Janis' conception of content (91) and has 
in reference to' Morris' theory of signs {l38) been phrased the structure 
of signification. It involves identifying basic dimensions of meaning 
or semantic components along or according to which the observed and 
recorded differentiations within the kinship terminology can be repre-
sented. It is assumed that this hypothetical construct accounts for a 
native speaker's signification habits. 
Goodenough's representational system consisted of the well 
e sta blished linguistic notations plus notations he had to develop for 
representing the "contextual elements" of utterances, i. e. the kinship 
relations denoted by a speaker. The notations had to make as many 
differentiations as conveniently possible. In its terms an English·in-
formant would use the expression "my. cousin" to denote what is 
transcribed here by FaBrSo (father's brother's son), Fa$iSo, FaBrDa, 
FaSiDa, FaFaSiSo, FaMoMoBrSoDa, etc. With the addition of Sp 
(spouse) this notational scheme can represent a very large number 
of familiar kins.hip relations, certainly more than can be expected to 
be culturally significant. 
The anthropologist's preliminary task .is to gather all expres-
sions whose denotata make it appear that there may be some common 
element in their significata. Goodenough found that whenever a person 
was denoted by one of 14 single utterances, called lexemes, it was 
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also 'tefej' to the speaker, here called " egO. II Hence,. 'tefej' was taken 
to define the universe of lexemes and denotata considered. After this 
first analytical step, each lexeme can be viewed as imposing a partition 
of the recorded denotatain the universe. For example, the kinship rela-














The structure of signification now becomes manifest in the dis-
tribution of lexemes in the universe of possible denotata. Oninspection 
this distribution revealed to Goodenough among other things that the 
Truk's concept of generation does not coincide with the usual genealog-
ical schema. For instance, 
the denotata--oI IIne-ji l ,. :-.includepeYs6:hsin: -tower-generations--
than ego's, excepting persons in ego's father's matrilineal 
groups and children of men in these matrilineal groups. They 
also include the children of any men in ego's matrilineal kin 
groups together with their children, and the children of any 
children of men of ego's father's matrilineal group (78:205). 
E. g. Ch, BrCh, SpSiChCh are included as well as FaBrCh, and 
MoFaFaSiCh although the latter range over generations higher than 
ego's while the former do not. 
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Such observations render sufficient support to the analyst's con-
viction that the native differentiates among the denotata within the uni-
verse according to some consistent principle which he hopes to formulate 
in terms of a few semantic dimensions or components of signification. 
The denotata of 'neji,' for example, were characterized by the two 
component values 1) being 'tefej' to ego and 2) being of·junior genera-
tioninthe Trukese sense of "generation height." The denotata of the 
kinship terms could be similarly characterized according to generation 
height as well as according to such dimensions as Sex of relative, sex 
relative to ego's sex, symmetrical or asymmetrical relation. Good-
enough's task was to construct a system of signification for Truk kinship 
terminology which he presented in the form of two simple paradigms. 
In it each lexeme is assigned a location that represents its relevant 
components of signification. 
The anthropologist's paradigm is a mapping of a set of lexemes 
into a hypothetical construct that is chimed to be a representation of 
a native's system of signification. Goodenough is quite aware of the 
hypothetical nature of this system of signification when showing that 
more than one such system can be constructed. 
The difference between Goodenough and a message analyst 
appears in the mode of validation to which the analytic results are 
amenable. While the mapping of lexemes into the hypothetical signif-
ication is well defined in Goodenough's paradigms, the relations be-
tween these significata and their observable denotata is not explicated 
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at all and requires an intuitive interpr",tation which is far fro:m obvious. 
Thus if the anthropologist receives so:me kinship term he can find its 
signification according to his paradig:ms but has no way other than his 
intuition in order to infer what kinship relation is being denoted by the 
speaker. Face validity is the only justification of this hypothetical con· 
struct. In analogy to Ogden and Richards' symbol/interpreter/referent 
triad (145 )Goodenough' s result :may be depicted in Figure 11. 
:mapping induced 














Lexemes ------------------ Denotata 
t~ ______________________ ~r-___ I~":<~' __________________ --') 
v It·, 
extensive but inco:mplete protocol 
Triadic Interpretation of GO'Qdenough's Results 
Figure 11 
What a message analyst would need to make inferences :more ex· 
plicit is either (a) a formal "tate:ment of the relation between significata 
and denotata in case of which the lexeme' s references could be inferred 
fro:m its hypothesized signification, or (b) an explication of the regularity 
that accounts for the constraints observed and recorded in the notational 
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terms of the protocol and is stated as a relation between denotata and 
lexemes. If the latter is given, inferences from a de nota tum to the 
lexeme appropriate in that situation can be made as well as inferences 
from a lexeme to the set of denotata that constitute its refe renee. If 
the former relation were given, inferences from denotata to lexemes 
cannot be made effectively because the relation from significata to 
lexemes is not single valued as far as Goodenough's conception is con-
cerned. The relations that are needed to fully account for a native 
speaker's competence in the situational use of his kinship terminology 
can be depicted as arrows (a) from significata to denotata 'and (b) be-
tween denotata and lexemes in both ways. 
In the above situation the mess.age analyst's task is rendered 
difficult by the fact that the sets of denotata tend to be very large and 
in many cases even non,-denumerably large (note the obligatory "etc." 
after each list of a lexeme' s denotata). As it would be unreasonable 
to assume that the native speaker has acquired his familiarity with 
kinship terminology by something like "pair-learning" it is hardly 
possible to expect adequate results from a contingency analysis of the 
kinship protocol. Rather, it may be assumed that such non-denumerably 
large sets are recursively enumerable by a few formulas, a set of which 
is associated with each lexeme in question. 1£ this is the ca.se we can-
not search for components of signification that seem intuitively satis-
factory but for recursive formulas that account for a native's recorded 
competence in using kinship terminology. 
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In search for suitable grammars of natural languages Chomsky 
(43) (44) suggested and investigated several generative processes of 
which a simple type, a "phrase structure grammar, " seems adequate 
for representing the regularities of our conCern. The rules governing 
this generative process can be applied in reverse and accept just those 
strings of symbols that can be generated by them. 
In terms of the above mentioned generative process, our form-
ulae which are in effect reversible rules of inference become sets of 
rewrite or substitution rules that generate all appropriate denotata (in 
notational form) for each kinship term. In this set of rewrite rules, 
lexemes provide the natural initial symbols, capital letters are used 
for the non-terminal symbols, and Goodenough's notation for kinship 
relations are the atomic terminal symbols. A typical rewrite rule 
"r6: . X--BrZ," for example, is to be read as "X may be replaced 
by BrZ." Another rule may replace Z and so forth until the string 
of symbols contains the description of a denotation. Taking again 
'neji' as an example, the rewrite rules depicted below recursively 
enumerate its denotata as far as is evident from Goodenough's report. 
(For the sake of simplicity the terminal symbols So and Da are 
collapsed into Ch). 
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rl: neji ,- Z r8: Y • FaY 
r Z: neji • X r9: Y -- MoY 
r3: neji .. SpX· rIO: Y .. BrZ 
r 4 : X .. FaYCh rll : Y .... SiZ 
r5: X ... MoY rlZ: Z • ChZ 
r6: X - BrZ r 13 : Z .. Ch 
r 7 : X 
c· .. SiZ 
On the basis of the rules formulated above, one of the possible inferences 
from 'neji' can be generated as follows: 
~ neji r3: 
l SpX r 4: SpFaYCh ~ r9: SpFaMoYCh 
• 





It should be noted that the formula for each individual kinship 
term cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest as it has been done here 
for purposes of demonstration. It must be assumed that the sets of their 
rules overlap somewhat. However, r lZ and r 13 as terminal rules 
leading to Ch, ... Ch, ... ChCh, etc. and r 4 and rS which ensure that 
decendants of the children of ego's father's group are included but not 
those of ego's mother's group, are not likely to be found in any other 
formula. Therefore, these rules represent in a different way those 
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aspects of the signification into which anthropologists such as Goodenough 
may want to inquire without attempts at making inferences .. 
It can well be imagined that some definable constraints.exist that 
limit the set of denotata of 'tefeji'inte·rms of the maximum "kin-distance" 
between ego and relative, Such a con'straint has not been mentioned by 
Goodenough who primarily focused on components of signification. Such 
a constraint would require a limitation a's to the number of times a re-
cursive rewrite rule can apply. 
In this discus sion no claim is meant to be made concerning the 
simplest symbolism for the formulas. Goodenough's notation was used 
just for convenience of presentation. In addition this elaboration is not 
meant to be a contribution to the study of kinship terminology. Good-
enough's data was merely used as a convenient vehicle to illustrate 
the formulation of a regularity that is much more comple« than is 
thought. Constraint analyses may have to locate constraints which are 
much more powerful than those discovered by correlational methods 
or by the Concept Learner's method, i. e. constraints which are 
appropriate for systems that possess a significant degree of organiza-
tion. We cannot go further into the discussion of various possible 
structures of constraints that maybe relevant to some content infer-
ential tasks. 
In summary then, constraint analysis operates on suitably 
represented data, filtered texts, or measures of relevant character-
istics that are found in data with the goal oLobtainingformulations of 
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regularities that account for observed constraints and can be utilized for 
making inferences to a given problem domain. Technical prerequisites 
for the discovery of constraints are measures of a constraint's severity 
and inferential power which serve as evaluative criteria of a given data, 
text, or signal for inferences intended. Though formally similar, hypothesis 
testing aims at the recruitment of evidence to test a given statement while 
constraint analysis aims at the recruitment of a formalization accounting 
for a discovered constraint that is suitable for specific content inferences 
from given data. 
Filtering 
The primary purpose of this constituent part of message analysis 
becomes at once apparent when one considers the sheer volume of data 
that has to be processed in most of the cases, (For exceptions See 
working examples I and Ill). In conjunction with the analysis reported 
in working example V, for instance, Lasswell writes: 
The Bookniga and Transocean cases involved great quantities 
of printed and unprinted matter. Four periodicals, 76 books 
in the English language and 132 books in the Rus sian language 
were examined in connection with the Bookniga prosecution. 
Particularly detailed analysis were made of the periodicals. 
Four kinds of material were relevant to the Transocean pro-
ceedings: "Gables" to Germany from America; "Transmis-
sions" to South America from America; English news service 
to Arn.ericans; and German news service to AITlericans ... 
(111:177). 
If one is willing to consider the number of propositions, not to 
speak of words, that had to be read, recorded, categorized, measured 
and subjected to some kind of computation, the problem of drastically 
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and rigorously reducing the complexity in the data to a manageable form 
becomes a major problem in most :r:'-essage analyseso. 
Rigorous reduction and simplification of data while an obvious 
prerequisite of many such analyses cannot be the sole criterion for the 
procedure in question. In fact one of the criticisms that had been made 
in chapter one is that content analysis often simplifies the data too much . 
. When relying on simple frequency characterizations, structures of which 
the textual units are constituents are counted away. and those within the 
units are treated as whole entities. If structural characteristics of 
text that are significant for further analysis simply disappear during 
computation, the analysis defeats its purpose. 
What the filtering process should accomplish is not simplifica-
·tion ~ ~ but a purposeful reduction of the available complexity.· The 
specific purpose of this complexity-reducing transformation cannot, 
on the other hand, be established without reference to the message 
analytic situation as a whole and the component structure of the analytic 
procedure in particular. 
Referring again to the diagrarnatic presentation of the message 
analytic procedures in the introduction to this chapter, filtering 
appears in two slightly different positions. In one case it takes an 
intermediate position betw"en recording and content inference, in the 
other between recording and constraint analysis. 
When filtering mediates between recording and content infer-
ence the purpose of filtering is well established: given a specific 
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prOblem domain and available regularities accounting for previously dis-
covered constraints in the object system, filtering has to produce just 
those representations of data that will lead via content inferences to 
appropriate selections within the problem domain. By replicating those 
transformations that lead to the observation of constraints, irrelevant 
information in the text or noise is suppressed. 
"Noise" in this formulation is not to be understood in the very 
specific sense of statistical random variation. The noise that filtering 
is to suppress is delineated by the purpose of message analysis and is 
of two kinds. 
Firstly, a text can be represented along dimensions irrelevant 
to anY'known regularity of the object system, i. e. dimensions, vari-
ables, components, etc. that do not or have not been found to relate to 
any other dimension, variable or component of the object system. Such 
dimensions of the text's representation do not contribute to any con-. 
ceivable inference and cannot be considered carriers of content. 
Statistical noise is a special case of this irrelevant information that 
filtering .is to eliminate. 
Secondly, among those dimensions of the text's representation 
that pertain to available regularities not all will lead to selections of 
content within the problem domain. They may lead to inferences other 
than those delineated by the ll1essage analytic situation. Hence, this 
source of irrelevant inforll1ation does not result froll1 the regularities 
available but froll1 a projection of the problem domain through those 
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given regularities onto the data representations needed. Thus, while 
the first kind of noise is rooted in the explicated "past experiences" of 
the analyst, the second type stems from the particular problem under 
consideration. 
When filtering mediates between the recording process and con--
straint analysis the specific nature of the complexity-reducing trans-
forma,tion is not known in advance. While filtering here too has to 
eliminate what does not lead to the discovery of constraints of potential 
use in content inference, the relevance of representational dimensions 
which filtering produces can only be established after the accomplished 
constraint analysis. Thus, when constraints are sought any conceivable 
filter may be used until the relevant constraint is found, but when 
specific content inferences are intended only those filters can be 
utilized that are known to produce desired text representations, that 
are standardized on the available regularities and delineated problem 
domain. 
Often complexity-reducing transformations are used and even 
defined as indicants. Janis and Fadne r IS" coefficient of imbalance" 
(93) reduces a whole text to just one variable whereby it is not at all 
clear what this c?efficient exactly indicates. The one-to-one relation 
that is claimed to hold between an indicant and some other variable is 
so simple that the implicit inference is often overlooked. For analyti-
cal purposes we have to clearly differentiate between some computa-
tional formula i. e., representing the filtering procedure; the various 
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states of "imbalance" i. e., the contents inferred; and the empirical 
generalizations that are needed to go beyond the characterization of a 
given text, i. e., the established regularities. 
To give a brief illustration of the role of filtering consider 
Mahl's "exploring emotional states by content analysis" (124) reported 
in working example X. He argued that our cultural standards stress 
concealments of a speaker's emotional states and that language training 
and communication habits tend to focus awareness more on lexical char-
acteristics of speech than on its non-lexical features (existing con-
straint). To obtain information about an individual's emotional states 
(problem domain) it is advisable to seek out those attributes of his 
speech that are most free from linguistic and social control (character-
istics that a filter needs to maintain) and discard those speech character-
istics under conscious control of the speaker (dimensions carrying noise 
with respect to problem domain). Mahl furthermore showed the high 
correlation between certain types of speech disturbances and the in-
dividual's state of anxiety (relevant constraint) and suggested a set of 
speech disturbance measures (standardized filter) as an inferential 
basis for individual anxiety. Here the existing constraint and the de-
lineated problem domain justified the computational reduction of the 
complexity of speech. 
Our conception of a filter must not be confused with a frequency 
selective network as it is traditionally conceived of in communication 
engineering. This conception appears narrow indeed when viewed 
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against the background of Wiener's theory of smoothing and prediction of 
time series (210) and Shannon's theory of statistical information (175). 
And even this recent development appears too specialized for our filter 
problem. ,Message analysis is not yet so well formalized. What Wiener 
and Shannon have shown, however, is that in order to reduce a certain 
amount of statistical noise in a signal, a certain amount of statistical 
information is required that is equivalent to the amount of noise to be 
removed from that signal. In Wiener's theory, dealing specifically 
with filter problems of continuous and stationary signals with additive 
noise, the designer of a filter must know the auto-correlation function 
and cross-correlation function of the input and the desired output. If 
he knows less he cannot design the filter and if he knows more he can-
not make use of the additional information. , 
Very shnilar conditions exist for the designer of the filter in a 
message analytic procedure. The problem domain must be delineated 
and some formulated regularities accounting for observed constraints 
must be available to him. Only then is he able to evaluate the possible' 
inferential paths that would lead him to appropriate selections within 
the problem domain and only then can he specify the transformation 
that was antecendent to the formulation of the relevant regularities and 
which can now be applied on the given data. The choice of the filter is 
thus' absolutely determined by the available constraints and the speci-
fiedproblem domain. If the filter designer has knowledge of the 
problem domain only, he cannot adequately select a filter and is trapped 
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by the content analyst's dilemma. If he knows only the regularities of 
the object system, no problem of message analysis exists thereby making 
inferences vacuous. 
Filtering procedures vary greatly in complexity. Simple selec-
tions among the elements of the data qualify as filter as well as such 
means of reduction as sampling procedures, categorizations, enumera-
. tions, elementary algebraic operations and even such sophisticated 
computational techniques as factor analysis. All accept the notations 
of one representational system and transform them into those of another 
more convenient form whereby the structure of data that are relevant 
for content inferences are carried over and those that are irrelevant 
are eliminated. In other words filtering is a mapping of one representa-
tional space into another which separates relevant from irrelevant in-
formation; it is a homomorphism maintaining significant structures 
that appear in the data or text to be analyzed. Much methodology in 
the behavioral sciences goes into the design of filters in our sense 
and the study of their properties. Kaplan uses the term "derived meas-
urements" to refer to computational techniques that are applied on 
"fundamental measurements" which presuppose no other measurements 
(97: 188). Derived measurements and filtering procedures are by and 
large synonymous. 
For the most elementary examJlle of the filtering process con-
sider two measurable text variables in a traditional content analysis: 
the total amount T of printed space in a newspaper and the amount S 
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devoted to a particular issue. Suppose the analyst knows that S varies 
proportionately with T and T is for some reason irrelevant to the analy-
sis while a third variable affecting S linearily carries the desiredinfor-
mation. Here some function like SIT could provide an adequate filter 
eliminating the effect of T on S and represent the relevant variable in 
an adequate form, say. in percentage. The example illustrates in the 
most simple form that (a) filter processes are irreversible, (b) the 
justification of a particular filter requires some knowledge about the 
relations between the observed variables or presupposes at least as-
sumptions about them, and (c) filters operate only on characteristics 
measurable on the data itself, i. e. represent only syntactic not 
semantic features. 
That filtering is irreversible does not need a detailed demon-
stration. The reversal of a many-one tt:jlnsformation is not single 
valued and always leaves some indefiniteness. After a set of cate-
gories is lumped into a single class nothing can be said about the 
original class membership of its elements. Percentages do not 
represent anything. about the magnitudes on the basis of which it 
was computed. Any summation irrecoverably loses information in 
this sense, etc. 
That filtering Presupposes some knowledge about the relations 
that hold between the observed vaf~aples is less obvious. The pre-
vious example make s evident that if S were not dependent on T, the 
filter would not produce any significant representation of the text. 
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But suppose we wish to sample from the available text. The implicit 
assumption that would justify such an attempt is that the text is either 
composed of statistically independent elements or that the dependencies 
that may be observed between those elements are irrelevant for the 
analysis. If this assumption cannot be maintained, any sample taken 
from the text would be biased, misleading or at worst represent only 
noise. While a categorization process irrecoverably eliminates a 
certain amount of specificity in the data, the enumeration of occurrences 
allocates equal weights to each categorized unit regardless of their 
position within a text. If, for example, something like "attention" is 
to be inferred from a text and this variable is expressed by the size of 
headlines and the relative position of the feature text within a news-
paper page, then an ordinary frequency count of specified references 
would not contain much relevant information for it discards contributory 
variables observable in the text. Gerbner's "news value index" (76: 
II-D-4) tries to maintain some such relations by considering frequencies 
of references to a topic in both headlines and feature text. Osgood's 
"contingency analysis" (147), for example, discards the individual 
frequencies with which differentiated units appear in a text in favour 
of co-occurrences. Osgood!s interest in assessing a writer 1s associa-
Hon structure clearly justifies such an omission but if it were shown 
that individual frequencies are related to the association structure of 
a source then the analysis would have to be said to eliminate too much 
relevant information. 
266 
Filtering procedures - whether merely categorizing text char-
acteristics Or computing numerical values for representing features of 
a text - generally have very little to do with analyzing the "meaning" of 
a mes sage or its "content" in the conventional sense of these words. 
This has been consistently overlooked by traditional content analysts 
who claim to analyze the content of communications by mapping a com-
plex text into some measure of permeation. On intuitive grounds the 
original text maybe quite meaningful to a competent user of the re-
spective language, but the transformed version of this text need not be. 
If the product of a filtering proce S8 is meaningful to someone - in 
whatever sense - it is so either through some familiar semantic clue 
that happened to·be maintained during the transformation process or 
due to some interpretations of these results that are based on infor-
mation other than that contained in the transformed version of the 
data itself. 
For example, Osgood in his contingency analysis of Goebbels 
Diary reported of a negative contingency. between ENGLAND and 
GERMAN SUPERIORITY as a race, significant at the 5 percent 
level (147:71). While the two categories into which various instances 
were grouped are labeled in an intuitively comprehensible manner, 
the meaning of the negative contingency between them can only stern 
from information other than that provided by the analysis. The con-
tent analyst may, for example, rely on an intuitive reading of the 
original text or know from other sources about the ideological conflict 
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that existed for the Nazis when differentiations between allies and enemies 
did not correspond with their racial conception of the war aims. 
How little filtering has to do with a semantic interpretation or an 
analysis of "content" will become even mare evident from the following 
pilot study: To determine the applicability of factor analysis and "to 
understand and interpret the inter,-acting forces that were identified by 
,theoreticians" of international relations, O'Sullivan Jr. (154) designed 
a content analysis in which Richard Snyder's Deterrence, Weapon Systems 
,and Decision Making was chosen as source material. The document was 
based on some 150 recent writings dealing with arms control concepts, 
particularly those dealing with stability and deterrence and was there-
fore assumed to be representative of the field. Forty variables and six 
degrees of relatedness were defined that led to generic assertions of 
the form "A affects B" in terms of which the text could be represented. 
Among the variables were "credibility of threat, " likelihood of accident, " 
11first strike premium,11 !'decentralization of decision process, 11 !!sta-
bility of deterrence." The degrees of relatedness ranged from "in 
certain situations induces" to "is directly related to." 
A factor analysis, "the principal purpose of (which) is to reduce 
a matrix of correlations to the sma~lest pas sible number of dimensions 
in the interest of parsimonious description of the interrelationships 
between the variables," (156:377) yielded six factors. They were named 
by the investigator: stability, decision making conditions, rationality 
of decision, credibility, eXl?loitativene s s. For one of the factors no 
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satisfactory name could be found. 
The kind of reasoning that goes into interpretations of the factors 
discovered by factor analysis is symptomatic for results obtained by 
means of a statistical procedure that is far removed from being com-
monsensical and reveals the non- semantic character of the filtering 
process. Suggesting "exploitativeness" as a characteristic quality of 
his factor no. VI, O'Sullivan Jr. argues: 
This factor has moderate negative loadings in constraints 
on the decision process, likelihood of containment of 
limited war and ability to engage retaliatory. systems. 
There are marginal negative loadings in the pace of arms 
race and agressors' uncertainty over defenders' specific 
tactics or weakness in weapons and marginal positive 
loadings in diversification and versatiling of weapon sys-
terns. This appears to be a power-grab situation, or a 
factor relating to the degree to which the situation is 
subject to exploitation by one of the parties (1~4:8). 
The argument illustrates what Peak observed elsewhere namely 
that "considerations other than the procedures of factor analysis must 
enter into the interpretation of the meaning of the factors discovered" 
(156:278). While this statistical tool is certainly explicit and deter-
minate, it is hardly conceivable that another investigator could interpret 
the semantically highly ambiguous results of the above analysis in the 
same way. Although the five factors named by the researcher seem 
indeed to be intuitively important in the process of international deci-
sion making,so are very many others. In addition, it should be men-
tioned that the nature of correlation on which factor analysis is based 
eliminates all the dynamic properties of the international system that 
may have been described by writers in the field, and the reliance on 
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binary generic assertions does away with all higher order relations that 
may have been felt to be of theoretical significance. The above example 
presents factor analysis as~ a means to reduce the dimensionality of the 
text in such a way that the new dimensions account for much of its var-
iance. But the statistical procedure neither processes nor analyzes 
"content, " nor does it help "to understand and interpret the inter-acting 
forces that were identified by theoreticians ... " as it was stated at the 
onset of the investigation. 
At this point someone may wish to argue that all statistics can 
qualify as a filtering ?f data. This is correct, but the reverse is cer-
tainly not the case. Someone interested in analyzing a particular for-
mal theory. as a message about an object system is not very likely to 
get very far by applying some statistic on the symbols appearing in 
propositions that are deduced from that theory. Such an attempt would 
most probably produce nothing but noise. ~ If one were to succeed in 
devising a suitable filter that would uncover the formal structure of 
that theory from propositions deduced from it, the filter will not say 
anything about the empirical content that theory may have. 
Summarizing this section, we can say that filtering is a homo-
morphic mapping, a many- one transformation reducing the variety in 
the data by eliminating variables in its domain that are irrelevant with 
respect to (a) the available regularities (or constraints to be discovered) 
and (b) the problem domain of a mes sage analytic situation. Filtering 
has little to do with processing content although it may have to operate 
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on structures of data that are meaningful to someone. The sole justifica-
tion for using a particular filtering process s:t~-ms from its having ex-
hibited a constraint of the object system that is to be utilized for a 
particular content inference. 
Recording 
When data are given to a message analyst they may appear-in a 
_form which is not amenable to the kind of analytical processes he can 
-handle explicitly. particularly written text, visual images, musical 
creations, etc. which possess an unmanageably large variety of 
structures and forms and may appear meaningful to the analyst on 
entirely intuitive grounds - cannot be subjected to scientific analyses 
unless some notational scheme is available in terms of which the data 
can be transcribed. The process by means of which given data, signals 
or texts are translated into the primary notations of a message analysis 
may be called recording. 
Although the sensory organs of an observer already impose 
some kind of notations or at least a structure on the received data, 
their "records" are rarely directly communicable to other observers 
and therefore lack inter-analyst verifiability. And if such records 
were indeed communicable they may not be in such a form that they 
can be subjected to the analysis intended. Recording produces a 
representation of the given raw data in an analyzable form. In Kaplan's 
terms recording provides "fundamental measurements" (97: 188), that 
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presuppose no other measurements. 
In content analysis the procedure by means of which a text in an 
observational space is recorded in terms of the categories of a repre-
sentational system is often called "coding." The use of this term for 
the categorization process by content analysts seems to be quite mis-
leading in view of the existence of an extensive body of literature on 
coding (including: encoding, decoding, recording and transmission) 
dealing with the subject in an explicit and well defined way, but in an 
entirely different sense. To take only a relatively simple but per-
fectly adequate definition of a code consider Chomsky and Miller's 
formulation made in the context of formal analysis of natural language, 
which necessitates the use of the concatenation '1--0.1' of symbols to 
strings. They define a code C as a l: 1 mapping G of strings in V 
into strings in A such that if Vi' Vj are strings in V then G(vi~Vj) 
G is an isomorphism between strings in A; strings 
in A provide the spelling for strings in V" (45:277). A typical 
example of a code is the mapping of letters of the English alphabet 
into the strings of dots and dashes of the morse alphabet and reverse. 
Working example III dealt with finding the key. to a code in order to 
decode a chipher. Being a l: 1 mapping, codes are reversible and have 
little to do with p:rocesses of coding as understood in content analysis; 
nobody would require Berelson (working example VIII) to reverse his 
coding.instructions that supposedly yielded a tabular representation of 
fictional characters to obtain the short stodes in which they occ"rred. 
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Only if the original could be reproduced from its coded version could he 
be said to have employed a code in the technical sense. 
It is not coding in the technical sense but rather some simplified 
description of the data which is the aim of recording. In this sense re-
cording resembles much of content analysis itself in as far as it has been 
explicitly stated by Janis (92:55) and Miller (136:95). This characteri-
zation, cited earlier, required content analysis to be a mapping of a 
. large variety of symbolic data into sets of fewer categories involving 
human judges. Here symbolic data include anything that is presuITled 
to have some meaning e. g., sign vehicles, words, visual forms, texts. 
Sets of categories are used synonymously with dimensions, variables, 
an attribute space, in short a notational scheme for representing the 
raw data, signal or text. While one feels inclined to identify content 
analysis with the process of recording, this identification would easily 
be ITlisleading for (a) the term is unfavorably loaded with the ITlethodo-
logical dilemma that is inherent in the analytical pursuits signified by 
. it, and (b) content analysts typically feel that they are not limited by the 
explicitly stated recording procedures and often claim much more than 
the analytical technique can accomplish. 
While it seems obvious that the notations in terms of which raw 
data are recorded have to provide for adequate representation of those 
data, determining this adequacy of representation is by no means a 
siITlple matter as we shall see later. But regardless of its representa-
tional properties the explicit analysis of data as messages imposes on 
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a primary notational scheme a formal requirement: the notations have 
to be well defined and neither lead to contradictions in the subsequent 
analytical process nOr allow syntacticambiquities to arise. Strictly 
speaking, the notational scheme has to be a formalized language that 
the explicit message analytical procedure can accept as input. 
Abstracted from a particular problem there seems to be no 
other requirement on the notation of a representational system. Con-
sequently the representational systems actually used can take many 
different forms. The most elementary structure of a representational 
system~ is found in a set of independent categories, a slightly more 
complex one in the conjunction of a fixed number of such categories 
constituting what is often called an attribute space. Because of their 
emphasis on relative frequencies that can be obtained most easily on 
the basis of such a scheme, attribute spaces of this kind have been 
preferrec\ by traditional content analysts. The generally accepted 
requirement that the categories be mutually exclusive shows the 
attempt at formalization which ensures that subsequent analysis does 
not produce spurious results. We can easily omit examples for this 
type of representational scheme. 
O'Sullivan Jr. 's (154) analysis of writings in international 
relations, already referred to, employed a representational system 
that included in addition to notations for forty categories, notations 
for six degrees of relatedness. If C il C. are categories and r J 
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a certain degree of relatedness, O'Sullivan could record observations of 
the type "CirC j ." 
In Osgood, Saporta, and Nunally's evaluative assertion analysis 
(151), the relation between concepts is provided by verbal connectors, c, 
the numerical value of which can range from -3 (strongly dissociative) 
to +3 (strongly associative). Differentiations among concepts are made 
between "common meaning terms, 11 cm~ and !1attitude objects, I' AOi . 
The emotive valence of common meaning terms ranges from -3 (strongly 
unfavorable) to +3 (strongly favorable)" and is assumed to be generally 
accepted among the speakers of a language, while the evaluation of 
attitude objects has the same range but is as sumed to be situation de-
pendent. The notations of the analysis represent assertions in the 
following formats: "AO·cAO·" and "AO·ccm." 
1 J 1 
North et al. discusses a set of notations that have been devel-
oped for a computer analysis. A manual editing phase that is pre-
paratory to programed data processing.introduces these notations into 
the text. Although defined semantically, these notations subscript 
fractions of a text that are treated in the subsequent analysis as syn-
tactic differentiations. The se notations a re defined as follows: 
/1 the perceiver and incorporated modifiers 
/2 the perceiver other than author of the document and 
incorporated modifie rs. 
/3 the perceived and incorporated modifiers 
/4 the action and incorporated modifiers 
/5 the object acted upon (other than actor-target) and 
incorporated modifiers 
/6 the auxiliary verb modifier 
/7 the target and incorporated modifiers (142:137). 
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The following is an example of an edited sentence from a study 
of the Cuban crisis: "Kennedy /1 Premier /2 Khrushchev /2 announced 
that, 'the Soviet Union /3 may /16 withdraw /4 the offensive /5 missles 
/5 from Cuba /7" 1 (142:138). 
A slightly more complex system of notations has been used by 
Piault (157) to analyze answers to open ended questions concerning re-
lations between foreigners and natives in Ghana. The structure of the 
notational system appears in the following general outline: 
a) Objective data of the interviewee such as age, religion, marital 
status, number of dependents, occupation. 
b) Identification of the source of judgments made. The sentence "for-
eigninterviewee says that natives say that foreigners are dirty" would 
be recorded as "X-Y~X" with X denoting foreigner and Y native. 
c) Type of predicate. The assertion "foreigners are avaricious" 
could be recorded as "avarice (X)" and "natives help foreigners" be-
comes "help (Y /X)" in the formal notation. 
d) Twenty eight categories of syntactic relations between X and Y 
each of which may be assigned separate indices: (F) factor or cause, 
(P) product or consequence or (N) neuter or non-causal relation. 
e) A list of 675 concepts divided into 28 classes to represent semantic 
characteristics of the text once the individuals, source, predicate type 
have been recorded. These notations were designed for a computer 
analysis of the data. 
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To conclude our examples of representational systems we may 
cite the formal notations Goodenough (78) used to record the denotata of 
kinship terms which constitute a mathematical group providing a non-
denumerably large set of categories. We referred to this notational 
scheme in the previous section of this chapter. 
With the rare exception of one to one identifications, recording 
reduces the variety in the raw data: it has filtering properties. That 
recording into the notational schemes described above omits much of 
the specificity that is present in the raw text is quite obvious. But let 
us turn to one more example. Contingency analysis, for instance, 
provides both a computational apparatus with which we are not con-
cernedin this section and a notational scheme for recording the raw 
text. During the recording process evaluative attributes, qualifiers, 
predicates, etc. are discarded and even the nature of relations ex-
pressed between concepts for which categories are provided are not 
differentiated by the formal notations. The notations of contingency 
analysis are capable of representing only co-occurrenCes of specified 
concept categories in the raw text. Osgood exemplified this method 
by an analysis of Goebbels' diary. The reported findings give anim-
pression of the nature of the recorded data. He describes his findings: 
References to GERMAN GENERALS were significantly 
contingent upon references to INTERNAL FRICTIONS 
(in the inner circle about Hitler) at the 1 percent level; 
references to GERMAN PUBLIC were associated with 
those to BAD MORALE at the 5 percent level, as were 
contingencies between RUSSIA and EASTERN FRONT; 
negative contingencies significant at the 5 percent level, 
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were obtained between RUSSIA and BAD MORALE, be-
tween references to ENGLAND and references to GER-
MAN SUPERIORITY as a race, and between references 
to the GERMAN PUBLIC and references to RUSSIA 
(147:69). 
While the imaginative reader familiar with the political situation which 
Goebbels' diary depicts will undoubtedly be able to explain some of these 
contingencies, he will also realize how much information has been re-
moved from the original text when recording in order to apply a con-
-tingencyanalysis. Osgood's primary interest in assessing the writer's 
association structure clearly justifie s this drastic reduction of the com-
plexity in the original text but other interests may not permit the same 
procedure. 
The variety reduction induced by recording procedures suggests 
problems of evaluation that are similar to those of filtering. If record-
ing is used in the course of attempts at finding constraints and formulat-
ing regularities little a priori criteria can be formulated. If recording 
is used to enter a message analysis in the narrower sense i. e., geared 
to make specific content inferences, (a) recording instructions must be 
standardized in precisely the same way. as filtering. That is, the result 
of their application must lead to regularities intended to be used for 
content h:tferences. In the case of contingency analysis this standard-
--
ization was based on psychological experimentation in the course of 
which association structure as a hypothetical construct was defined 
operationally. (b) The elimination of variables due to recording raw 
data can only be justified in terms of known regularities and a given 
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problem domain. Osgood's declared interest in inferring the association 
structure of the source defined many intricacies of the text, except co-
occurrences, as irrelevant to the problem. So did Piault's problem 
impose a simple structure and a particular unitization of the raw data 
that would otherwise not appear acceptable. 
One is almost inclined to identify recording as a filtering process. 
Although these processes do indeed have several characteristics in corn-
man, they differ in two related respects. One source of differentiation 
lies in the non-formalized nature of the raw data to which recording but 
not filtering applies, and the way representativeness can be assured. 
The second difference appears in the kind of operations that go into re-
cording but not into filtering, and the kind of empirical problems that 
are associated with it. We will consider both differentiatingfeatures 
separately. 
First, while filtering (whether accomplished by a set of standard-
izedanalytical operatio!l3orby a computer program) can be described 
as a well defined and explicit transformation of one representational 
system into a more simple second one, the domain of recording pro-
cedures is typically not so.formalizable. Film, painting, visual dis-
plays, much of music and to some extent speech has largely resisted 
formalization so far. Alphabetical transcripts of human verbalizations 
lose many non-formalized expres sions in the original. Even though 
the textures of such signals may be copied and reproducably stored 
ona one-to-one basis by photographic means or sound recording 
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devices. Respective equipment for recording such data in a way amen-
able to message analysis is rarely available. If the raw data were 
already given in formalized notations and a mapping could be defined 
from those data into the notations needed, then the problem would be 
reduced to that of filtering and would not concern us here, 
Not only is it logically impossible to explicate the translation of 
non-formalized raw data into formal notations but also very little is 
known about how the observational space of a human judge gets repre-
sented in the notational terms an analysis requires. What is known, 
however, is that often this translation can be accomplished quite 
accurately. 
In the absence of the kind of definiteness filtering exhibits, the 
only evaluative criteria concerning the representativeness of the records 
obtained is a measure of reliability defined as the consistency with which 
judges record raw data or the degree to which a recording process 
approximates the ideal of a mapping. The measure is completely. ab-
stracted from the nature of the representation of raw data in formal 
notation and concerns only. its degree of definitiveness. This critical 
property of reliability has already been elaborated in Chapter 
Measuring reliability presupposes at least some formal distinc-
tion between elements in the raw data. Otherwise observations con-
cerning whether something is consistently represented by a certain 
notational term cannot be made. Thus, if any attempt is made to 
assess the accuracy of the formal representation of data or the 
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consistency of the recording process as a whole, raw data must be at 
least unitizable or, in other words, partially formalizable. 
These problems do not occur in filtering. The motivation for 
making use of recording .procedures almost always derives from the non-
formalized raw data that constitute the domain of a message analysis. 
Second, even if raw data were given in formalized notation, it 
may not always be possible - for whatever reasons - to explicitly define 
the operations for translating raw data into the notations needed. In 
such cases we will also speak of recording. The operations that can 
go into a recording procedure may range widely. The most elementary 
recording process seems to approximate a one-to-one identification of 
directly observable characteristics in the raw data. It is most prob-
ably these physical-syntactic characteristics of raw data to which 
Gerbner refers when stating that the non-randomness or structuredness 
of a signal, its "built in quality, " is to be recognized in order to assess 
meaning (72: 180). In its most simple form identification could make 
use of an extensionally defined catalog of terms. For example, in the 
case of colors, each color in the catalog would have to be matched with 
the ones appearing in the raw data where measures of resemblance 
determine the appropriateness of a particular notational term. 
However, judges in content analysis or observers of social 
situations are rarely ever limited to identification in the above sense. 
Moreover, they are frequently expected to estimate the meanings a 
text may have for a particular audience and categorize them according 
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to intentionally defined notations. It is this kind of identification that 
takes place within the semantics of a non-formalized natural language, 
some terms of which provide the formal notation of the analysis. This 
later characterization would be a "semantical content analysis" accord-
~ing to Janis while the former would be a "sign-vehicle analysis" (92:57). 
Recording may not be limited simply to a semantic interpretation 
of the text. For example Shneidman requested his judges to record the 
missing premises that must be supplied to a political argument in order 
to make the assertions logically conclusive (176). Here notations do 
not represent semantical interpretations of a text but certain inferences 
accounted for by a well defined hypothetical construct cast in formal 
logic terms. The underlying operations of such a recording process 
are quite complex and require considerable training on the part of the 
judge. 
It is probably safe to suggest that the further the operation of 
recording is removed from simple identification, the lower the re-
liability that can be achieved. Although such a proposition has not 
been subjected to an experimental test so far, its intuitive acceptance 
seems to provide the motivation for many researchers to push the 
explicit analysis as far "down" as possible such that fewer inter-
mediate operations are necessary to obtain formal notations whereby 
recording becomes ideally equivalent to an identification. This ideal 
is achieved, for example, in Stone's General Inquirer computer pro-
gram (188) which simply requires the text to be punched on machine 
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readable cards or,in Cassotta, Feldstein and Jaffe's Automatic Vocal 
Transaction Analyser (40) operating directly on tape recorded psycho-
diagnostic interviews. 
On the other hand, as the recording process increasingly re-
sembles that of identification or even becomes eliminated as a signif-
icant analytical component of message analysis, it is to be expected 
that processes of filtering and content inference demand a large amount 
of requisite information which would otherwise be supplied by intuitive 
interpretations made by the judge during the recording process and 
become increasingly complex and costly. Hence, a particular message 
analytic situation may define an optimal mixture of the unaccounted 
complexity that goes into the recording process and increasingly re-
duces reliability, and the accounted complexity that goes into filtering 
and content infe renee and increasingly incurs costs. 
Thus, while filtering treats recorded data - whatever they may 
represent - syntactically, it does mt go outside those data, and hence 
has little to do with processing tlrneaning, It ttcontent, 11 or 11sernantic 
features" of the original text; the informal use of the capabilities of 
human individuals for formally representing only partially formalized 
raw data allows semantic interpretations and certain informal pro-
cesses to enter the recording process. Therefore, information may 
be supplied during recording which would not be able to find its way 
into the filtering procedure. 
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As far as the typical empirical problems are concerned, record-
ing resembles most closely the process of content analysis. As men-
tionedabove we avoided the term for its ambiguous connotations and 
methodological insufficiencies elaborated in Chapter Two. 
Content Inferences 
Inference commonly refers to a process of reasoning by means 
of which propositions are derived from other known propositions. 
Traditional logic contrasts essentially two kinds of inference: deduction 
and induction. Deductive inference proceeds from a general proposi-
~tion to particular instances implied by it. The classical Aristotlelian 
syllogism illustrates this mode of reasoning. Inductive inference on 
the other hand leads £rom less general to more general propositions 
orin Aristotle I s terms from individuals to universals. For this reason 
induction and deduction have often been said to be "inverse operations." 
Content inference does not fit either characterization. For ~in-
stance, deduction presupposes complete availability of information. 
As the working examples have amply demonstrated message analytic 
situations are existentically linked to the partial observability. of an 
object system. Consequently the message analyst!s efforts are 
typically constrained by the lack of complete information. On the other 
hand, the working examples show no sign of attempts at generalization. 
The inferences that are made in message analytic situations are always 
directed toward a rather specific problem domain, are pointed rather 
than universal. 
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Many logicians maintain that this contrast between inductive and 
deductive inference is not the most fruitful one. The distinction should 
rather be one according to whether the inference is logically conclusive 
Or not. Induction clearly goes beyond its premises in the sense that the 
conclusions do not completely follow from the antecedents, while deduc-
tion certainly remains within its premises. And yet, in the light of the 
recent advances in inductive scientific methodology these distinctions 
are not altogether happy ones either. 
The prominent method of inductive or predictive sciences as 
they are often called, is statistical inference or inductive statistics. 
Briefly, the method provides a rationale for deriving statistical gen-
eralizations concerning a population or universe - as it is interchange-
ably termed - on the basis of empirical knowledge obtained from a 
sample drawn from that universe. The argument is a strictly prob-
a.bilistic one. The certainty with which evidence obtained from an 
analyzed sample can be considered to confirm or disconfirm sets of 
hypotheses concerning a universe is a function of two probabilities: 
(al the probability. that a sample of a given size represents a certain 
universe, and (b) the probability of obtaining the differences observed 
within or the scores measured on the sample by chance. Thus, the 
apparent logical inconclusiveness of the basically inductive argument 
is replaced by a probability calculus providing a measure of certainty 
assigned to a generalization which accounts for incomplete observa-
tions. This measure is founded on the fundamental assumption that 
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the universe is composed of statistically independent individuals and that 
the degree to which sample statistics represent the parameters of a uni-
verse is solelY,a function of the relative sample size and the nature of 
the sample statistics. 
Overtly, the situation in which inductive statistics is applicable 
seems similar to that of the message analytic situation for both methods 
pertain to incompletely observable objects, i. e. object systems, popula-
tions or universes, and both attempt to go beyond their direct access, 
::---c....--.. 
i. e. beyond the data, signals, texts or observations. The methods 
must however be kept strictly separate since the assumption upon which 
inductive statistics rests is incompatible with those required for content 
inference. 
Inductive statistics rests -as we have said - on the assumption 
of statistical independence of the individuals in a particular sample 
and those in the population toward which the generalization proceeds. 
Message analysis is based on the recognition of possible dependencies 
between the individuals in a sample (data, signal) and those in a uni-
verse (unobserved components of the object system) to which content 
inferences lead. If the data obtained can be shown to be independent 
of the unobse;cved components of the object system, attempts to treat 
this data as a message would be in vain. If the sample turns out to 
be dependent on the rest of the population, inductive statistics leaqs 
to fallacious generalizations. Since inductive statistics presupposes 
the assumption of statistical independence of the sampled components 
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of an object system or universe, it must discard any communication 
between sample and univer se, it can in no way account for the commun-
ication structure that an object system may possess unless this com-
munication structure is decomposable into independent components 
and is adequately represented in the sample. 
This differentiation is not meant to suggest that inductive 
statistics has no place at all in message analysis. For example, if 
sampling from a given text is theoretically possible and practically 
feasible, inductive statistics may become an unavoidable method for 
reducing noise during filtering. Or, generalizations of statistical 
regularities formulated on the basis of samples requires inductive 
statistics for evaluating the gene·ralizability of such formulations for 
content inferences. But the calculus for justifying statistical infer-
ences from a sample to its universe requires assumptions entirely 
different from those of content inferences proceeding from signals 
to contents. Since many content analysts habitually apply tests of 
significance (developed according to the assumptions of inductive 
statistics) on data lcoown to be the outcome of complex communication 
structures, one can hardly give enough warning .against improper 
usages of such methods by emphasizing the incompatibilities of 
their basic assumptions. 
With the aid of known regularities of the object system, con-
tent inference proceeds from given data or signals to those unobserved 
components of an object system that are represented in the specific 
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and often rather limited problem domain. Traditional logic would say 
. that it proceeds from particulars to particulars, leaving universals com-
pletely out of its consideration. A logical scheme that seems to come 
closest to content inference has been described by Johnson (94), as 
leading from instances to instances, and has been given the technical 
te r1TI. 11 eduction. ',1 
Johnson demonstrates this mode of reasoning by using.a rather 
simple example: 
Mars is a solar planet 
the earth is a solar planet 
the earth is inhabited 
mars is inhabited 
and argues: 
Here the only point of agreement between mars and the earth 
is that they are both solar planets, and from this very slender 
relation of agreement we infer with the lowest degree of 
probability tha:t mars is inhabited,. because we know the earth 
to be so. The probability of this conclusion is strengthened, 
the greater the number of characters in which mars is found 
to agree with the earth; e. g. its being near the sun, and having 
atmosphere and vapour. It would be still further strengthened, 
if other solar planets besides the earth were known to be near 
the sun, to have atmosphere and vapour, and to be inhabited. 
The more complete process of eductilOn thus exemplified may 
be represented in the following scheme: 
(1) s is-characterized- by PI and P2 and ... Pm' 
(2) PI and P2 and ... Pm characterize sl and s2 and.;. sn' 
(3) sl and s2 and ... sn are-characterized-by p, 
s is-characterized-by p. 
Thus, in eduction there are three summary premises, con-
taining (a) the summary term "PI and P2 and ... Pm" which 
is adjectival; and (b) the summary term"sl and s2 and ... sn" 
which is substantival; besides the substantival terms "s" and 
the adjectival term "p" which occur in the conclusion 
(94:45-46). 
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It is quite clear from this formulation that Johnson deals here with 
an object system "s" and that the data Pi in terms of which it is repre-
sented are incomplete. From given knowledge about other object systems 
which are in many ways similar, possible properties of "s'" that are not 
accessable are then "educed." His premise (1) represents what the in-
complete observation of "s" yields while his premises (2) and (3) repre-
sent the knowledge already possessed about objects "s. and s2 and ... sn'" 
. 1 
The knowledge that is brought to bear in the situation can be formulated 
by putting the premises (2) and (3) together in the following way: "s 1 
and s2 and ... sn" are characterized by both "PI and P2 and ... Pm" and 
"p." Although Johnson did not think in terms of constraints and there-
fore does not make it very clear exactly which of the possibilities are 
excluded by assuming "PI ·and P2 and ... Pm" and "p" to hold, the con-
junction',induces a constraint in our sense. 
Johnson's motivation for using the two summary terms in the 
eduction scheme most probably derives from the stated intent to develop 
a rationale for accepting eductive inferences. According to his argu-
ment the number of objects in "sl and s2 and ... sn" provides him the 
basis for weighing previously obtained knowledge, i. e. the basis for 
assessing the certainty with which an established regularity can be 
assumed to hold for an object system, regardless of its inferential 
use, while the number of properties "PI and P2 and ... Pm"in which 
both "s" and "sl and s2 and ... sn" agree provides him the basis for 
weighing the eductive conclusiveness of a specific inference, regardless 
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of the nature of the object systeul. In an appendix Johnson goes on to 
suggest corresponding probability ll1easures with which we are not con-
cerned here. 
Statistical and eductive inference both show that it is obviously 
pos sible to elill1inate the seeTIling arbitrariness of inductive conclusions 
by accepting certain assull1ptions concerning the nature of the object 
systell1. Inductive statistics aSSUll1es statistical independence of an 
object systell1's eleTIlents. Johnson's eduction aSSUll1es SOll1e sort of 
stable contingencies between the properties of objects: theTIlore objects 
are known to agree in a certain set of properties, and the ll10re the in-
cOll1pletely assessed properties of another object agree with the forTIler 
. the TIlore likely. is the latter object to possess properties of the forll1er 
not assessed with regard to the latter. On the basis of any of those 
assull1ptions definite calculi for specialized forll1s of induction TIlay be 
forTIlulated. 
Since content inferences by definition go beyond i=ediately 
observed evidence, they. are specialized forll1s of inductive inferences 
and require certain justifying assull1ptions. Based on constraints dis-
covered in the past, content inference derives its justification on the 
assull1ption of the perTIlanence of these constraints in an object systell1. 
Osgood (147) talked about a general law relating the nature of the source 
with the nature of the TIlessages produced; Yule (217) assull1ed the 
relative invariance of a writer's use of his vocabulary, and Leites 
et al. (118) justified their inferences by pointing to the history of the 
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Soviet use of political symbolismo If regularities fonllulated in the past 
will not account for future constraints any content inference that is justi-
fied in terms of such regularities is bound to produce invalid results 0 
Since there can never be absolute certainty of the invariance of a con-
straint, the assumptions that need to be made to justify content inferences 
can only be heuristic ones o 
The argument that seems to prevail is that the longer the time 
period during which constraints have in the past been found to be in-
variant, the less likely they will be expected to change in the future 0 
This heuristic assumption is of course analogous to the one contained 
in the usual argument that the amount of evidence provided in support 
of a theory. is proportional to the degree to which this theory can be 
acceptedo Although Hume' s scepticism fully applies to this situation, 
to make such heuristic as~urriptions .about the nature of the constraints 
that are utilized in content inferences is probably the only way that 
information acquired in the past can be transformed into predictions; 
that certainty about unobserved parts of an object system can be gained; 
and that content inference can be justifiedo This as sumption ought to 
be regarded as a policy in the Peircean sense which has to be dis-
carded as soon as it does not produce valid predictions 0 
Content inference can take many different forms depending on 
the nature of the constraints discovered in an object system and ulti-
mately on the type of regularity that has been formulated to account 
for these constraints 0 It cannot easily be forced into a simple 
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syllogism, L e. into a traditional scheme of logical inference particularly 
since the content inference need not be single valued which means that the 
content inferred may not reduce the uncertainty perfectly. Es sential to 
content inference is a representation of the data obtained from suitable 
recording Or filtering procedures, an adequately formulated regularity 
from which rules of content inference are derived, rules matching data 
representations with the arguments in the rules of content inference that 
determine which of the rules are applicable in a given situation, and 
ultimately the content within the dimension of the problem domain. A 
diagramatic presentation of the typical elements of content inference 













Signal---' ..... Data Repre sentation 
Rules of Inference 
Content 
Diagram of the Process of Content Inference 
Figure 12 
The examples that can be given to illustrate content inferences 
exhibit structures that are far less complex than those of filtering. 
This fact is quite understandable in view of the long history of using 
292 
derived measurements, L e. filtering in our sense, in the physical and 
. behavioral sciences and the only recent interest in communication and 
the analysis of messages in particular. The formal characteristic of 
content inference has already been implicitly referred to when discuss-
. ing the empirical problems of formulating relevant regularitie s. Here 
we will give only a few more detailed examples that demonstrate the 
pOints mOre clearly. 
A more explicit example of content inference, although involving 
only a binary choice of possible contents, is one of Yules final argu-
ments in working example IV. To recapitulate: in one of his analyses, 
he eliminated from the texts in question all grammatical structures, 
frequencies, rank orders, etc. and represented the documents solely 
by the set N. of nouns that appeared in theith work. The problem 
1 
domain was just one ;"ariable, the set [Gerson, it Kempis] of pos sible 
authors. A constraint analysis yielded the set f< Ng, Gerson;>, 
< Nk' it Kempis,> J of couples representing the author by his name 
and his writing vocabulary by N i . The Imitatio was subjected to the 
same filtering procedure and became represented by the set N s of 
nouns. The rule of matching involved an "association quotient, " 
-1" Qij "+l defined as follows: 
= 
#((NiUNj)-(NiflNj))' #(Nl1Nj) - #(Ni-Nj)' #(Nj-Ni) 
#((NiUNj)-(NiflNj))' #(N/1Nj) + #(Ni-Njl' #(NrNi) 
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The rule of inference that was derived from the above regularity 
simply determines the selection of that author the vocabulary of whom 
resembles most closely that of the unidentified document;i. e. has the 
highest association quotient. Yule's content inference is diagrammed 
in Figure 13: 
",--, 
/ " I \ f <N , Gerson~, <Nk , a Kempis.>} ~ ~ 
Imitatio 
Diagram of Yule's Content Inference 
Figure 13 
a Kempis 
(is the Author) 
Lasswell's attempt to provide evidence to the courts about 
propaganda links between U. S. publications and foreign governments, 
described in working example V, could be formalized similarly to 
Yule's inference. As we suggested in the section on constraint analy-
sis, the regularity that must have been assumed by Lasswell can be 
stated as t1whenever communication between two parties exists, SOITle 
transmitted signal or message characteristics are typically invariant. " 
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Assuming certain types of characteristics that are maintained when a 
foreign government has control over the channel between its nation and 
a U. S. publication, an inferential rule can be derived as follows: "if 
measures of certain specified signal characteristics show a suspected 
publication to exhibit above chance resemblances with information 
sources of a foreign government in question, then the suspected publica-
tion can be inferred to possess a link to that government." It should be 
mentioned that "chance resemblances" obtain a special non- statistical 
meaning .in this context and is measurable in comparison with a publica-
tion which is known not be to under control of that foreign government. 
The content inferences that are built into evaluative assertion 
analysis (151), already referred to on several occasions, are of a 
different kind. Here inferences are made as to a writer's affective 
evaluation of a particular attitude object AO I from the associative or 
dissociative bands to other attitude objects A02 and common meaning 
terms cm the affective evaluation of which is already known. The 
rules of inference are presented in the form of a calculus that derives 
from Osgood's congruity principle (150). Briefly, the congruity prin-
ciple states that initially affective-neutral AO l ' s obtain their favorable 
evaluations as they are associatively linked to favorable A02's and 
cm's and dissociatively linked to unfavorably evaluated A02 's and 
c-mls. The rule for inferring the evaluative direction of a particular 
AOI makes use of the algebraic convention that assigns a positive 
value to the product of two numbers with equal signs and a negative 
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value to the product of two nUll1bers with unequal signs. Thus, an asso-
ciat:\ve band between AOI andAOZ or Cll1 to which a plus is assigned 
gives, ll1ultiplied by the positive valence of anAOZ or Cll1, a positive 
valence for AOZ and ll1ultiplied by the negative valence of anAOZ or 
Cll1, a negative valence for AOZ. 
Dissociative bands are handled analoguously. The intensity of an 
affective evaluation of an AO I is sill1ilarly inferred by weighing the in-
tensity of AOZ's and Cll1'S with the strength of association or dissocia-
tion respectively. Thus, Osgood's congruity principle which absorbed 
considerable experill1ental work in psycholinguistics provided definite 
and forll1alized rules of content inference froll1 the co=on ll1eaning 
terll1S appearing in a text to a particular attitude object according to 
the net bands that link thell1. 
A less forll1alized but nevertheless ill1portant exall1ple of content 
inference has been described in working exall1ple VI. The British propa-
ganda analyst had discovered a sudden gap in retaliation propaganda 
which was followed by a watering down of propaganda cOll1ll1itll1ents on 
reprisal. His ll10de of reasoning was based on the following observed 
regularity: "references to reprisal usually occurred either in propa-
ganda diatribes against Allied air raids or in conjunction with propa-
ganda efforts to solve the poor ll10rale of the Gerll1an public ll (71:148). 
Put into the terll1S of a rule of content inference: lIif no other ll10re 
ill1portant event overshadows the references to reprisal weapons, 
their absence allows us to infer an absence of Allied air raids on 
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Germany and/ or an improvement in German morale, and/or interferences 
with the preparation of the weapon referred to." The analyst knew that 
no other important event superseded the reprisal talk, that air raids 
did not cease in intensity, and that the situation was such that German 
morale had no reaSOn to be improved. Only when these possibilities 
were successively ruled out, was it possible to infer quite specifically 
that something had happened to the preparation and scheduling of the 
retaliation weapon, a fact that could be later confirmed. 
George called the methods of drawing inferences from such propa-
ganda messages as the one presented here "indirect" ones for they use 
the conventional meanings of the propaganda only as a vehicle to get at 
a speaker's purpose or propaganda goal and finally to the events in the 
problem domain. Diagramatically the inferential steps and known reg-
ularities of the previous example can be depicted in Figure 14. 
By this multiple- step inference which involves consideration of 
the lexical use of language, the propaganda objectives and techniques, 
as well as information of situational changes, the propaganda analyst 
systematically eliminates the possible denotations and antecedents a 
given propaganda message may have under situations other than the 
one given. These multiple-step inferences seem to be neces'sary when 
object systems possess some intelligence, i. e. desseminate messages 
according to some objective. 
The example illustrates moreover how many inferential pos-















Example of Inferential Steps for Inferring Content 




when simple frequency counts of manifest references are made in such 
situations. Traditional content analysts would be able to only scratch 
the surface, if not possibly themselyesbe subject to manipulation by 
this highly instrumental use of c;ommunic;ation. 
Mahl had a good point in arguing that if human individuals use 
their speech instrumentally, and psychological states of interest to the 
psychodiagnostician are very likely to be suppressed consciously, the 
speech characteristics not under the direct conscious control of the 
speaker are more likely to carry the desired information. He thus got 
around the problem of treating communications. instrumentally by rely-
ing on direct indicators of an unconscious kind. Yule's authorship 
identification in IV, Lasswell's detection of propaganda channels in V, 
Leites' analYSis of political distances of members of the pOlitburo to 
Stalin in VII, etc., all disregard the possible instrumentality of mes-
sages. They make use of some content inferential procedures pre-
. supposing the assumption of the o1;>ject system as a basically purpose-
less one. George Seems to present the' only large scale effort to make 
content inferences from partly observable object systems that are 
considered as having some teleological properties. 
Psychological theories of meaning too are of little help in sug-
gesting more definite rules of content inference for the analysis of 
data derived from a source which is purposive. This is most obviously 
. true for Skinner's conception of meaning as a conditioned constraint on 
the stimulus response pattern a person can exhibit (181). But Osgood's 
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theory of meaning which represents the significata of words in a metric 
"semantic space" having psychologically relevant dimensions (152) does 
not corne closer to the instrumental use of meaning either. 
Only very recently algorithms have been studied that describe 
inteUigent behavior although still of a rudimentary type. Most promi-
nent among those approaches is Newell, Shaw, and Simon's Logic 
Theory Machine. The machine "was devised to learn how it is possible 
to solve difficult problems such as proving mathematical theorems, 
discovering scientific laws from data, playing .chess, or understanding 
the meaning of English prose" (141:109). The authors demonstrated 
that it can be programed to prove theorems in elementary symbolic 
logic. In this case, the machine was given the five aJd"ms used in 
the Principia Mathematica, three rules of inference, and the theorem 
to be proven. The machine generated sequences of logical expres-
sions', evaluated each step heuristically according to whether the sub-
goal or goal was approached. It terminated when a sequence of trans-
formations linked axioms with the expression to be proven. 
With a little imagination, the procedures that lead to proving 
a theorem seem tobe overtly similar to the reasoning a propaganda 
analyst. emPloys incoming to a conclusion concerning the existence 
of reprisal weapons talked about by an opposing power. And yet, a 
few very important differences .should be noted. Firstly, symbolic 
logic is a formalized system of mathematics. Although the propa-
ganda analyst'S reasoning can surely be described as logical in his 
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own terms, the "logic" of propaganda, of political mobilization or of the 
manipulation of war-moods - if one can speak of "a logic" at all - is 
certainly not formalized at this point. Secondly, the "constraints" in 
the system of symbolic logic are imposed by very few axioms and rules 
of inference. The constraints a propaganda analyst has to rely on are 
numerous and typically incomplete. This leaves the analyst uncertain 
about the adequacy of his representational system and thus leads easily 
to inconsistencies, indeterminacies, etc. Thirdly, the system of 
symbolic logic is deductive and not inductive in the sense that axioms 
and rule s of inference provide all information a bout the permis sible 
states of the system. On the other hand, content inference is inductive. 
The formulated regularities are assumed to account for the constraints 
of the object system and in the light of the heuristic assumption of the 
temporary invariance of those constraints messages obtain specific 
interpretations. Although the Logic Theory Machine does not provide 
a mechanism for the type of inferences needed in message analysis, 
it illustrates a. few of the procedural requirements for Simulating 
some kind of intelligent behavior. 
A machine program which "understands natural language" at 
least in the domain of simple kinship relations has been described by 
Lindsay (120). The motivation for developing such a program sterns 
from various sources. Information retrieval as currently applied 
to numerous library problems usually processes items of informa-
tion without considering their meaning in any of the possible senses. 
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High-speed computers have been employed to scan very long lists for 
key words, count their frequencies etc. and although abstracts, biblh,-
graphies, subject matter identifications have been made in this way, 
they are anything but those produced by a human being "understanding" 
the meaning of the text. Machine translation has mainly been approached 
by devising syntactic rules and extensive dictionaries for converting 
sentences of one language into the other. Native speakers then have to 
refine such translations by supplying information which may. indeed 
account for what he "understands" the text to mean. Simply adding to 
each stored word its idiosyncratic usages or how it is to be understood 
in each of its possible contexts multiplies the memory space required 
of a machine and becomes quickly unrealizable. 
Lindsay identified the problem of understanding as one of £ind-
. ing ways of storing and using large amounts of detailed knowledge 
while keeping the amount of memory capacity required within realiz-
able limits. By calling such ways of storing information an "infer-
ential memory" the relevance of his work for content inference is 
even more suggestive. 
The filter of the machine which "understands ... " is a syn-
tactic analysis or more specifically, a sentence-parsing program 
making use of Chomsky's phrase structure grammar (44). The 
sentences it accepts are those included in Ogden's Basic English, 
. a system of grammar and a vocabulary of about 1700 words. The 
program constructs a phrase structure diagram for each sentence 
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with the component words as terminal elements and stores them with their 
syntactic description. In this way the enormous number of relations that 
are expressed in the text are reduced to a manageable size and only those 
of interest are maintained. 
Lindsay's subsequent semantic,analysis program does not com-
pletely distinguish between constraint analysis and content inference for 
reasons which will become clear immediately . The first step is to take 
all nouns appearing in the text and search for all subject-object combina-
tions whose main verb is some form of "to be." Words in such combina-
tions are then marked "equivalent" and their modifiers grouped together. 
Next a search is made for the eight words which Basic English 
provides to discuss kinship relations; "father," "mother," "brother," 
ITsister, 11 l1brother-in-law, II 11 s ister-in-law, 11 and "married. 11 If any of 
these relations oCCurs in the sentence, their modifiers are examined to 
discover proper names appearing as possessive adjectives or objects 
of a proposition, as for example "Jane's brother" or "the father of 
John." The sentences are thus reduced to a set of word triplets con-
taining two proper nouns and a relation word which connects them. 
Now family trees are constructed. The computer memory is 
organized as a list structure in which items in one list can be asso-
ciated with items in another list. Each list is reserved for one family 
unit leaving places for the names of "husband, " "wife, " "offspring, " 
"husbands' parents," "wife's parents." Suppose the triplet "Jane 
married John" appeared in the sentence, the two names are then 
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written 'inthe respective places of husband and wife of say, family unit 1, 
The triplet "Jane's father Bill" would then be stored in the following way: 
Bill is written in the place of husband in, say, family unit 2 and the Jane's 
family unit 1 gets the entry "family unit 2" in the place of wife's parents. 
In this way lists representing family units are used to represent more 
and more complicated kinship relations as texts are read into the memory. 
Lindsay also describes how the order of presentation of the input 
data has a crucial effect upon the efficiency of memory allocation, even 
when dealing with simple kinship relations. For example, if the machine 
is first told that X has offspring A, B, C, and D it must construct an 
elaborate organization to handle this information, places such as for 
the spouse of X being left blank. If the machine is then in.formed that 
Y has offspringE, F, G, and H, it must construct another such structure, 
unrelated to the first. Finally. it may learn that A and H are brothers. 
This permits (neglecting multiple marriages) a collapsing of the two 
structures into a single organization representing the implied.informa-
tion much more compactly. Such collapsing of severarlist structures 
into a simple scheme could - permitting an analogy to subj",ctiveex-
perience - very well account for the so-called "aha-experJ.ence." 
The contribution of such inferential memories to message analy-
sis is quite obvious although its rear significance may not appear when 
e><;emplified only by storing kinship relations. But, the inference of 
X being Y's spouse from knowing the regularities of kinship and 
"reading" that A and H are brothers is at least as simple as the 
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propagandist's reasoning concerning inferences as to the planned use of 
reprisal wea pons. 
Suppose the explicit structure of the memory, i. e. the overall 
regularity of the object system, is adequate for representing relevant 
implications implicitly, a message analyst may wish to build up an in-
ferential memory during the history of his dealing with an object system 
as the propaganda analyst did concerning Goebbels' propaganda habits, 
the behavior of a decision making-elite and of large masses of people 
under stress. Given a further piece of information, a signal, (either 
linking several structures in an hitherto unprecedented way or simply 
replicating an event while perhaps other structures have been modified,) 
a problem- solving program of the type Newell, Shaw and Simon used 
for their Logic Theory Machine could now be employed to search for 
the implications a signal has for the problem domain or to trace a path 
through the memory. 1£ enough inferential information is available an 
automatic message analysis can be accomplished that is at least in 
the domain of intelligent object systems and infinitely more promising 
than traditional content analyses. 
Lindsay realizes of course the extreme simplicity of kinship 
relations which were chosen only to demonstrate the technical possi-
bility of constructing memories for storing definite implications im-
plicily since the required memory capacity increases too rapidly when 
storage is explicit. But the demonstration quite clearly supports his 
main point that machines exhibiting some human-like intelligence in 
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handling natural language presuppose some memory with inferential 
capabilities because otherwise meaning and understanding - whatever 
they may. be - cannot be adequately processed. 
Concluding this section we wish to contrast inference with filter-
ing in message analysis in the narrower sense. Since both procedures 
are derived from discovered constraints or from formulated regularities 
they are apt to be easily confused. Filtering has been characterized as 
a mapping, as a mathematical function, or as a computational procedure 
reducing the complexity of data and representing it in the terms in which 
relevant regularities are formulated. Content inference on the other 
hand neither needs to be nor usually is a mapping, i. e., it is not re-
quired to be everywhere defined and single valued. Filtering reflects 
the way regularities of an object system are formulated. More specif-
ically, it is either identical with or a projection of the mapping that 
leads to the discovery of a relevant constraint. A regularity could 
also be said to be a partial model of the object system. The rules of 
content inference that derive from an adequately formulated regularity 
then become equivalent to the operating rules in the object system's 
model. Hence, content inference can always be regarded as interpr'et-
ing a given message by applying relevant operating rules of the object 
system on suitably represented data· yielding specific contents within 
a problem domain. Filtering remains within the data to be analyzed. 
Content inference goes beyond their formal representation requiring 
the assumption that the object system's constraint, on the basis of 
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which rules of content inference were formulated, remain invariant. 
As we have emphasized in Chapter Four the content so inferred 
subsumes the traditional concept of meaning, whether it be connotative 
Or denotative. It may take the form of causes or effects, of antecedent 
conditions of data or its consequences, of logical implications, or of 
imputed goals. The working examples identified content in our sense 
with deciphered messages, predicted political actions, inferJ;"ed social 
distances or communication structures - in any case-with events other 
than those manifest in the physical characteristics of a given Signal, 
data, text or representations thereof. A classification of .types of 
inferences can lead to a set of distinct models of content inference. 
The task of formalizing such models goes beyond the scope of this 
work and must be postponed for a later paper. 
Validation 
There really can be no justification for any message analysis 
unless there are sufficient reasons to believe that its outcome has 
some factuality; unless some evidence can be provided to sub~tantia te 
its results; _unless the content ultimately inferred has an acceptable 
degree of validity. The goal of "optimizing valid content within a 
problem domain" has been suggested as a definitional requirement 
of message analysis. Optimizing valid content is meant to be 
synonymous with minimizing the uncertainty within a problem domain 
where the source of this uncertainty may stem from incomplete know-
ledge within that domain or from the lack of confidence concerning 
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whether the content inferences made will stand empirical tests. Valida-
tion in message analysis then is the process by means of which the 
procedures of message analysis in the narrower sense are jOintly eval-
uated with respect to their ability to yield reliable information about an 
object system's unobserved components which are of declared interest 
to the analyst. 
Validation has obtained its highest degree of formalization in 
the statistics of psychological testing. This methodology attributes 
validity to a measuring instrument when referring .to the degree to 
which this instrument measures what it purports to measure. Thus 
an intelligence test may be said to be valid to the extent the scores 
obtained are indicative of the subject's intelligence. The example is 
not as simple as it sounds for intelligence is not directly observable. 
Thus, the validity of a measuring instrument is usually assessed by 
comparing its sCOres with those obtained from another measuring 
instrument independently of the former, the validity of which is 
already established. A suitable example is the General Inquirer 
measures, . presumed to be indicative of international tension, which 
have been shown to correlate with the Dow-Jones average of In-
dustrial Securities (84). The extent to which these two measures 
correlate expresses the degree to which the validity established for 
whatever the Dow- Jones Average is indicative of can be transferred 
to the General Inquirer measure. It is evident that the validity of a 
measuring instrument can never be higher than the validity of those 
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instruments by means of which it is validated. 
In traditional content analysis, validation is an extremely diffi-
cult problem. Not only is the meaning of "meaning" hardly understood, 
as we have seen in Chapter Two, the term "content" is not always ex-
plicated either. Thus, it is not altogether clear against which criteria 
results of content analysis are supposed to be validated. 
We cited Janis' suggestion that "semantical content analysis" be 
identified with a classification of the "signifying responses" to given 
"sign-vehicles. "While this does not provide an immediate basis for 
validation, Janis suggests the measurement of a related characteristic 
called "productivity" which would lead to some kind of indirect valida-
tion of content analytic results. 
A content-analysis procedure is productive insofar as the 
results it yields are found to be correlated with other var-
iables. Whenever there is a substantial correlation be-
tween two variables, one variable maybe regarded as an 
indicator of the other, because it is possible to predict, 
within known limits of error, the value of the second var-
iable from the first. We may say, then, that a technique 
is productive to the extent that the results it provides 
serve as indicators of other variables. Thus, a content-
analysis technique would be highly productive if its results 
served as indicators of such variables as, (a) intentions 
of the communicator to produce favorable attitudes toward 
a foreign country, (b) periods of severe frustration for the 
pOlitical organization within which the communicators are 
affiliated, (c) 'unconscious' guilt feelings on the part of 
the speaker, (d) changes in attitudes toward democratic 
practices on the part of an audience, and (e) feelings of 
insecurity about the future on the part of the audience, 
etc. (92:65-66). 
Janis goes on to say that although the validity of semantical 
content analysis cannot be established directly, it may be inferred 
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frolll the measurable productivity on the assulllption that "relationships 
alllong various observable aspects of the cOlllmunicative proces s are 
lllediated by signification responses, Different signification responses 
tend to have different behavioral causes and effects; similar significa-
tion responses tend to have silllilar causes and effects" (92:70), The 
conclusion drawn from such considerations is that "every content 
analysis study, therefore, is required to provide some evidence of 
validity. This means that, for the present, research projects which 
intend to provide purely descriptive information about content - without 
testing any relationships exhibited by the content data should be 
avoided" (92:78). This advice, however, has been rarely taken. 
It is not difficult to see that correlations between hypothetical 
signification responses and other variables which according to Janis 
are necessary to infer the validity of a content analysis, are indicative 
of a constraint similar to the one we presupposed for content infer-
ences, The correlational measure of productivity purporting to 
establish relations between these variables is nothing but a measure 
of the severity of a linear constraint. In fact Janis supports our view 
partially, via the discus sion of the empirical problem of validating 
the analytical procedure that the only methodologically acceptable 
way to analyze data as messages is one that includes content infer-
ences of some sort, although he does not formally state such require-
lllent. 
In the light of Janis' discussion of the validity problem in 
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content analysis we should like to make an additional remark. We can 
regard such content analysis results as being only arbitrary hypothetical 
constructs. Since descriptions of the conventional meanings of symbolic 
data, their semantic representation, etc., cannot be validated directly, 
they cannot in themselves lead to predictions, have no theoretical or 
practical consequences. Such hypothetical constructs for significata 
are arbitrary in the sense that almost always several ways of descrip-
tion can be found as Goodenough has amply demonstrated with his 
semantic analysis of kinship terminology (78). The arbitrariness of 
these constructs becomes restricted, however, if taken in conjunction 
with specific inferences that are claimed to be validly drawn from 
them. In this sense the results of message analysis represent aspects 
of the unobserved components of an object system and are subject to 
direct validation while the results of content analysis remain hypo-
thetical and are indirectly valida table only. in conjunction with an 
additional hypothetical construct that relates signification to other 
measurable aspects of the object system. 
Numerous schemes for differentiating types of validation have 
been suggested by various authors. Janis mentioned "direct" and 
"indirect" validation. The American Psychological Association con-
cerned with the clinical use of tests identifies and defines "content 
validity, !I 'tpredictive validity~ 11 t'concurrent validity, 11 and !'construct 
validity" (197). Content validity is solely based on the informed 
judgement of the investigator, predictive and concurrent validity are 
both established by some correlation either between simultaneously 
occuring variables or between variables distinguished along a time 
scale,. and construct validity bestows validity not only upon the out-
COme of the test but also upon the theory underlying the construction 
of the test. Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (173:154-166) felt 
that there were only two basic types of validity, "pragmatic validity" 
as an answer to such question as rldoes this rneasur'ing instrument 
work? ".and "construct validity" characterized as above. They also 
mention "face validity" as a self-evident measure. 
In message analysis problems of validation are not always 
identical with those of psychological testing. For one thing, the 
stimulus conditions that are typically standardized in test situations 
are rarely accessable in message analysis;or, psychological tests 
can often be regarded as a more economical shortcut to the assess-
ment of personality characteristics such as through ·aptitude tests 
for particular jobs in order to ensure efficient labor. In message 
analysis, the components of the object system that its results claim 
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to represent are often impossible to observe. This necessitates modes 
of validation which are quite different from those used in psychological 
tests. Thirdly, psychological tests make use of relatively general-
izable psychological constraints such as manifestations of intelligence, 
aspiration levels, psychopathologies, etc., while message analysis 
. is more often based on relatively situation specific regularities that 
are often hardly generalizable in the same way the empirical domain 
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of psychological testing seems to permit. Finally, message analysis is 
often bound to operate in situations that are less controlled than those of 
psychological testing but nevertheless requires methodological examina-
tion and evaluation. 
In spite of the obvious differences validation in message analysis 
can take any of the above mentioned forms. Whether only the product of 
a content inference is validated against some external criterion (prag-
matic validity in Selltiz et aI's sense) or whether external criteria are 
chosen to validate the theory underlying the analytic procedure (con-
struct validity) in all cases some evidence other than the one utilized 
for processing the data has to be made available. We therefore wish to 
leave the question open as· to whether the message analyst gathers 
additional data to confirm his inferences or whether he employs such 
information to validate the theoretical constructs that went into the 
design of the analysis. Hence, we suggest a differentiation of modes 
of validation according to the nature of information utilized for such 
ends. Without insisting too strongly on the terminal names for types 
of validation, the diagram in Figure 15 intends to depict the suggested 
distinctions and to outline the subsequent discussion. 
The left-to-right order in which the five types of validation are 
presented in the above diagram suggests an order of increasing cer-
tainty that could be claimed on the basis of the kind of information 
utilized. Although the certainty each type of validation can render is 
also limited by the amount of validating evidence available, logical 
Validation 
based on·information -
- internal to message 
analytic procedure 
- external to message 
analytic procedure -
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validation tends to provide the least certainty concerning the content in-
ferred, predictive validation the m.ost. The m.essage analyst of course 
is not free to choose at will am.ong the types of validation. His choice 
is dependent on the kind of information that the message analytic situa-
tion m.akes available to him. 
Logical Validity 
If no information is made available other than the one already 
utilized in the message analytical process, the justification of the con-
tent inferred rests solely on the logical conclusiveness of the m.ethod 
em.ployed and on the certainty associated with the assumption that the 
relevant constraint still holds for the object system under consideration. 
True, this situation seems most uncertain but it m.ust be considered 
the m.08t frequent situation in which a m.essage analyst finds himself. 
Indeed, if he optimizes the content in the specified problem. domain, 
he should be expected to have utilized all available resources leaving 
nothing for additional validation. Yet, the redundancy of available 
information and the stability of the constraint observed during the 
history of dealing with the respective object system, as well as the 
conclusiveness of the procedures, certainly does give weight to the 
content inferred. 
For example, historians have traditionally dealt with infer-
ences from documents to events although no extensive methodology 
.has emerged from this pursuit. Only recently Dibble (51) devoted a 
paper to the explication of some general syllogisms that historians 
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tend to use implicitly to evaluate the reliability of a document whether 
it bea testimony, a product of' social bookkeeping, or considered as 
correlates or direct indicators of events. Such attempts toward a 
methodology for content inferences in history are not very highly 
developed. By referring to the correct use of such syllogisms his-
torians attempt to provide logical validity to the results obtained. 
Another case in point has been described in working example 
V where Lasswell tried to substantiate the suspicion that certain 
publishing agencies were controlled by a foreign government. The 
validity of his inferences rested solely on his definition of propaganda; 
the assumptions that went into the identification of "links to a foreign 
government" and specified characteristics in texts; and the reliability 
with which the statistical analysis was executed. Reporting on such 
matters justifies the result in the light of the conclusiveness of the 
investigative technique. It provides a logical validation. 
Similar justifications seem to have been required from the 
war propaganda analyst in working example VI. George reported 
that in writing their weekly reports the FCC analysts included their 
mode of reasoning in support of the inferences made. Reporting 
these explicit reasonings was most probably intended to give weight 
to the results of the analysis by exhibiting their logical conclusive-
ness. No information external to the message analytic procedure 
was provided. Only.its internal structure could be exhibited to those 
making use of the inferences. (This apparent requirement incidentally 
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enabled George to reconstruct many of the models of the situation propa-
ganda analysts made explicit use of). 
Fa c e Validity 
Most content analyses, while required to be explicit concerning 
the procedures employed, do not attempt to provide explicit external 
information to validate their results. Such results are accepted or re-
jected according to whether they seem plausible or not to the analyst. 
Variously referred to as plausibility or content validity, this mode of 
validation involves - as we have mentioned -the intuitive judgement of 
an informed investigator. This is the most critical type of validation 
since the plausibility of an analytic result is not communicable; it can 
only be intuitively evident to the one who assesses the validity of the 
result and is based on implicit competencies. 
The most general example of this mode of validation is the use 
of relative frequencies of references appearing in newspapers, for 
example, to measure public attention to the respective referents. 
This identification has been accepted for over 50 years without re-
cruiting empirical evidence in its favor. Although it is not difficult 
to find sufficiently many examples where identifications of this kind 
seem invalid, the plausibility of such measures seems so strong to 
content analysts that they have never seriously been questioned. 
Another example for face validity is Gerbner's definition of 
his "news value index" (76:II-D-4) the values of which are presumed 
to measure the llnewsworthiness rr of a topic to a ll1ass llledia 
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institution. Gerbner accepts this measure on the basis that it Seems to 
be intuitively plausible without providing further evidence. Similarly 
Berelson's equation of the disproportionate representation of U. S. 
minorities in fictional stories with "constant deprivation" is - as plaus-
ible as it may appear to him - simply accepted "on the face of it" with-
out further justification. A somewhat mixed example is provided by 
the General Inquirer measures obtained from documents pertaining to 
international issues and plausibly. interpreted by Holsti, Brody and 
North (84) as measuring international tension. The example states 
an attempt at predictive validation although the idea of such a measure 
does not seem to have been conditioned by such an attempt at validation. 
That face validity cannot be communicated and rests solely on 
the intuition of the individual judging the results of a message analysis 
has already been mentioned. Another critical characteristic of face .. 
validity. and concordance validity as well, lies in the fact that it in-
volves some knowledge of the probable content prior to the date the 
analytical results are assessed. Thus, results may be rejected if 
they do not seem plausible or do not confirm the prior knowledge held 
by the investigator. Such a validation can easily lead to setting up a 
procedure in support of already established beliefs about incompletely 
observable systems, often without the investigator becoming aware 
about the circularity of the validating process involved. The history 
of science is tull of examples where face validity failed to accept 
analytical results that turned out to be acceptable at a later time. 
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Concordance Validity 
Concordance and face validity have in common the characteristic 
that information utilized to validate the results of a message analysis is 
available to the analyst concurrently with the information used to accom-
plish the intended content inferences. While face validity refers to an 
informed judgement of the investigator, we wish to reserve the term 
"concordance validity" for a systematic and explicit attempt to validate 
inferences on the basis of their coherence, consistency or at least lack 
of contradiction with other information about the partly observed object 
system. A more thorough analysis of the process involved may render 
both modes of validation the same with the exception that the former is 
characterized by intuitive judgements, while the latter by more explicit 
formal rigor. Hence, the evidence of concordance validity is commun-
icable while that of face validity is not. Although the borderline between 
these two types may not always be easily drawn, the two extremes 
should be distinguished. 
All analyses of messages from object systems having existed 
at some point in the past history are absolutely bound to be evaluated 
at best on the basis of concordance validity. Consider Yule's statistical 
analysis of literature describe in working example 1. There is no hope 
of obtaining direct evidence from the object system studied; the authors 
of the documents cannot be intervewecL Inferences as to the author-
ship of the unsigned document can only be justified on the basis that 
they are not contradictory to the information that had been accumulated 
319 
about the authors, their works, ... and some generalizations concerning the 
statistical properties of their writing styles. 
The use of the concordance criterion as a basis for validating 
message analyses can be illustrated by almost any content inference 
made from historical documents. Working example I, the decipherment 
of the hitherto unreadable old Persian script, may suffice. In the cause 
of this analysis none of the numerous hypotheses that had emerged con-
cerning the semantic interpretation of the cuneiform characters, their 
grammar, or their phonrtic values were rendered acceptable until some 
consistency with known historical events of the old Persian Empire 
could be d.efuonstrated. It was only after a century of trying and test-
ing that some of the inferences suggested by scholars emerged as not 
only being.in conformity with known historical facts but moreover ex-
plained several events in a coherent way. This refers particularly 
to the medieval Persian use of titles which provided the key for the 
names of consecutive kings whose periods of reign were consistent with 
the use of the three distinct writing systems, etc. So content infer-
ences from documents were systematically validated by testing their 
concordance with the transmitted history of the culture until all con-
tradictions were eliminated. 
Concordance validity as a mode of evaluating content infer-
ences does not of course lead to absolute certainty about inferences. 
Householder (85) has investigated some of the peculiarities of the 
"semantic mapping" as he calls it. He could easily demonstrate 
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that given a syntactic description of a text, the words of which are some 
coded version of English, there are almost always several distinct ways 
of interpreting the text semantically, i. e. consistent with the semantics 
of the English language, making perfect sense to a native English 
speaker. The number of possible inferences that can be drawn from 
a given text without violating known language universals decreases as 
the length of a text increases but no theorem is known concerning the 
minimal length of a text that will receiv'e an unambiguous semantic in-
terpretation given the semantic structure of a language (85: 183). 
Recently a~tention has been focussed on the problem of grammatical 
ambiguity where the situation is similar to the above, given the know-
ledge of a grammar. The"problem becomes particularly acute in a 
very different case of grammatical ambiguity when an attempt is made 
to construct a grammar for an unknown language from given texts of 
"insufficient" length which support a number of hypothesized gram-
mars. Structural ambiguities may easily lead to semantic ambiguities, 
(99) i. e. to several content inferences that are equivalent under the 
• 
criterion of concordance with the information available. Thus it is 
not implausible that the old Persian script could have been interpreted 
in an entirely different way without being inconsistent with what was 
then known about Persia. It is' equally possible that the information 
in conjunction with which the inferences were evaluated had been dis-
torted during the process of transmission through history and had 
therefore .affected the deciphering process, etc. Although concordance 
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validity as a criterion for evaluating accomplished content inferences 
has certain recognizable pitfalls, it is certainly the best method that 
can be employed if the information used for validation is concurrent 
to the information used in the inference. 
Pragmatic Validity 
1£ the information used for validating message analysis is a 
posteriori to the information which went into the content inference, 
the validity may be established indirectly on the basis of information 
about the consequences that derive from it. This type of validation 
will be called pragmatic. It should not be confused with the same 
term used much more broadly by Selltiz et. a1. (173: 157). Prag-
matic validity is to be understood as being only indirectly assessed, 
quite similar to the way Janis wanted to have the validity of content 
analytic results inferred from what he called productivity. 
In many situations the problem domain of the message analyst 
is set up in such a way that the inferred content implies sequences of 
·decisions, leading ultimately to specific actions directed toward the 
unobserved part of the object system having observable consequences. 
Such a situation existed for the cryptographer in III. His deciperment, 
although having at once a considerable degree of face validity and 
concordance validity could not gain further certainty until its conse-
quences were put to test. If the cryptographer's interpretation of 
the cipher was correct, then certain military operations would have 
to lead to certain predictable results. Similar was the situation for 
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the war-propaganda analyst in VI. Here the problem domain was specif-
ically delineated to satisfy the informational needs of the policy makers 
with the primary objective of recommending effective military strategies. 
Much of the case studies that George (71:125-250) describes were in fact 
concerned with only pragmatically confirmable inferences such as about 
anticipations concerning the success of planned military operations; 
elite expectations concerning the viability of the Axis or concerning 
Allied actions and possible preventive measures, perceptions concern-
ing morale and public confidence in leaders. Unfortunately the practical 
consequences that may have been derived from such propaganda analytic 
results were not reported in this work. That the mass communications 
of Allies, opponents, and neutrals were monitored by all major powers 
during World War II and intensively analyzed by quite elaborate and 
specialized organizations suggests at least a considerable amount of 
pragmatic validity as sociated with their re suIts. 
The psychodiagnostic attempts in X to adapt message analytic 
procedures for therapeutic ends may serve as a third illustration for 
the pragmatic validation of content inferences. As mentioned before 
the psychodiagnostic inferences which are hoped to be obtainable from 
analyzing a patient's speech do not generally represent the person's 
internal states, unobservable as they are, but psychotherapeutic con-
structs that have been evolved in the context of the patients' behavior 
toward specific treatments. Here message analytic products imply 
recommendations of possible causes of treatments which will lead 
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to desirable and accessable results provided that the analysis is valid. 
Hence, the validation of message analyses in the domain of psychodiag-
nosis is dominantly a pragmatic one. 
The nature of pragmatic validation is such that inferences can 
only be rendered invalid but can never be positively judged as being 
valid inferences, i. e. if content inferences do not lead to the conse-
quences implied by it, the message analysis must be rendered invalid. 
While if the implied actions lead to the expected observations, these 
consequences may have been due to causes other than those induced 
by the action. Hence message analysis can be said to become prag-
matically validated only insofar as no information becomes available 
according to which the content inferences would have to be rendered 
invalid. 
Predictive Validity 
The validation of message analysis may be based on informa-
tion pertaining directly to the problem domain and received a posteriori 
to the analysis. Such validation is called predictive validation and is 
differentiated from pragmatic validation by the absence of any need 
for actively interferring with the behavior of the object system to 
produce the validating evidence. Predictive validity in our sense in-
cludes APA's concurrent validity. Assessing the predictive validity 
of a message analysis requires establishing agreement of the content 
inferred with a posteriori information obtained within the problem 
domain. This case of validation which is formally the most simple 
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was taken up in chapter four in order to define the amount of valid infor-
mation conveyed bya signal, the evidence for "valid information" having 
been given as the "validating signal" first introduced in Chapter Three. 
The assessment of predictive validity by an external observer of the 
message analytic situation had been shown to be a prerequisite for deter-
mining whether some procedure satisfies the goal of message analysis. 
The simplest example for a predictive validation has been 
described in working example IX where the task was adopted to develop 
a mechanical procedure for predicting whether or not a set of letters 
had been written by persons intending to commit suicide. After rele-
vant constraints had been formulated and found to distinguish between 
such letters, the sources of which were known to the researchers, 
the predictive validity of the analytic procedure was tested. To this 
end another set of letters of unknown identity was subjected to mes-
sage analysis. Only after the predictions were made was the identity 
of the writers revealed to the research team. That the psycho-
logical state of the writer had been inferred correctly for seventeen 
out of eighteen pairs of notes was used as an argument for the pre-
dictive validity of the message analytic procedure. 
After World War II, the validity of content inferences from 
war propaganda was assessed and the performance of the propaganda 
analysis operation of the Federal Communications Commission 
evaluated. This could be accomplished by matching a large sample 
of inferences against relevant information contained in official German 
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war records, diaries~ rneTI1.oirs~ captured documents, interrogation-
reports, etc. Since most of the predictions concerned issues reflected 
in domestic propaganda which was subject to instructions of the Min-
istery of Propaganda, Goebbel's diary proved to be the most significant 
source of providing validating information. For example, a prediction 
concerning anticipations of an opponent's actions: 
FCC analyst: 
Hence, it may be deduced that Berlin is convinced either 
that there will be no early invasion attempt along the 
Atlantic, or that any such attempt will be repelled (CEA 
#14, April 16, 1943, p. B-7). 
Goebbels: 
In the West only diversionary maneuvers will in all likeli-
hood take place, assuming that the secret reports of our 
agents are correct. Personally I consider this plausible. 
I don't believe that the English and the Americans will 
attempt to break in on us in the West as they know only 
too well that they will bleed to death there (Goebbels Diary, 
Aprilll, 1943, pp. 324-325) (71:196-197). 
And an example of an inference concerning changes in military 
ope ra tions: 
FCC analyst: 
Apparently to prepare for a (Getman) retreat from the 
Kuban bridgehead, there is detailed and comparatively 
large-volume reporting on the fighting in that sector. 
There is some reporting of (German) successes, es-
pecially in losses inflicted (on the Russians) but there 
is clear avoidance of any indications that the Germans 
intend to hold there indefinitely. Nor do the (German) 
propagandists ... any longer inflate the importance of 
the bridgehead as a 'potential springboard' ... as they 
formerly did in the apparent effort to get the Russians 
to divert as much as possible of their strength to that 
sector (CEA #36, September 16, 1943, p. C·-I). 
Order froITl Hitler to the Army H. Q. involved: 
In order to free forces for other tasks, I have decided 
to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead and to withdraw the 
17th ArITly across the Kerch Strait to the CriITlea (U. S. 
ArITlY, A. G. 0., DepartITlental Records Branch, 
T.A.G.O.,: .. p. 89) (71:240). 
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As illustrated by the cOITlparisons cited, George ITlatched each 
inference in the saITlple with the validating inforITlation now available 
and found about 80% of the FCC inferences to have been in fact accurate. 
As already noted, he found also that the accuracy increased as the 
analysts accuITlulated more and more inforITlation about the object 
systeITl. Although the situation did not perITlit the application of 
statistical techniques for assessing the predictive validity, the un-
usually high percentage of accurate predictions could not have been 
due to lucky guesses and were in fact not solely the result of gifted 
intuition. Thus a considerable predictive validity could be associated 
with the inferential methods used. 
An atteITlpt has been made in this chapter to outline the ITlacro-
structure of ITlessage analytic procedures. An overview is presented 
diagraITlatically in Figure 9. This figure also depicts the differentia-
tion of ITlessageanalysis in the narrower sense which is basically 
concerned with ITlaking specific inferences as elaborated in Chapter 
Four and ITlessage analysis in the wider sense which includes certain 
procedures that must precede such inferences. The most distinguish-
ing procedure of ITlessage analysis in the narrower sense is content 
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inference. Constraint analysis provides the informational foundation of 
content inference and is hence a prerequisite of message analysis in the 
narrower sense. Recording and filtering may lead either to content in-
ferences or to constraint analyses and may therefore serve different 
ends with profound empirical implications that would justify a nominal 
differentiation. Validation succeeds message analysis in the narrower 
sense. It evaluates the antecedent analytical procedures as a whole. 
A brief comparison of the goals, major problems and evaluative 
criteria of these five component procedures of message analysis is 
presented in tabular form in Figure 16. 
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.... Goal Major Problem Evaluative Criteria 
Recording Representations Raw data not ac- Reliability of record-
of data, adequate ceptable to explicit ing j 
for analysis processes by being formalized character 




mati on relevant with 
respect to subsequent 
processes 
Filtering Transformed Quantity_and com- Maintenance of infor-
representation' plexity of data mati On in data relevan t 
of data amen- exceed limits of to available regularitie s 
able for con- computability and! and given problem 
tent inference or contain too domain 
or discovery of much irrelevant Accuracy of executing 
constraints info r rna tion the formal operations 
.' 
Constraint Formulation of Detection and Severity of constraint 
Analysis regularities with formally account- ha ving infe rential 
inferential ing for suitable qualities, 
capabilities constraint among 
adequacy of formali-
large numbers of 
zation 
variables 
Content Selections of Trans fe ra bility of Validity 
Inference contents in un- regularities to 
observed problem present situation 
domain and their infe rential 
use 
Validation Assessment of Application of in- -
the message formation not 
analysis pro- already consumed 
cedure in terms by message analysiE 
of the quality of procedure 
its results 
. '. 




SOME FURTHER INFORMATION MEASURES 
The previous chapter discussed some empirical problems of mes-
sage analysis. These problems are far from being solved. The analyt-
ical procedures described therein can be considered as no more than a 
bare outline of what is typically required when scientific analysts attempt 
to treat available observational data as messages about unobserved com-
ponents of the system of their attention. At several points in the discus-
sion intuitive notions of information were used that had not been explicated 
in Chapter Five. In this chapter we wish to formally define some of those 
notions that were introduc"d in Chapter Six merely as a suggestion. 
In the first section of this chapter a general measure of the 
severity of a constraint is developed which is extended in the 'subsequent 
section to a measure of the amount of inferential information that a given 
relation contains. Section three is devoted to how such measures may 
be utilized for the systematic analysis of relevant constraints. The 
fourth section elaborates on the notion of content and content inference 
which leads in the sixth section to a measure of the amount of informa-
tion carried by a message, i. e., to a measure that is concerned with 
the contellt of a message as well as with the signal carrying it. The 
fifth section shows how some of the information measures are applic-
able for evaluating the adequacy of filtering procedures in mes sage 
analysis. The chapter is finally concluded with a summary of the 
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ll10re significant inforll1ation ll1easures developed so far and an exall1ple 
involving a dynall1ic systell10 
It should be ell1phasized that the theoretical and ll1ethodological 
problell1s posed in the previous outline of the ell1pirical procedures can-
not be solved on the basis of an inforll1ation calculus aloneo But it seell1S 
to be of interest, or at least challenging, to ll1ake an attell1pt to see how 
far such inforll1ation ll1easures are capable of clarifying SOll1e of the 
critical issues of this 1l10de of inquiryo 
A Measure of the Severity of a Constraint 
Whenever an object systell1 is not free to aSSull1e all of its pos-
sible states, cannot follow all the trajectories that are conceivable, 
or is restricted in exhausting its full cOll1binatorial possibilities, then 
we say a constraint is presenL We argued in Chapter Six that in order 
to discover a constraint a ll1easure of its severity is neededo Such a 
ll1easure is 1l10reover indicative of the POB sibility of forll1ulating a 
relation, a regularity, or any forll1 of representation that can be con-
sidered to account for that constrainL Based on the idea of Fisher 
(63), we also argued that the ll1easure of the seveTity of a constraint 
can under certain cOonditions be taken as a ll1easure of the all10unt of 
inforll1ation that is supplied when such a constraint becoll1es kllown or 
recognizedo 
As has been ll1entioned in the previous chapter, starting froll1 
Wiener's idea of identifying a relation R* with the set R of ll1any-
° tuples in the product set gZ ° that satisfies that relation, Ashby (16) 
331 
defined a constraint simply and most straight forwardly as the set: 
R whereby /35/ 
In conjunction with our information calculus we can most naturally define 
the severity of such a constraint as the quantity: 
log # R . /36/ 
This quantity clearly satisfies the intuitive requirement on a measure of 
the severity of a constraint to which Ashby most probably refers when 
stating" ... when gZ = R the constraint is zero; as R shrinks, so does 
the constraint become more intense" (16: 9) (original symbols replaced). 
/ 36/ gives this notion at once a definite quantitative form. With 10g#gZ 
as a measure of the maximum range of freedom and 10g#R as a meas-
ure of the restricted range, the expression in /36/ proves to be a par-
ticular interpretation of the general form of measures of the severity 
of a constraint referred to in Chapter Six. 
The left part of the expression /36/ is clearly recognizable as 
U Z according to the definition /22/ in Chapter Five. The right part 
of the expression may be defined for any subset G of Z, leaving Z 
as a special case, as: 
= log # coGR. /37/ 
Thus the more general form of the measure of the severity of a constraint 
expressed in /36/ may be defined as: 
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= = /38/ 
whereby R may be any subset of any subspace of gZ and coGR is 
consequently contained in the arbitrarily chosen set of dimensions G. 
Capital letters as subscripts will from now On be reserved for subsets 
of a state space which satisfy a relation. The superscripts continue to 
denote the dimensions of that subspace to which the measures refer. 
/38/ presents the measure of the severity of a constraint again 
as a difference of two uncertainties, the uncertainty before and after a 
constraint has been induced or the uncertainty before and after a rela-
tion R has become known. The quantity thus qualifies as a measure 
of information analagously t'; those explicated in Chapter Five. Yet 
there is a fundamental difference between the amount of signal informa-
tion defined in /24/ and the quantity defined in /38/. The former is a 
measure of the amount of information carried by a single signal, the 
latter is a measure of the .amount of information conveyed by the 
structure of the object system as far as it is manifest in the distribu-
tion of possible signals it emits or states it occupies. 
Note that while the unconstrained uncertainties of distinct sub-
spaces are additive, the quantity of information introduced by a relation 
into one subspace and the quantity introduced by the same relation into 
another subspace are additive only under very special conditions and 
reHect an important property of the relation which induces the constraint. 
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Let G and H be two arbitrary sets of dimensions, the deviation d 
from the case of additivity be: 
d = KI
GUH KIG - H KIH R R R 
= UGUH - UGUH U G - H + UG - H UH + U
H 
R R R 
= 
UG - H + U H U
GUH 
R R R 
= 
Hence, additivity exists only if coGUHR is a product of the two cojec-
tions of R onto G"H and H respectively. Since the deviation d can 
only be equal to or larger than zero: 
KI G - H 
R + /39/ 
The condition of non-additivity gives rise to an important information 
measure which will be the subject of the next section. 
A Measure of the Amount of Inferential Information 
We argued in Chapter Six that a constraint analysis has to make 
use of measures of that aspect of the severity of a constraint that is 
significant for the analytical problem at hand, in our case, for making 
content inferences in the context of a specialized message analytic 
situation. Available data may exhibit constraints that are irrelevant 
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for any sort of inferences or others that' possess constraints of the type 
needed but lead to inferences other than those desired. At any rate a 
specialized measure of the severity of that aspect of a constraint has to 
be developed which is to be utilized for specific content inferences. To 
illustrate the indicative power of the information measures so far de-
fined, let us refer to four examples of constraints depicted in Figure 17, 
each is contained in the same state space but induced by relations of a 
different form. 
In Figure 17 the state space gE l( gF " gG = gEU FuG has 
4 3 = 64 elements. The subsets Ri, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are equal in sille, 
i. e., have sixteen elements each but differ profoundly in the distribu-
tion of the elements in that state space; Hence for all Ri: 
KI~t'FU G = UEUFuG U~~;FU G = 10g2 64 - log2 16 = 2 bits 
which is an indication of only one magnitude of the four constraints. Yet, 
the measure of this magnitude is obviously invariant to the distribution 
of Ri's elements although it is this distribution which seems to account 
for the apparent differences in the properties of the relations. Rl, for 
example, shows no constraint on the dimensions denoted by E and F. 
It induces a constraint on G only. Rl can be considered a cojection 
of an element in G onto the total state space. It therefore follows 
that: 
KIEVF Rl 















= 2 bits 
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The measures thus reflect what is visually quite obvious--that Rl in-
duces a constraint only on G or that the constraint on G fully accounts 
for the total constraint on EuFuG. 
R2, on the other hand, cannot be so analyzed. The figure indi-
cates that while there is no constraint on the dimension F the constraints 
on E and G jointly account for the total constraint. The cylindrical 
base of R2 can be obtained by the intersection of the cojection of R2 
in E onto EuG and the cojection of R2 in G onto EuG. When apply-




= KIEUG R2 
= 
= + 
= 1 bit 
= 2 bits. 
This reflects the fact that F is unaffected by the constraint and the con-
straint on EuG is composed of two otherwise independent constraints 
in E and in G respectively. The additivity of our measures in caSes 
of independence indicate s the situation quite clearly. 
The cylindrical base of R3, on the other hand, cannot be obtained 









> KI~3 + K1G R3 R3 R3 
This shows that while the dimension E is not contributory to the total 
constraint, the constraint in FuG cannot be reduced further into in-
dependent components. R4, however, induces a constraint that affects 
all three dimensions without permitting any decomposition. On intituitive 
grounds R 1 maybe said to represent the least and R4 the most com-
plex relation depicted in Figure 17. This intuitive notion of complexity 
seems to correspond to the decomposability of a relation into smaller 
sub- relations. 
We argued in Chapter Six that in order for a constraint to supply 
the information required for makioclg specific content inferences it must 
impose a constraint on the interaction between at least two sets of vari-
ables or two subspaces of an object system'" state space. For example, 
although both Rl and R2 induce some constraint on the state space as 
a whole, they do not represent any dependency between E, F or G. 
Each of these subspaces can be taken independently without loss. In 
fact while measuring some kind of severity of a constraint within a de-
signated subspace in terms of our information measures KI, these 
measures do not in any way measure the quantity of information which 
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has to be supplied for making specific content inferences possible. KI 
does not take the relevant distribution of the elements of a subset of a 
state space into consideration. It does not measure the constraint on 
the interaction between subspace s. 
The additivity of information measures applied on subspaces 
that a particular constraint renders as independent can now be utilized 
for defining a measure of the constraint-induced dependency between 
distinct subspaces. Let the amount of interaction information intro-
duced by a relation R into a state space of which a typical dimension 






This measure may be interpreted as a measure of the severity of a con-
straint on the interactions between the components of an object system; 
as a measure of the amount of communication between them; or from 
the point of view of a message analyst, as the amount of inferential in-
formation that can be utilized to make inferences from one set of the 
state space's dimensions to a distinct second set. 
For purposes of message analysis in the narrower Sense not 
all of the interactions that a constraint induce s may contain relevant 
information. Therefore a more specialized form of the amount of in-
ferential information, between just two arbitrary subspaces denoted 
by· E and G, may be mare convenient. Let this measure be: 
IIE :G - E 
R = /41/ 
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where E may, for example, denote the dimensions within which given 
signals are considered and G may be conceived of as denoting the mes-
sage analyst's problem domain. 
The inequality /39/ moreover implies that: 
n:i: i€GUE 
R 
nE :G - E 
R 
The difference between these two measures incidentally, expresses a 
quantity of inferential noise that a suitable filtering procedure will have 
to eliminate, among othe r quantities, when practical me ssage analyse s 
are attempted. 
Inguiry into the Nature of a Constraint 
The idea of discovering a constraint within dimensions of interest 
and of the kind that brings the given problem closer to a solution is 
always associated with systematically applying appropriate measures of 
the severity of the kind of constraint sought. The previous section sug-
gested that the algebraic relations holding between the information 
measures Over various subspaces yield some important properties of 
the relation that accounts for the constraint. Particularly questions 
concerning whether and how such a relation may be reduced to its 
elementary forms can be answered on~ the basis of the algebraic rela-
tions between such specialized measures. Such measures may there-
fore be utilized for systematic inquiries into the nature of a constraint 
thereby uncovering significant properties of the complementary relation. 
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Ashby (16) suggested a method for discovering the reducibility 
of a many-valued relation, which is only apparently complex by analyz-
ing the constraint induced by it. The method has been presented as a 
sequence of set theoretical operations the result of each of which is 
submitted to a certain test that implicitly keeps track of the quantities 
we defined in /38/. The outcome of the test determines whether sub-
sequent operations are to be applied and their results tested or whether 
the analysis can be considered terminated. 
The method starts out with cojecting the subset satisfying a rela-
tion on each individual dimension, and tests for the identity of the product 
of the constraints on each dimension and the original constraint induced 
on the whole state space. For R2 in FigureJ 7, for example, such a 
test would be positive because the total constraint can be considered a 
product of the constraints induced by R2 on each individual dimension. 
In this case the constraint is decomposable and so the relation can be 
reduced to elementary relations holding in this case only in dimensions 
G and E. For R3 such a test would be negative as far as dimensions 
F and G are concerned. The next step therefore becomes one of 
considering all pairs of dimensions and testing whether they can fully 
account for the total constraint. R3 would turn out to be reducable to 
its projection onto FuG but R4 certainly could not be simplified into 
mOre elementary forms. The analysis continues in this manner until 
the simplest set of independent sub- constraints are found that fully 
account for the total constraint induced by the original many-valued 
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relationo Thus the analysis assesses how an apparently complex many-
valued relation can be reduced in a systematic fashion. This suggested 
reduction of the complexity is achieved without any loss in the explan-
atory power of the original relation. 
In terms of our information measures, Ashby's constraint 
analysis would suggest a reduction of the dimensionality of a relation 
by holding the value of KIEUFuG constant throughout the analytical 
Rl 
process. Demonstrated on the constraints depicted in Figure 17, the 







indicating that the constraint on G alone is responsible for the constraint 
imposed on the total spaceo On the other hand: 
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making it clear at once that the total constraint can be viewed as the pro-



















demonstrating that dimension E can be simply dropped but FuG cannot 











Thus the constraint induced by R4 can in no way be simplified. 
KIEUFUG 
R4 
However, as we suggested in the previous section of this chapter, 
a constraint analysis for purposes of making valid content inferences from 
signals has to focus primarily on the constraint that affects the interaction 
between the dimensions of available signals and the dimensions of a de-
·lineated problem domain. We indicated that the property of a relation 
that is significant for content inferences is not assessed by any measure 
KI of the severity of a constraint but by measures II of the quantity of 
inferential information that a particular relation introduces between two 
distinct subspaces. Hence, if a constraint analysis such as the one sug-
gested by Ashby is used to inquire into the nature of a constraint that is 
Z 
relevant for content inferences not some such quantity as KIR is to be 
held constant throughout the simplification process, but the quantity 
E:G-E 
IIR where E may denote the set of a signal's dimensions and G 
those of a subspace toward which inferences are intended. 
In effect Ashby's constraint analysis can be used to analyze a 
constraint with implications for content inferences if the invariance of 
the quantity of inferential information is adopted as a test criterion 
but not the invariance of the magnitude of the severity of a constraint 
as measured by KI Z 
R 
The essential tests referred to maybe as follows: 
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Test 1: Is a relation R contributory to the solution of the in-
ferential problem within the delineated dimensions E and G? A positive 
answer to this question must be given when n E :G - E takes a value 
R 
larger than ZerO. 
Test 2: Is there a set E-Q of dimensions in E and a set 
{G-E)-P in G-E for which R provides no basis for the making of 
content inferences required by the message analytic situation? A 
positive answer would have to be given if the amount of inferential in-
formation introduced by the total constraint is not affected by the re-
duced constraint, i. e., a positive answer presupposes that: 
nE :G - E 
R 
= and nE-Q:(G"E)-P 
R 
= Obits. 
Test 3: Can the inferential relation in QuP be regarded as 
composed of elementary inferential relation in a partition of QuP? 
Let QuP = AUBl.iCU ... and A, B, C, ... be non-overlapping sets. 
A positive answer to the above question has to be given under the con-
dition that: 
E:G-F 





where by the coj ection of R onto A, B, C, ... can be considered ele-
mentary inferential relations that can be taken independently. 
The examples depicted in Figure 17 are too simple to demon-
strate the simplifications that such a constraint analysis will have to 
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suggest. More elaborate examples for which this analytical method may 
. indeed start to become productive beyond what is already visually obvious 
must be omitted in this presentation. 
One of the roles that we assigned to constraint analysis as out-
lined in Chapter Five is the finding of a suitable filtering procedure 
which is capable of carrying the process of simplifying the relations 
further than was discussed here. We will take up information measures 
for evaluating filtering procedures after the next section. 
Content and Content Inference 
An appropriate definition of the amount of information carried 
by a mes sage presupposes an explication of "content" and "rule of con-
tent inference" to which this section is devoted. The notion "rule of 
content inference" is also a prerequisite for the choice of suitable 
filters in message analyses. As we have argued all along, the notion 
of "content" is the distinguishing characteristic of a message as com-
pared to a signal and is therefore essential to a definition of the amount 
of information carried by a message. 
Once the irrelevant dimensionality of a relation has been 
properly reduced, i. e. the constraint has been identified and decom-
posed into a set of simple relations, the result has to be put into a 
form amenable to the making of content inferences. Chapter Six 
briefly discussed the transformation of formulated regularities of an 
object system into rules of content inference. A rule of content in-
ference is always of the form: 
E (s) EnG = (/J 
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where (s)E is an observed signal and the set [(S)GJ is the set of con-
tents or the set of possible signals not observed, and the arrow denotes 
the direction of content inference. The set of rules of content inference 
implied by. a given relation R may not be single-valued as suggested 
above and hence may not be a mapping. 
To operationalize the set of rules of content inference for our 
purposes, let us first consider a "R-restricted cojection" which may 
. be defined as: 
G 
cOR A = /42/ 
where A may be any set in whatever dimensions of a state space and 
R takes the position of a relation imposing the restriction on the co-
jection. Applied on a single signal, the R-restricted cojection becomes 
analogously: 
= 
G Z E Z 
co (co (s) n co R). /43/ 
G The range of an R-restricted cojection onto G is the set co R 




G Z Z GZ Z G 
co (co Q nco R) = co (Q n co R) = co R 
The domain of an R-restricted cojection can be considered as partitioned 
into two sets. According to /42/ the R-restricted cojection is every-
where defined only within the set R or any projections coHR thereof, 
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1. eo, only within the set of possible signalso Within the set QH_coHR , 
the constraint, however, the R-restricted cojection is not definedo There-
fore, whenever R induces a constraint on the domain of a R-restricted 
cojection, the operation is not a mappingo But as long as R adequately 
represents all the possible states an object system can take, then every 
receivable signal is an element of the set for which the R-restricted 
cojectionis everywhere definedo Hence, under the assumption that the 
regularities of an object system are known, the R- restricted cojection 
is everywhere defined for all possible signals that an object system can 
emito 
It is evident that the nature of the R-restricted cojection is en-
tirely determined by the nature of the constraint induced by R and the 
arbitrarily chosen domain and range of that operationo Note that the 
set of signals for which an R- restricted cojection is well defined is 
identical with the domain of the set of possible rules of inference that 
is induced by Ro Furthermore, the range of the R-restricted cojec-
tion, as far as it is distinct from its domain, contains all possible 
contents that are inferrable from the signals in the domain of the R-
restricted cojectiono We therefore can say that a R-restricted cojec-
tion includes the possible rules of content inferenceo 
When applied on a given signal (s)E, a rule of content in-
ference that is implicit in the R- restricted cojection onto G-E pro-
duceos elements in the respective subspace which we must identify. as 
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contents 0 Following from the definition /42/: 
G-E 
co R gG-E. 
To the extent coG - E (s)E is contained in and not identical with coG-ER 
R 
we could argue that some selection has been made among those content 
elements that remain in gG-E after the object system's constraint has 
become known. Thus, whenever these two sets are not identical, there 
is always a set [(S)C] of elements in coCR, CcG-E, for which it is 
true that: 











If this condition is satisfied, the set [(s)C] can then be identified with 
the set of contents that are being inferred from a given signal (s)E on 
the basis of some rule of content inference. If the set [(s)C] is 
identical with the set coCR then it is reasonable to argue that no infer-
ential effort h<,s been made. In this case we have to consider that only 
a signal has been received and not a message, at least <'s far as the 
chosen problem domain is concerned. 
Thus we can characterize the process of content inference 
more fully as any process going from received signals to a set of 
possible contents that is smaller than the set of possible contents 
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implied by the relation R apriori to receiving the signal. This process 
maybe depicted as follows: 
c c co R, Ene =: 0 
That is, the set of contents inferred must be a proper subset and not 
identical with a cojection of the relation R onto the dimension of that 
content. Note that this process of content inference is implicit and a 
special case of R-restricted cojections. 
R-restricted cojections can be considered a formalization of 
the set of rules of content inference determined by R. Some such rules 
may associate a single content with each given signal, some others may 
exhibit no restriction in which case it operates in effect as an unre-
stricted cojection. For a quantitative measure of the amount of infor-
mation conveyed by the content of a message it is therefore of interest 
to determine how many content elements are inferred from each of the 
possible signals. Or, more specifically, whether and the degree to 
which the rules of content inference are single-valued as a whole. 
This degree of single-valuedness is important because it can be 
thought of as the extent to which certainty can be gained within an un-
observed problem domain or the extent to which a message is ambig-
uous with respect to a certain delineated set of contents; or the extent 
to which the content of a message is specific. 
If a R-restricted cojection co~-E is single-valued with respect 
to the pos sible signals E (s) , then the number of elements in the 
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domain and range of this operation are related as follows: 
= 
If this condition is satisfied then the quantities can be written: 
#coG-ER = 
which implies that: 
EUG log#co R = # G-E log co R. 
According to the definition /37/ the above expression is equivalent to: 
+ uG - E R = 
and can be rewritten according to the definition /41/ as: 
E:G-E 
IIR = U~-E /45/ 
Thus, whenever a R-restricted cojection is single-valued for the possible 
signals in its domain, the amount of inferential information equals the 
amount of uncertainty in its range. The equation/45/ implies that R 
provides a satisfactory inferential basis for making unambiguous content 
inferences from given signals that totally reduces the uncertainty in the 
chosen problem domain. 
The uncertainty in the range of the R-restricted cojection or in 
the problem domain towards which content inferences are intended is 
evidently the limiting value of the amount of inferential information. 1£ 
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some of the possible signals in the R-restricted Gojection's domain are 
multi-valued, i. e. if contents are ambiguous, then: 
# coEUG R > 
in this case the amount of inferential information becomes smaller than 
the amount of uncertainty in the range of the operation. Hence, generally: 
o U E :G - E 
R 
uG - E 
R 
/46/ 
This shows II~:G-E to be a measure of the extent to which some signal 
iJ;l E can be expected to convey content referring to some unobserved 
part of an object system in G Or the extent to which signals can be ex-
pected to become messages about the states of an object system within 
a problem domain. If the relation between the possible signals and the 
possible contents is a one-to-one mapping then evidently; 
= 
nE :G - E 
R 
= 
Referring again to Figure 17 for examples 
= = 
G 
U R3 = 2 bits 
which exhibits R3 to be a one-to-one relation between the sets of 
possible signals and contents within the two dimensions F and G. 
This is quite obvi~us from Figure 17. That the quantities of infer-












= 2 bits 









= 2 bits 
The above equations indicate that none of the possible signals (s)E, 
(s)F, or (s)G can be assigned a unique content under R4 when taken 
individually. On the other hand, the R4- restricted cojection is single-
valued if applied to signals (s)EvF, or (S)FUG to which it 
assigns a unique content in dimensions not specified by those of the 
signals. For example: 
> U EUF:G R4 = 
Such a condition suggests moreover, that if the complexity of a relation 
is increased, more information may be needed at the signal end to allow 
for adequate content inferences. Such is the situation of the jury in 
court where the relations to be considered are so complex that a tre-
mendous amount of information has to be processed to make an inference 
that yields just one bit of information: "guilty" or "not guilty." We 
will corne to a measure for the amount of such inferences after the 
next section. 
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Quantities of Information Relevant for Filtering 
The notion of filtering was introduced in Chapter 'Six where it was 
characterized as a procedure for eliminating or at least reducing the 
quantity of noise in the available data, i. e., the amount of information 
which is irrelevant to a given problem of message analysis. While con-
straint analysis presents a method for systematically dis Ce rning the 
nature of a constraint, particularly for identifying the decomposability 
of a constraint that is accounted for by a relation which is required for 
making content inferences, a filtering procedure may be regarded as a 
particular realization of the results obtained by constraint analysis. A 
filtering procedure has been described as a mapping of one representa-
tional system into a simpler second one such that relevant regularities 
of an object system are maintained. In other words, a filter in message 
analysis is a homomorphic transformation under which relevant infer-
ential information is invariant. 
Let the operation of filtering be defined as the homomorphic 
mapping: f: 
G' G G such that f co R = G' co /.l R' I 
/48/ 
whereby R' = P R. One of the conditions that a suitable filter must 
satisfy has been mentioned above in conjunction with analyzing a con-
straint: the invariance of the quantity of inferential information. That 
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is, given the signal dimensions E and the problem domain denoted by 
D: 
= 
E"D'-E' II ' 
R' 
In accordance with results obtained from inquiries into a given con-
straint, one of the operations that is to be incorporated into filtering 
is a projection, This function can be chosen in such a way that those 
dimensions of a state space'are eliminated that do not contribute to 
the relevant amount of inferential information, Depending on whether 
and how the relation can be decomposed into less complex sub-relations, 
the filtering operation may be :regarded as a set of independent opera-
tions having distinct ranges and domains, The constraint analysis 
previously discussed provides a rationale for the design of a filter 
that can be :regarded as a composite of these two types of reductions 
of the apparent complexity, It does not indicate however, a further 
reduction that is due to simplifications within the subspaces of the 
total space, That is, a partition of the state space which discards 
the distinctions th'\t are irrelevant with respect to the infe:rential 
problem at hand, Such a simplification can be visualized in Figure 18. 
In this Figure two constraints are presented, One, R3, has 
already been presented in Figure 17, As we demonstrated earlier 
R3 can be simplified by simply dropping the dimension E of the 
original state space since it does not a£fect the quantity of inferential 
information provided by R3. The transformed version of gEUFUG 
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E 
Two Constraints and their Simplifications 
Figure 18 
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shows R3' to be a one-to-one relation between the dimensions F' and 
G', 
The constraint induced by R5, - 'on the other hand, cannot be re.· 
duced by eliminating any dimensions in which it is contained, This can 
be easily seen by the distribution of the amounts of inferential informa-



















The measures moreover indicate that the relation R5 cannot be decom-
posed into sets of simple sub-relations. But a considerable reduction of 
the complexity can be evidently achieved by partitioning the subspaces 
as shown because the distribution of elements constituting the relation 
R5 appears to contain a certain symmetry, L e" can be regarded as an 
a·rrangement ~f identical subsets of R5. 
While we have not developed a measure of symmetry, the 
examples make it evident that the invariance of the amount of inferential 
information cannot be the only criterion for evaluating the adequacy of 
a filter. The t 't UEUD quan 1 y R must be reduced to a minimum as well. 
Therefore a second criterion for assessing the adequacy of a filter in 
a given situation has to be found and can be derived from the inequality 
/46/. The inequality states that: 
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equality holding whenever co~-E contains only single-valued rules of 
inference. If both co~-E and co~ contain only single-valued rules 
of inference then according to /47/: 
nE :D - E 
R = = = 
which is indicative of a condition that presents in a sense, the ideal of 
rules of content inference, rules that are most easy to handle, rules 
that assign to each signal a unique and distinct content and not sets 
thereof. A coefficient for the degree to which su<;:h an ideal is approached 
may be in place here and can be defined as: 
o 
nE:D-E 
R 1 . /49/ 
According to /47/ the coefficient assumes the value of unity whenever the 
set of signals are in a one-to-one relation to the set of contents that can 
be legitimately inferred from them, 
Hence a suitable goal for selecting the homomorphic mapping p. 









E"D'-E' II . 
R' 
/50/ 
---.... ~ 1. 
357 
The arrow denotes the direction of a process converging towards unity. 
It is clear that this goal implies that of minimizing noise in the sense 
that irrelevant varieties of any kind are absorbed in the filtering process 
and do not enter the process of content inference. 
In terms of the examples in Figure 18: 
UEUFUG 
R3 = logz#R3 
= logZ16 = 4 bits 
F'UG' 
U R3' = logZ#R3' = logZ4 = Z bits 
n EUF :G U FUG E UEUFUG 2 bits = + U R3 = R3 R3 R3 







n EUF:G F'·G' n . 
R3 




U R3 ' 
in which case G' co R3 , is known to contain only one-to-one rules of in-
ference .for thepos sible signals. 
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UEUFUG 
= 6 bits R5 
E'UF'UG' 
U R5 ' = 
Z bits 
nEUF:G 
= logzlZ + logZ4 - logZ3Z = .58 bits R5 
E'UF"G' 









II RS ' 
= .097 .79 = 
UEUFUG E'UF'UG' 
R5 URS' 
While p can achieve a considerable reduction of R5's apparent com-
plexity in the original state space, the measures indicate that it is not 
possible to bring the rules of content inference into a one-to-one rela-
tion. 
It should be noted that we have been explicit only concerning 
filters that operate on a state space which is conceptuali:?'ed as a pro-
duct set. If domain and/ or range of the filtering procedures involve 
representational systems that are formally different. from the above, 
for example, when statistical properties of an object system are 
represented in the range of a filter, then a constraint analysis will 
have to focus on different properties of a relation that can be dis-
cerned as accounting for the constraint observed, But in all message 
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analytic situations in which filters are selected, the two goals defined 
above seem to be prevalent: firstly, the relevant inferential information 
is to remain invariant throughout the filtering process or at least should 
not diminish below an accepta ble level. Secondly, the complexity of a 
relation, for example, the number of terms needed to specify that rela-
tion, is to be reduced to a point at which it is rendered more manageable 
or easier to handle in subsequent content inferences. 
However, since the filtering procedure pis conceptualized 
here as a homomorphic mapping which maintains all relevant relations 
for the intended content inferences, and since neither R-restricted co-
jections nor the set of rules of content inference need to be mappings, 
i. e., since: 
-1 G' ? cOR' P = 
it does not seem necessary to account for the quantities of irrelevant 
information that a filter reduces when we explicate the amount of mes-
sage information in the following section. 
The Amount of Information Carried by a Message 
This section tries to develop a measure for the amount of infor-
mation conveyed by a signal that can be regarded as a message about 
some unobserved"part of an object system. A proper measure for the 
amount of message information should include the quantity of informa-
", 
tion conveyed by the content that can be legitimately inferred from a 
signal a'S well as the quantity of information conveyed by the signal, 
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some constraints on the signal's dimensions being known. Such a meas-
urewould regard the quantity conveyed by the content alone as a special 
case of the amount of message information. We will develop such a 
Ineasure and show some of its quantitative relations t<;> other inforInation 
Ineasures of our calculus at the end of this section. 
The notion of content inferred froIn a signal (s)E was defined 
asa non-empty set {(S)C] of elements in a problem domain denoted 
by D which does not overlap with the signal's subspace. We can argue 
that the set of contents induces a certain constraint on the subspace 
which is not observed. If the argument is sufficient, then this constraint 
can be easily measured by one of our information measures. For instance: 
log # coC Q 
#coC[(S)CJ 
But the condition under which we can view the subset of the space as the 
content of a message requires the set of contents to be a proper subset 
of and not identical with the set of elements excluded by the constraint 




co R . 
If the two sets are identical then we argued that in effect no choices 
have been made among the possible contents contained in coD-ER in 
which case the amount of content inferred should be zero. But, 
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KI{ (S)c:} is not zero when [(S)ej = coeR which proves the above 
measure to be insufficient as an acceptable explication of the quantity 
of information conveyed by the content inferred. Since: 
we can equate; 
= 
and extend the above measure of the constraint induced by the set of 
contents as follows: 
= 
D-E D-E log # co g # coR g 
# coD-Eg R # co~~E t (s)e] 
# coD-Eg # 
D-Eg 
log + log 
cOR 
# coD-Eg # co~~E[(S)CJ R 
= 
The left part of the sum is nothing but a measure of the constraint in-
duced by R as defined in /38/. The right part of the sum comes 
closer to our intuition concerning the amount of content: the right 
part is a measure of the amount of uncertainty reduced beyond what 
was already known by R. If this part of the expression is zero, con-
dition /44/ is not satisfied which means that no content is inferred. 
If this part of the expression is not zero then some inferred content 
can be said to have caused a reduction of the uncertainty that persisted 
after the constraint existing in the object system became known. 
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Since we want to trace back the origin of this additional constraint 
to the set of signals froln which the set of contents are inferred, we can 
write the following expressions as: 
= KID -E R + 
The right part of the SUlnnow expresses what we wish to define: the 
amount of information that a signal carries with respect to an unobserved 
part of an object system. It is the amount of information carried by the 
content of a message alone. The logarithm of the numerator of the 
D-E proportion is already known to be U R The logarithm of the denom-
ina to!' of this proportion may be given the general form: 
G . 
UR(···,(s)i'···) = log #Q co~ (s)i /51/ 
This quantity can be interpreted as the uncertainty remaining in G 
after signals have been received and content inferences made from 
them. Obviously the definition of UG ( ... , (s)""') in /23/ is a special 
1 . 
case of / 51 / in which case R = gG and the cojection employed in /23/ 
is unrestricted. 
A measure of the amount of information carried by·a signal in-
eluding .the contents that are inferred from it can be defined as: 
G 
MIR ( ... , (s)i"") = G UR(···,(s)i'···) /52/ 
Where G is again an arbitrary subspace and R the relation inducing 
the constraint on the total state space. This measure is to be interpreted 
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in analogy to the amount of signal information as a difference between the 
apriori uncertainty within G, the constraint due to R being known, and 
the 'uncertaintya posteriori to the reception of a message. We will call 
this measure function "amount of message information. " 
The amount of information carried by the content of a message 
alone can now be interpreted according to the expression above: 
= /53/ 
the severity of a constraint induced by the set of contents inferred from 
a given signal minus the severity of the constraint induced by the rela-
tion R. 
The quantity of message information lends itself to various equa-
tions that are of interest to message analysis. For instance, the total 
amount of message information conveyed by signal and content jointly, 









Thus the total amount of message information in the dimensions of the 
signal and the problem domain can be considered as the sum of the 
quantities of information carried by the signal and the content individually 
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minus the amount of inferential information supplied when regarding a 
given signal as a message, i, e" when making specific content inferences, 
The amount of information carried by a signal, R being known, 





The above can be interpreted as the difference between the amount of 
signal information, R not being known or ignored, and the amount of 
information contained in the constraint induced by R on the signal's 
diInens ions. 
Inserting /55/ into /54/ yields the following: 
rrE :D - E 
R 
/56/ 
This shows that the amount of message information in the dimensions of 
the signal and the problem domain, R being given, is composed of the 
quantities: the amount of signal information minus the quantity of con-
straint induced by R within the signal's dimensions, plus the amount of 
information carried by the content alone, R being given, minus the 
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amount of inferential information supplied by R. 
Numerous other theorems can be derived from the axioms and 
the definitions all of which seem highly meaningful on intuitive grounds 
but we will focus only on some inequality involving the quantity of mes-
sage information of the content inferred. According to /46/: 
o nE :D - E R 
The amount of message information referring to the content of a mes-
sage has identical limits. According to the definition of this quantity, 
/52/ : 
o 
But the two quantities are identical only at their extreme values which 
. b' f h b d . h h D-E is qUlte 0 V10US rom tea ove an occurs elt er w en COR is 
single-valued or when it is not R-restricted, respectively. The funda-
mental difference between the two quantities is that the amount of in-
ferential information is an over all measure of the extent to which a 
R-restricted cojection from E onto D-E is single-valued, given 
the set of all possible signals; while the amount of information refer-
ring to the message content is a measure concerned with the effect of 
only one out of a set of possible signals. Whenever the measures de-
viate from the two points of equality, they vary relatively independ-
ently of each other. All that can be said is that the amount of infer-
ential information can neither exceed the maximum nor be smaller 
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than the minimum of the amount of message information carried by a 
member of the set of possible signals. Hence, putting these arguments 
together, we can state: 
IIE :D - E -' R ... /57/ 
According to this inequality we cannot say that the amount of con-
tent inferred is absolutely. limited by the amount of inferential informa-
tion supplied. This limitation is only.a relative one. The amount of in-
ferential information also can not be interpreted as an average of the 
amount of message information concerning the inferrable content. This 
average, when computed, may take values slightly different from the 
amount of inferential information. But we can say with full confidence 
that on the whole the amount of message information that can be inferred 
--
from a signal is limited by the amount of inferential information available. 
1£ the difference between the nature of overall measures and 
measures of individual cases is taken into consideration many more 
meaningful limitations and inequalities can be derived. For example: 
the amount of signal information is on the whole larger than the amount 
of information that can be inferred from it. This shows the process of 
interpreting messages on the whole as one of only losing information. 
Information About a Dynamic System: An Example 
The previous discussion limited the representational system of 
a message analyst to a product set having many dimensions along which 
the states of an object system's components are represented. From the 
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point of view of the analyst such a representational system implicitly re-
stricts the message analytic situation to a kind of diagnostic situation. 
This is a situation in which the knowledge of co-occurrences of events 
provide3the basis for making .inferences from observations to non-observed 
phenomena of which the observations are said to be symptoms. 
We claimed generality for our argument, tried to support this 
claim by referring to numerous entirely different examples in such and 
similar modes of inquiry as content analysis, but restricted the explica-
tion of our calculus to just this simple kind of representational system. 
Giving just one more example does not of course fully support our claim, 
but shows at least that our efforts are not confined to the situation we 
assumed at the beginning of Chapter Four. Moreover it seems that the 
extension to other message analytic situations which are in a sense more 
complex, shows additional features that are even more interesting than 
the one to which we restricted our previous concern. 
For example, we mentioned in the requirements for a measure 
of signal information that if a representational system is not powerful 
enough tb represent the object system in< question, i. e. ,. if the quantities 
of signal information turn out to be infinite, then the representational 
system has to be altered. We were mainly concerned with signals that 
provide the basis for content inferences, but in addition signals may 
convey. information about the structure of the object system itself. 
Thus we have to consider that a single signal may simultaneously con-
vey information on three levels: . (a) information concerning the 
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adequacy of a representational system. This information has not been 
and may not need to be quantified in this study. (b) Information concern-
. ing the structure Or regularities of the object system on the basis of 
which content inferences may subsequently be made; and finally, (c) in-
formation concerning unobserved states of the object system, i. e., 
information that is the characteristic of mes sages. 
Let us therefore consider a dynamic object system, i. e., a sys-
tern in which attention must be given to changes over time. Given that 
the observer of such a system has access only to a short and even in-
complete sequence of signals which may not even pertain to all states 
of the object system, one of the questions that may be put to the mes-
sage analyst concerns how much inferential information is contained in 
the observed history of the object system to anticipate its future states. 
The an"wer would at once indicate how futile predictive efforts are 
bound to be. Another question may have to do with how much addi-
tional information is needed or how long a sequence will have to be 
observed to predict with reasonable certainty the next state of the 
object system. One may also ask whether the most recent signal re-
ceived contributed to the making of inferences concerning unobserved 
states, i. e., whether that signal can be regarded as a message about 
states of an object system not accessible at the time. 
To force the discussion to become more concrete let the follow-
ing protocol be given which records signals that have been received by 
. an observer at successive steps in time. Dots represent "nothing ob-
served" in the dimensions in question. 
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Time t G 
1 ~ I 0 . I 1 
I 
2 I 0 
3 1 0 0 1 
4 1 
5 0 
6 0 1 0 
7 
8 1 1 
9 0 1 
10 0 0 I • 
11 0 1 0 
12 0 1 1 1 
Suppose we were to fail to view the object system as a dynamic 
one, i. e., we were to make use of a representational system that does 
not consider changes Over time, we would start as follows. Let the 
state space of our interest be gG= {<OO>, <OL>, <10>, <11> J . 
With n = 2 components each of which can take k = 2 states, the max-
imum uncertainty would be: 
= = = 2 bits 
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and the accumulative amount of signal information would be: 
Time 1 SP«S)l) = 1 bit 
2 G SI ((s)1,(s)2) = 1 bit 
3 G 2 bits SI ((s)1, ... ,(s)3) = 
4 G 00 SI ((s)1, ... ,(s)4) = 
Without even attempting any. inferences we would at least at time 4 dis-
cover that the representational system gG is not powerful enough to 
adequately represent the object system of which we have obtained the 
protocol. 
However, a dynamic system can be said to follow some trajectory 
within a representational system of its possible states. Let us there-
fore take another representational system into consideration which rep-
resents not states, but all possible sequences of states s·uch an object 
system may follow - provided that it behaves in a determinate manner. 
Let us begin with a behavior space BQ · that contains all possible 
trajectories generated by mappings of the type gG,..!..-. gG, t+l, where 
Q denotes a finite sequence of steps 1, 2, ... , t, in time. If 
such a behavior space again leads to contradictory signals then another, 
more powerful representational system will have to be employed. As 
has been stated before, to determine the adequacy of a representational 
system is the first use that we can make of a signal. 
Given the behavior space, each set of signals (s)t can now be 
cojected onto Q whereby a constraint is induc;ed that hopefully becomes 
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successively more severe uptothe point where just one trajectory re-
mains in the space. The maximum uncertainty that has to be eliminated, 
the maximu:m a:mount of infor:mation a set of signals :may be able to con-
vey, now beco:mes the logarithm of the nu:mber of possible trajectories. 
Again for n = k= Z 
= " logZ196 = 7.61 bits. 
(kn - v - w)! 
Now the a:mount of infor:mation a given set of signals conveys about the 
structure of an object system, i. e., the quantity it introduces into the 
Q t behavior space can be measured by 81 ( ... , (s) ). This is a second use 
to which a signal maybe put. We will give the :measures of a:mount of 
signal infor:mation referring to the structure of the object syste:m shortly. 
At the initial state of the analysis, where nothing is known about 
the object syste:m, when all possible trajectories are equally likely, any 
attempt to :make content inferences would be futile. It is only after 
some signals have beco:me known that so:me behavioral property of the 
object syste:m :may appear which :manifests itself as a constraint on the 
conceivable behaviors the syste:m :may follow. The behavior space into 
which the signals are cojectedwas defined as the set of trajectories 
that are generated by all possible :mappings gG, t , gG, t+l. Let 
Gl Gt G,t+l" us now define the set R as a subset of g , )( ... G ' KG : _ ... 
which at each state t accounts for the possible trajectories in the be-
havior space. Thus, R can be considered a representation of those 
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trajectories that are left in BQ after the set of received signals ha,ve 
been cojected into it. 
The constra,int which R induces on the possible mappings now 
provides us with the basis for content infeTencesfrom the signals, it 
provides us with the necessary inferential information. Inferences 
from available signals to unobservable states is the third use to which 
such signals may be put. The quantities conveyed by the signals as 
messages about some other states can now be measured by MI~' t((s)). 
We will present SOme such measures in a table to follow, 
With the first signal (s)l = <0,.> it becomes known that the 
system's initial state is either <0,0> or <0,1> G of G . Thus, not 
all four but only two of the possible initial states have to be considered 
whereby the number of possible trajectories reduces from 196 to 
exactly half that number. Therefore, (s)l conveys SIQ((s)l) = 1 bit 
of information. The cojection of (s)l and (s)2 causes a further 
shri!lkage of the set of poss'ible trajectories to 64. And so the process 
continues, hopefully, until the last uncertainty, is removed and the 
structure of the object system is perfectly known to the analyst. The 
successive elimination of trajectories is depicted in Figure 19 and 
the amount of accumulated information due to this process tabulated 
in Figure 20. It can be seen that at time t=9 perfect certainty is 
gained where every additional signal is merely redundant. 
The amount of message information that signals upto time t 
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Successive Changes of the Content Inferred from 
Accumulating Signals 
Figure 19 
t (s)t Q t S1 ( .. , (s) ) Sp, t((s)t) MI~' t+1 ((s)t) MI~: t+l ((s) t~ 1 (s) t) MI~' 1 ((d) 
I <0, .> 1. 00 1. 0 0 1. 
2 <0, .> 1. 61 1. 0 0 0 
3 <. , 0> 3.53 1. 0 0 0 
4 <1, .> 4.81 1. 0 0 0 
5 <. , 0> 5.29 1. .42 .42 .42 
6 <. ,1> 6.61 l. l. 2. =UG , t+l l. 
7 <. ~ . '> 6. 61 0 0 2. l. 
8 <l,l> 6.61 2. =UG , t 1. l. 1. 
9 <0. ,) 7.61=U Q 1. 1. 2. 2.=UG ,t 
10 <0. ,) 7.61 1. 1. 2. 2. 
II < 1, . > 7.61 l. 1. 2. 2. 
12 < . , 1) 7.61 l. 1. 2. 2. 





to the amount of information that can be supplied at each interpretive 
stage. The table shows that it is hardly possible to say anything .about 
the next state of the system until a relatively large amount of information 
about its structure has been accumulated. 
The table moreover shows that the amount of signal information 
within a state space affects the predictability of the next state. If only 
signals at time t are considered as messages about the subsequent 
state, no perfect certainty can be reached at time ttl as far as our 
protocol shows. If however, signals of two preceding time periods are 
taken jointly, the lack of information due to incomplete observability 
. during a single time period may be compensated by the additional quantity 
that a longer observational history provides. As the table indicates, the 
message information conveyed by two successive signals is always at 
its maximum from time t = 9 onwards 0 
One of the columns shows in addition the quantity of message 
information that a signal at time t conveys with respect to the initial 
state of the object system. As Figure 19 already demonstrates, this 
content cannot be perfectly inferred before time t = 9. 
A few conc.luding observatioDSshould be mentioned at this point. 
We specified numerous paper and pencil machines, made themincom-
pletely accessible in various ways, and investigated the different 
quantities of information signals convey. This was frequently quite 
painstaking since the variety within a representational space increases 
exponentially as a few variables are added. But this makes the need for 
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some powerful information calculus even more urgent. 
Intuitively acceptable and clearly supported by our experiments 
was the hypothesis that a higher degree of incompletenes s indeed requires 
a longer time period of observation before reasonable quantities of mes-
sage information do appear. This is already seen in the previous example. 
If some variables are not accessible at all, it is possible to 
specify the maximum quantity of information needed to make the desired 
inferences, and this quantity may indeed correspond to the maximum 
amount of communication that may take place from the unobserved com-
ponents to the dimensions of the obtained signal. But very little can be 
said about the direction of such communication. 
1£ a system is observed incompletely before it reaches its 
equilibrium, uncertainty as to the initial states of that system may 
remain no matter how long the system has been observed and how 
accurate predictions as to its future states may become over time. 
Cases where the observed part of an object system is relatively 
small and the communication between that part and the rest of the 
system is very rich, require consideration of very long histories of 
such systems, very powerful representational systems and constraints 
and considerable information processing capacities. This is the situa-
tion in which the majority of practical message analyses take place, 
a situation in which information from the past history of an object 
system must be utilized more effectively and economically in order 
to corne to content inferences with reasonable certainty. To reduce 
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such complexity is a considerable challenge. To measure the quantities 
involved is just a first step towards meeting that challenge. 
Summary of Terms 
At this point a brief summary is in order. In Chapter Six we 
developed a conceptualization of the empirical procedures of mes sage 
analysis. In that chapter an outline of four such processes were depicted 
in Figure 9. Chapter Seven was primarily devoted to some informa-
tional aspects of mes sage analysis and developed explicit definitions of 
the procedures in question. The procedures are adequately defined 
for use only in representational systems that are many-product sets. 
But the basic nature of these procedures, it was claimed,. is general. 
Figure 21 of this chapter provides an over-view of the terms used as 
far as they refer to processes, products and operands. Following the 
diagram in that figure is a brief summary of the definitions of various 
quantities of information that pertain to our calculus. Only the more 
significant definitions are included. Equations that hold between 
these terms are not repeated here. 
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The uncertainty within a state space QG denoted by the set G 
of its products or dimensions, a constraint induced by the relation R 
being given or known: 
= log # coG Q R 
With UG defined in /22/ as a special case in which no constraint is 
present and the subscripts are accordingly omitted. 
/37/ 
The uncertainty in QG after a set of signals have been introduced 
or become known, the relation R being given and considered: 
u~ ( ... , (s)i' ... ) = /51/ 
With UG ( ... , (s)i' ... ) defined in /23/ as a special case in which no re-
lation R is considered. 
The uncertainty in QG as in U~ ( ... , (s)i' ... ) but of signals 
or inferences that are verified according to a validating signal (v) Z: 
G Z 
Y R("" (s)i"" // (v) ) /58/ 
With yG( ... , (s)i" .. // (v)Z) as a special case analogous to the above. 
Secondary Definitions 
The severity of a constraint within QG or the amount of infor-
mation introduced by a relation R into a state space: 
G 
KIR = /38/ 
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The amount of inferential information contained in the relation R 
between two destinct sub-spaces of gZ denoted by the sets E and G 




The amount of message information, i. e., the amount of informa-
tion a set of signals and/ or the contents inferred from it conveyes: 
G M1 ( ... ,(s) .... ) R 1 u~ ( ... , (s)i' ... ) /52/ 
The amount of signal information can be regarded as a special 
case of the amount of message information in which the relation R is 
either not known Or ignored: 
G SI ( ... ,(s)i"") = /24/ 
The amount of redundancy conveyed by a set of messages or the 
degree to which a set of signals and/or their content are superfluous 
with respect to what they convey: 
G 
R1R ( ... ,(s)i'···) = ~ G MI R {.·· ,(s)i"") /59/ 
1 
The amount of redundancy contained in a set of signals ignoring 
the e'ldstence of a relation R is a special case of the above: 
G 
- SI ( ... , (s) i' ... ) /25/ 
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The amount of valid message information: 
Of which the amount of valid signal information is again a special case: 
G Z G G Z VSI ( ... '(s)i •... //(v) ) = U- V ( ... ,(s)i''''//(v)), /31/ 
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